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ABSTRACT		
The thesis develops a comprehensive framework to analyse charity fraud, an 
important but under-investigated problem. The organisational factors that are 
associated with the likelihood of financial misconduct/fraud occurring within 
charities in England and Wales are examined. A mixed research method is 
utilised with both qualitative research methods (particularly the use of 
interviews) and quantitative research methods (involving the testing of 
hypotheses). The thesis sheds light on perceptions of the reasons why fraud 
occurs in the charity sector and suggests solutions to the fraud problem.  
Interviews were conducted with charity officials, donors, beneficiaries, 
auditors and regulator/watchdog organisations. The findings of the interviews 
suggest that the charity sector is an easy target for fraud. Compared to the for-
profit and public sectors, excessive trust in charities plays a key role in the 
occurrence of fraud, as it hinders appropriate controls and creates 
opportunities for fraud. Among Cressey’s fraud triangle components, 
‘opportunity’ has been discovered to be the leading component for fraud to 
take place in charities. Solutions which work in the for-profit sector were 
criticised as too costly and not fit for charities. Oversight by stakeholders is 
seen to be vital for tackling fraud but is found to be inadequate. 
The quantitative section of the thesis analyses 42 fraud and 42 no-fraud 
charities using logistic regression to assess the differences between fraud and 
no-fraud charities. The thesis finds that fraud charities are more likely than 
no-fraud charities to have a small number of trustees, which supports the 
finding of the qualitative section of this thesis that charities have a ‘small cosy 
environment’. Also, absence or low grant funding deprives charities of long-
term donor monitoring, which is also important in fraud occurrence. The high 
accuracy of prediction of the model enables the model and therefore the 
variables to be developed for further use. 
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PART	I	
1. INTRODUCTION		
The aim of the first chapter is to provide a brief outlook of the charity sector 
in the United Kingdom with a focus on England and Wales. The charity 
sector’s importance for the UK economy and society, its progress, and some 
definitions on charities are provided. The role of the Charity Commission for 
England and Wales and the development of charity accounting and reporting 
through time is discussed. The chapter then focuses on misconduct and fraud 
in charities, the topic of the thesis. How crucial the problem is for the sector 
and society, and therefore the source of the motivation for this research, is 
stressed. Research objectives, questions and the methods used are also briefly 
stated. The chapter concludes with presenting the findings, contributions of 
the study and a summary of the structure of the thesis.   
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Figure	1.1	Structure	of	Chapter	1	
1.1 		The	charity	sector	in	the	UK	
1.1.1 Size	of	sector	
The not-for-profit sector and in particular the charities part of it, which 
contains the majority of not-for-profits in the UK, has an immense importance 
both financially and in terms of its impact on society (Parliament, 2017). As 
of September 2018 (the most recently available data), there were 183,941 
charities registered with the Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
with an income of £77.07 billion (Commission, 2018c). 
According to the Charities Aid Foundation’s (CAF) World Giving Index 2018 
(Foundation, 2018), which is a generosity league table that aggregates cash 
giving, volunteering and helping strangers, the UK is 6th in the world and if 
donations alone are considered the UK is 4th. While the charities possess 
significant economic influence, their impact on society deserves closer 
attention.  
1.1.2 History	and	development	of	the	charity	sector	
Although the UK's oldest charity is indicated as the King's School, 
Canterbury, which was founded in 597, the first legal document that is 
accepted as clarifying the purposes of a charity is the Statute of Charitable 
Uses (1601), enacted during the reign of Elizabeth I (Committee, 2013). The 
preamble of the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) is still accepted 
as an essential reference in assessing whether or not a purpose is charitable. 
As is usual in Anglo-Saxon lawmaking, the courts played a significant role in 
shaping charity law. The famous case of Income Tax Special Purposes 
Commissioners v Pemsel (1891, A.C. 531) in which charitable purposes were 
classified as "the relief of poverty; the advancement of education; the 
advancement of religion; and other purposes to the community which the law 
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recognises as charitable" is still used as the inspiration for charity legislation 
and law.  
The industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, for which Britain was 
the standard bearer, brought enormous social change and as a result 
proliferation of charities.  With the Charitable Trusts Act (1853), the Board 
of Charity Commissioners for England and Wales (today's Charity 
Commission) was formed. The introduction of the Charities Act (1960) 
brought the registration of charities, and the Charity Commission was 
equipped with authority to investigate charities. The Charities Act (1992) 
made registration mandatory for charities with over £1,000 income, and the 
Charities Act (1993) merged the acts of 1960 and 1992. In 2006, the Office 
of the Third Sector in the Cabinet Office was established to coordinate 
policies for the sector. The (2006) and the following (2011) Charities Acts 
transformed the legislation into the form it takes today (Committee, 2013). 
While the charities in England and Wales are obliged to implement the 
Charities Act 2011, they also have to comply with the Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP) which designates financial reporting matters, 
where this is required (SORP, 2015).  
Following the growing concern over the transparency and accountability of 
charities (Hyndman and McConville, 2016), the Charities (Protection and 
Social Investment) Act (2016a) provided investigation powers to the Charity 
Commission.  The Act made improvements, one of them being the ability to 
publicly issue official warnings to a trustee or charity where the Charity 
Commission thinks a "breach of trust or duty or other misconduct or 
mismanagement" has taken place (2016a, Provision 1). Other new rules 
include enhanced authority to the Commission by procuring power to: remove 
trustees following an inquiry (2016a, Provision 4), remove a disqualified 
trustee (2016a, Provision 5) and require more clarity about fundraising 
(2016a, Provision 14).  
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1.1.3 Definition	and	types	of	charities	
According to section 1 of the Charities Act (2011) ‘charity’ means an 
“institution which (a) is established for charitable purposes only, and (b) falls 
to be subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
concerning charities.”. The term ‘charitable purpose' is defined by section 2 
(1) as: “a purpose which (a) falls within section 3 (1), and (b) is for the public 
benefit1.” There are four types of charity (Commission, 2014a), differentiated 
in specifications such as who will run the charity and whether it will have a 
wider membership:  
• charitable incorporated organisation (CIO) 
• charitable company (limited by guarantee) 
• unincorporated association 
• trust 
1.1.4 The	Charity	Commission	for	England	and	Wales	
The Charity Commission for England and Wales2 (The Commission) which 
is a non-ministerial and independent government department accountable to 
the Parliament of the UK, is the regulatory authority of charities in England 
and Wales (2011). One duty of the Commission is to decide if organisations 
are charitable and therefore should be added or removed from the Register of 
Charities3. The Commission also tries to solve problems regarding charities 
                                                
1 According to Section 3 of the Charities Act (2016) an organisation can be deemed charitable 
by following at least one of 13 ‘charitable purposes’. An organisation seeking charitable 
status must have as its main goal at least one of these and, in addition, fulfil a ‘public benefit’ 
test. 
2 As the study is not limited to fundraising in the charity sector, the Fundraising Regulator, 
which regulates charity fundraising in England and Wales and Northern Ireland is not 
discussed 
3 According to section 14 of the Charities Act, 2011 the Commission has the following 
objectives: "(1) The public confidence objective is to increase public trust and confidence in 
charities. (2) The public benefit objective is to promote awareness and understanding of the 
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with its involvement, which can range from warnings to opening a statutory 
inquiry. The Commission's priority risk areas are defined as: 
"fraud and other financial abuse of charities; safeguarding 
beneficiaries, particularly children and vulnerable adults; misuse 
of a charity for terrorist purposes or to foster extremism; other 
significant breaches of trust or non-compliance that significantly 
affect public trust and confidence in charities." (Commission, 
2015-16, p.8). 
The Commission, as a response to the priority risk areas, has developed five 
strategic priorities on:  
“holding charities to account, dealing with wrongdoing and harm, 
informing public choice, giving charities the understanding and tools 
they need to succeed abuse or mismanagement, keeping charities 
relevant for today’s world.” (Commission, 2018-2019, p.10-11)  
1.2 	Charity	accounting	and	reporting	
It is was agreed by scholars (Ashford, 1989; Bird and Morgan-Jones, 1981; 
Connolly and Hyndman, 2000) that the Charities Act (1960) was insufficient 
to establish a unified charity financial statement and reporting, and therefore 
that an inadequate regulatory structure governing charity financial reporting 
was in force.  
A report by Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) mentioned the lack of consistency 
and poor accounting practices, and they were the first to allege a lack of 
                                                
operation of the public benefit requirement. (3) The compliance objective is to promote 
compliance by charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and 
management of the administration of their charities. (4) The charitable resources objective is 
to promote the effective use of charitable resources. (5) The accountability objective is to 
enhance the accountability of charities to donors, beneficiaries and the general public." 
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coherence in financial accountability of UK charities. This report 
(commissioned by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales) triggered debate on the necessity for a revision of accounting and 
reporting practices of charities because of designated variations in accounting 
implementations and also non-compliance with reporting standards. The 
report created controversy and led to further work, resulting in Accounting by 
Charities, Statement of Recommended Practice in 1988. Subsequent research 
(Gambling et al., 1990; Hines and Jones, 1992) also revealed that 
discrepancies between charities were continuing but diminishing (Connolly 
and Hyndman, 2000; Connolly and Hyndman, 2004; Hyndman, 1990; 
Hyndman, 1991; Hyndman and McMahon, 2010; Palmer et al., 2001) with 
each new SORP. 
Following the Charities Act of (1992), the SORP became mandatory (SORP 
1995) for charities which met certain criteria. Further research and the need 
for greater accountability established by the impact of various scandals led to 
the issuance of subsequent iterations of the SORP: SORP (2000) and SORP 
(2005). A new SORP (2015) began to be used in line with the latest UK 
GAAP, applying for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2015.  
Over time, the SORPs, which are defined as ‘engines’ of the charity sector by 
Hyndman (2018) also changed in some particular areas. For example, a 
Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA) was introduced to replace the 
income and expenditure statement. The SORPs became clearer and more 
detailed, composing of mandatory aspects rather than being recommendation 
base only, and also began to provide recommendations on better governance 
and performance reporting (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). The accounting 
recommendations of the SORP do not override accounting standards (now 
FRS 102) but aim to supplement them. 
The accounting requirements of charities depend on the type, income and 
value of assets of the particular charity. All charities, even the ones that are 
not registered with the Commission, have to prepare accounts and make them 
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available on request (Commission, 2016a). An annual return form must be 
completed and filed  by all charitable incorporated organisations and all 
charities if gross income is more than £10,000 (Commission, 2016a). A 
registered charity also needs to prepare a trustees' annual report and make it 
available on request (Commission, 2016a). Filing accounts and trustees' 
annual reports is mandatory for all registered charities whose gross yearly 
income exceeds £25,000 and for all charitable incorporated organisations 
regardless of their income (Commission, 2016a). A more simplified 
accounting scheme (receipts and payments) can be adopted by a non-
company charity whose gross income is £250,000 or less in one year 
(Commission, 2016a). If on the other hand, a non-company charity whose 
gross income is over £250,000 or utilising accruals accounts or the charity is 
a charitable company, then the charity is required to prepare accounts in 
accordance with the SORP (Commission, 2016a).  
The amount of scrutiny is being determined regarding the assets and income 
of the charity. In line with the recent changes in December 2017, while an 
independent examination is required if gross income is over £25,000, an audit 
is needed where gross income is over £1 million, or the gross income exceeds 
£250,000 and total assets (before liabilities) exceeds £3.26 million 
(Commission, 2017). Figure 1.2 summarises the documents necessary to be 
prepared by charities depending on their type and income. 
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Table	1.1	Required	charity	documentation	
Source (Commission, 2016a) 
1.3 Misconduct/fraud	in	charities	
Fraud is a big problem as it damages the organisations, the society and the 
economy in many aspects (Hogan et al., 2008). Fraud is also a major issue for 
not-for-profit organisations (Gibelman and Gelman, 2001). Although this has 
not been assessed and analysed in detail by scholars, the impact of financial 
misconduct and fraud has shaped the regulation, such as the Charities Act 
(2016a), and has damaged the perception of charities. Reports such as the 
Annual Fraud Indicator Report also underline the importance of fraud and 
financial misconduct in the sector and estimated losses of £2.3 billion or 3% 
of annual charity income during 2017 (Fraud, 2017). The same report states 
that compared with 2016, fraud in the sector has increased by nearly £400 
million (Fraud, 2017). 
This problem rubs salt into the wound, as the reputation of the charity sector 
is already damaged because of other misconduct allegations. As a result, the 
voluntary income of the top 100 charities has fallen for three successive 
quarters from beginning the second half of 2016 (Society, 2018). As of July 
2018, public confidence in charities was also recorded at the lowest level 
Type of document/ 
Income per year 
Between £25,000 and £250,000 Over £250,000 or £1million 
Accounts/ Comply 
with the SORP 
Filing accounts and trustees’ 
annual reports is mandatory  
Receipts and payments can be 
adopted by a non-company 
charity if gross income is 
£250,000 or less 
Applying SORP not needed if 
charity is a non-company charity 
A non-company charity whose 
gross income is over £250,000 
or utilising  accruals account or 
a charity that is charitable 
company, is required to 
prepare accounts in 
accordance with the SORP 
Scrutiny Independent examination is 
needed if gross income is 
between $25,000 and £1million 
Audit needed if total assets 
(before liabilities) exceed 
£3.26 million, and the charity’s 
gross income is more than 
£250,000 or where gross 
income exceeds £1million 
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since monitoring began in 2005 (Sector, 2018), again a consequence of the 
highly publicised scandals.  
The issue of fraud and financial misconduct is so widespread that, for the 
period 2016-17, fraud/money laundering occurred in 296 serious incident 
reports, and 315 of the compliance cases opened for the 2016-17 term were 
related to fraud, theft or other misapplication of funds (Commission, 2018e). 
Also, for the same period, fraud, theft or other misapplication of funds 
featured in 253 compliance cases which concluded during the year and in 92 
inquiries which were opened during the year (Commission, 2018e).   
Given the scale of financial misconduct and fraud, it is not surprising that, 
‘Holding charities to account’ and ‘Dealing with wrongdoing and harm’ were 
determined as two of the five strategic objectives of the Charity Commission 
for the period between 2018-2023 (Commission, 2018b). The Commission 
had previously stated that identifying and investigating apparent fraud, 
misconduct or mismanagement is a statutory function (Commission, 2013a, 
p.2). The Commission defines the terms of ‘mismanagement,' ‘misconduct' 
and ‘fraud' as: 
‘Mismanagement’ “includes any act (or failure to act) that may 
result in charitable resources being lost or misused, a charity’s 
reputation being harmed, beneficiaries being put at risk.” 
(Commission, 2016b, p.2) 
‘Misconduct’ “includes any act (or failure to act) that the person 
committing it knew (or ought to have known) was criminal, 
unlawful or improper” (Commission, 2016b, p.2)  
‘Fraud’ on the other hand is defined as “a form of dishonesty 
involving, amongst other things, false representation, failing to 
disclose information or abuse of position, which has been 
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undertaken in order to make a gain or cause loss to another” 
(Commission, 2013a, p.2). 
The Charity Commission uses tools such as accounts monitoring and review4, 
monitoring, operational compliance cases 5 , reports of serious incidents 
(ROSI) 6 , official warnings and statutory inquiries 7  to combat 
fraud/misconduct (Commission, 2014-15). Some other powers the Charity 
Commission possess as of 2019 are suspending or removing a trustee, officer 
or employee, restricting the transactions of a charity, establishing a scheme 
for the administration of the charity etc. (Commission, 2018a). 
The Commission also had initiatives such as the Charity Sector Counter Fraud 
Group (CSCFG)8 and national charity fraud prevention conference with the 
Fraud Advisory Panel (FAP) to tackle the issues of fraud and financial 
misconduct (Commission, 2018-2019).  
1.4 Motivation	for	the	study	
The importance of the charity sector in the UK is beyond dispute as it has an 
immense impact on the economy and on society. However, the publicised 
                                                
4 “identify potential mismanagement or non-compliance as well as concerns about inadequate 
reporting” 
5 “robust regulatory advice to the trustees, or instructing them to fulfil an action plan.” 
6 “A serious incident is one that results in, or risks, significant loss of a charity’s money or 
assets, damage to a charity’s property or harm to a charity’s work, beneficiaries or reputation. 
Serious incidents include, for example, fraud, theft or other significant loss, large donations 
from unknown or unverified sources, suspicions and allegations or incidents of abuse or 
mistreatment of vulnerable beneficiaries.” 
7 “an inquiry is opened where there is a high risk to public trust and confidence in the charity, 
where there is evidence of misconduct or mismanagement or charities’ assets, reputation, 
services or beneficiaries are at a high risk of harm or abuse. The purpose of an inquiry is to 
establish the facts.” 
8 “Brings together over 30 charities, professional bodies and other key stakeholders. It meets 
four times a year to identify emerging fraud risks, share good practice and support charities 
to enhance the sector’s capability to prevent fraud.”	
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scandals, which mainly are related to fraud/misconduct (McDonnell and 
Rutherford, 2018), damage public trust and confidence in charities, which 
was recorded at the lowest level since monitoring began in 2005 (Sector, 
2018). The fraudulent activities come in several varieties, including excess 
expenditure to the private benefit of officers and directors, misuse of the 
charity's bank account, the creation of false employees or inflated expenses, 
or other claims (Commission, 2013c). One of the highly publicised fraudulent 
activities concerns the Kids Company which closed on 5 August 2015 and is 
still under inquiry at the Charity Commission because of the allegations of 
poor governance and financial misconduct (Kids, 2015). 
This level of fraud highlights the need for charities’ accountability and 
therefore a focus on the charity stakeholders. The accounting research in the 
area, which has been influential as it changed the SORP, mainly focused on 
how accountability is discharged (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009; Connolly et 
al., 2013a; Dhanani and Connolly, 2012; Dhanani and Connolly, 2015; 
Hyndman, 1990; Hyndman, 1991). The studies also revealed the importance 
of stakeholders for charity regulation and the impact on society (Dhanani and 
Connolly, 2012), and that the stakeholders playing vital part in legitimising 
charities and shaping their policies (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013b). The 
studies of Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) and Connolly et al. (2011), which 
proposed important and interesting areas for further studies to be focused on 
matters such as the involvement of beneficiaries and donors in the governance 
of charities, also inspired the thesis and encouraged a focus on the 
stakeholders.  
Also, the fraud studies for both the for-profit and not-for-profit sector mainly 
focused on the impact of governance and the influence of stakeholders was 
not well studied. Different from for-profit organisations, the not-for-profit 
organisations are characterised by the absence of owners, profit incentives 
and shareholder meetings. Therefore, the organisational structure and task 
environment of the charities imposes increased demands on the charities, as 
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their economic model is more complicated, they have a larger base of 
stakeholders but an unclear external accountability.  
The primary motivation of the thesis derives from the importance of 
fraud/misconduct in the charity sector and that the phenomenon has not been 
investigated in detail. There were only a few recent fraud/misconduct studies 
which are either focused on Scottish jurisdiction (McDonnell and Rutherford, 
2018) or on smaller charities (Ohalehi, 2019). Therefore the present study, 
which aims to assess the organisational factors that are related to 
fraud/misconduct, is intended to contribute to the literature and to improve 
practice by enhancing the understanding of the problem. The scope of the 
research is limited to internal charity fraud, performed by members of the 
organisation. Fraud perpetrated on charities by beneficiaries and outsiders is 
not considered in this research. 
1.5 Research	objectives	and	questions		
Compared to the for-profit sector, fraud research has been limited in the not-
for-profit sector. The general tendency in both for-profit and not-for-profit 
sector studies had been to use quantitative analysis (Beasley, 1996; Beasley 
et al., 2000; Holtfreter, 2008), aiming to assess governance determinants and 
their relationship with fraud. Fraud studies predominantly focused on the 
internal-organisation governance aspects in analysing empirical data and did 
not take into account the ‘task environment' or the impact of the stakeholders 
on fraud.  
The purpose of this research is to examine the organisational factors that are 
associated with the likelihood of fraud and financial misconduct occurring 
within charities. The thesis analyses accountability discharged towards 
charity stakeholders, stakeholders’ perceptions of and stakeholders’ influence 
(if any) on fraud and fraud prevention, governance elements of charities such 
as board structure, disclosure patterns, and the role of auditors/accountants. 
By doing this, the research aims to find any determinants of fraud in charities. 
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While the study benefits from research on the for-profit sector, it creates 
relevant hypotheses and employs methodology individually tailored to the 
not-for-profit sector. As the topic is awaiting further research, it is believed 
that the study will contribute to the enhancement of accountability of charities 
in multiple dimensions.  
The research provides a holistic view of fraud in charities by analysing the 
relationships of fraud to organisational factors, both internal and external 
(task environment). The thesis also combines theories and methods 
(qualitative and quantitative). The study integrates and utilises agency, 
stewardship and stakeholder theories and also benefits mainly from Mitchell 
et al. (1997) theory of stakeholder salience and the fraud triangle theory of 
Cressey (1953). To briefly summarise, the integrated theory allows assessing 
the factors affecting fraud in charities both internally and externally.  
As the study aims to assess both internal and external organisational factors 
relevant to fraud in the charity sector, two research objectives are identified 
to realise the research aim:  
Research Objective 1: To assess how stakeholders conceptualise charity 
fraud and their views on the reasons for and solutions to fraud 
Research Objective 2: To assess the governance characteristics associated 
with fraud in charities 
The first research objective assesses stakeholders’ views and influence on 
charity fraud. This research objective aims to reflect first the problematic 
areas of charity organisations in three areas: understanding ownership, 
stakeholder salience and accountability; assessing the causes of fraud; and 
examining solutions to fraud. In more detail, the objective comprises six 
research questions, as follows: 
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Ownership, stakeholder salience and accountability 
Research Question 1a: What are the accountability dynamics in the 
charity sector? 
Research Question 1b: How do stakeholders identify ownership and 
stakeholder salience in the charity sector? 
Causes of fraud 
Research Question 1c: How do stakeholders conceptualise fraud in 
the charity sector? 
Research Question 1d: What reasons are identified by charity 
stakeholders for fraud? 
Solutions to fraud 
Research Question 1e: What solutions to fraud are identified by 
charity stakeholders? 
Research Question 1f: What are stakeholders’ perceptions of 
stakeholder oversight? 
The second research objective aims to provide an assessment of charity fraud 
from an internal charity perspective and comprises two research questions: 
Research Question 2a: What are the differences between fraud and 
no-fraud charities in terms of governance?  
Research Question 2b: Which governance characteristics are related 
to fraud? 
The figure 1.2 depicts the research objectives and questions that will be 
assessed in this study: 
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Figure	1.2	Research	objectives	and	questions	
1.6 Research	method	
The research employs a mixed methods approach. This has been proved to 
strengthen possibilities of uncovering causal relationships among variables, 
thereby reinforcing both internal and external validity of the research. 
Because this study is multi-focused and utilises an integration of theories, 
utilising mixed methods is believed to enhance the research. The research is 
distinguished in two stages: qualitative and quantitative methods respectively. 
The first stage involves a qualitative assessment of stakeholders' views and 
their influence on charity accountability and fraud. This stage conducts 
interviews with key charity stakeholders. The second stage utilises a 
quantitative examination of charity governance practices and their relation to 
fraud. The data for this stage is derived from official charity documents and 
is assessed by using logistic regression analysis. 
The research method utilised is explained in detail in Chapter 5. 
Research	Objective	1: To	assess	how	
stakeholders	conceptualise	charity	fraud	
and	their	views	on	the	reasons	for	and	
solutions	to	fraud
Research	Question	1a: What	are	the	
accountability	dynamics	in	the	charity	sector?
Research	Question	1b: How	do	stakeholders	
identify	ownership	and	stakeholder	salience	in	
the	charity	sector?
Research	Question	1c: How	do	stakeholders	
conceptualise	fraud	in	the	charity	sector?
Research	Question	1d:What	reasons	are	
identified	by	charity	stakeholders	for	fraud?
Research	Question	1e:What	are	the	solutions	
to	fraud	identified	by	the	charity	stakeholders?
Research	Question	1f:What	are	stakeholders’	
perceptions	of	stakeholder	oversight?
Research	Objective	2: To	assess	the	
governance	characteristics	associated	with	
fraud	in	charities
Research	Question	2a:	What	
are	the	differences	between	
fraud	and	no-fraud	charities	
in	terms	of	governance?	
Research	Question	2b:	Which	
governance	characteristics	
are	related	with	fraud?
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1.7 Overview	of	findings		
The findings demonstrate that the fraud problem in the charity sector is unique 
and multi-dimensional in terms of the reasons of the fraud problem and the 
solutions offered for the problem. Therefore, the remedies offered in the for-
profit sector are not applicable directly to the charity sector. Awareness of 
fraud is found to be high in the charity sector and no charity is immune to the 
problem. The findings suggest that ‘excessive trust’ towards the charities 
creates the opportunity for fraud to take place. Among Cressey’s (1953) 
‘fraud triangle’, opportunity is also found to be the leading component of 
fraud, ahead of the other two components of ‘pressure’ and ‘rationalisation’. 
The quantitative section findings show that lack of donor oversight as 
evidenced by low or zero grant income is also a contributory factor for fraud 
to take place. In terms of factors enabling fraud, lack of segregation of duties, 
absence of fraud policies and insufficient control environment were identified 
most often by the charity stakeholders. The quantitative section findings 
presents that charities with few number of trustees are more prone to fraud. 
The red signals of fraud identified by both the qualitative and quantitative 
methods are: problematic independent examinations and audit reports, 
trustees receiving remuneration, absence of documentation, charities 
depending highly on cash and individuals with excessive powers. 
The research used an integrated theory that combines agency, stewardship 
and stakeholder theories in order to provide a broader understanding of the 
fraud problem.  The findings suggest that unlike the for-profit sector in which 
the shareholders are the definitive owners, the charity sector has multiple 
owners or principals. This absence of a single owner is found to hamper the 
monitoring that can be done by the charity stakeholders, and therefore creates 
opportunities for fraud to take place. Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder 
salience theory, with its three dimensions of ‘urgency’, ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘power’, suggests that donors are the primary stakeholder. Beneficiaries on 
the other hand are found to be leading regarding salience in terms of ‘urgency’ 
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and on par with donors and regulators in terms of ‘legitimacy’ however are 
way behind in terms of ‘power’. 
Beneficiaries and donors were proposed by interviewees as the two charity 
stakeholder groups to whom accountability should be mainly directed. 
However, the discharge of accountability was found to be unsatisfactory as 
especially donors and beneficiaries wanted less financial and more inclusive 
accountability which would allow them to feel ‘a part’ of the charities. Also, 
the mechanisms such as the financial statements used to discharge 
accountability were not found to target the beneficiaries. The accountability 
relationship between the charities and their stakeholders is also found to be 
‘informal’ especially with donors and beneficiaries. Therefore, the 
accountability is more in range of Laughlin’s (1990) ‘communal 
accountability’ and even Stewart’s (1984) ‘links of accounts’. However, this 
informality is also argued by the respondents to hamper monitoring and 
accountability in the sector. The interaction among charity stakeholders is 
found to be very limited and barely existing. 
The solutions suggested to the fraud problem in the charity sector by the 
respondents were efficient internal and external oversight, an effective control 
environment, proper segregation of duties and dual authorisation process, an 
interiorised anti-fraud culture and tone at the top which enhances 
whistleblowing practice and enhanced prosecution. However, the respondents 
criticised the solutions as imposing a heavy burden on the charities and 
therefore argued the solutions to be ill suited for the charity sector and 
especially for the smaller charities. The legislation was also argued by the 
respondents to be satisfactory but also too burdensome on especially the 
smaller charities and not a direct solution for fraud. 
Trustees were identified by the respondents as the first in line to tackle fraud, 
however the tackling process is also found to comprise every stakeholder. 
Stakeholder oversight is argued by the respondents to be very important in 
tackling fraud. However, the findings suggest that especially small donors 
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and beneficiaries are ineffective in performing oversight and not interested in 
overseeing the charities through assessing financial reports and annual 
reports. Lack of power for beneficiaries and excessive trust for donors and 
absence of a definitive owner were found to be the main reasons for this 
ineffective oversight. The stakeholders identified that effective oversight 
from the charity stakeholders can be achieved by embodying the stakeholders 
in the organisational structure of the charities and not by discharging more 
accountability. 
The findings of the quantitative section of the study extend the findings of the 
qualitative section and provide a view on actual charity fraud cases. This part 
of the study suggests that fraud charities have fewer committees, receive a 
lower percentage of grant income and are prone to problematic audit reports.  
Also a higher number of fraud charity trustees receive remuneration.  Both 
the univariate and logistic regression analysis suggest that larger boards of 
trustees provide better monitoring in the charity sector as fraud charities had 
fewer trustees compared with the no-fraud charities. The study also tested the 
predictive accuracy of the model, which is found to have accurate predictions 
for fraud occurrence. 
The findings overall suggest that the charity sector is made up of an over-
relaxed environment with lack of sufficient monitoring and therefore 
triggering the opportunity for fraud and financial misconduct to take place. 
The solution for the fraud problem is also found to be unique to the charity 
sector, and especially has to comprise stakeholder involvement in the 
oversight process. In line with the findings and to foster the development of 
new research agendas for the sector (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009), the 
thesis suggests that a new approach is needed to tackle fraud in the charity 
sector and to enhance stakeholder oversight and engagement (Connolly et al., 
2013c).  
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1.8 Contributions	of	the	study	
The study contributes in three different pillars: the literature, the theory and 
the methodology. The research is one of only a few studies that assess fraud 
in the charity sector in the UK. The study also contributes to the literature on 
fraud in the not-for-profit sector by assessing both reasons for fraud and 
solutions to fraud in a single study. In terms of the accountability literature, 
the study finds that the charity sector has an informal accountability 
framework, donors and beneficiaries are the two groups to which 
accountability should be discharged the most, and beneficiaries and donors 
are not interested in accountability provided by documents only.  
The study contributes to the accountability and governance theory by showing 
that an integrated theory is more suitable and appropriate for the charity sector 
rather than separate theories designed with the for-profit sector in mind. The 
study finds that agency theory coupled with stewardship and stakeholder 
theory is more capable of explaining the reasons and solutions to fraud in the 
charity sector compared with the theories used individually. Two theories 
were also tested by the study and contributions were found regarding the two 
theories: the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) and stakeholder salience theory 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Regarding the fraud triangle theory the component 
‘opportunity’ was found to be the leading component for fraud to take place 
in the charity sector over the components of ‘pressure’ and ‘rationalisation’. 
Donors were found to be the ‘primary’ stakeholder in the charity sector and 
beneficiaries being very crucial in terms of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘urgency’ but 
lacked ‘power’ when assessed by the stakeholder salience theory.   
The study contributes to the methodology by using mixed methods in the 
analysis of fraud, which has generally been examined using the quantitative 
methods only. Using mixed methods has enhanced the understanding of the 
fraud problem and has contributed to the accounting fraud literature by 
incorporating interviews along with content and logistic regression analysis. 
Unlike most of the charity studies, the qualitative analysis also conducted 
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interviews with a wide range of stakeholder groups and did not only 
concentrated only in larger charities but also comprised small and large 
charities together and therefore provided a broader view on the charity sector. 
The use of logistic regression was also a contribution to the fraud literature in 
the not-for-profit sector as logistic regression has seldom been used. The 
study has assessed the variables used for the for-profit sector logistic 
regression analysis and has examined their suitability to be used in the charity 
sector. The study has also contributed to the not-for-profit fraud literature by 
identifying new variables specifically for the charity sector to be tested in the 
analysis of fraud in the logistic regression model.  
1.9 Structure	of	thesis	
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and 
summarises the key issues covered in the thesis. It provides vital facts and 
information on UK charities. It explains the research problem, the motivation 
for the study and the research objectives. The findings and the contribution of 
the thesis are also outlined. 
Three chapters make up Part II. Chapter 2 briefly highlights internal and task 
environments and focuses on accountability and governance in organisations 
and charities. The meaning, types, need for, the aim and the target group of 
accountability and governance are assessed. The chapter especially focuses 
on accountability and governance in not-for-profit organisations and provides 
a review of UK accountability and governance literature on charities. Chapter 
3 discusses the theoretical framework and elaborates agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder theories. The chapter examines how each theory is used to explain 
the concepts of accountability, governance and fraud, especially in not-for-
profit organisations. It also emphasises the importance of integrating the 
theories to fully understand internal and external causes of fraud. Chapter 4 
assesses the concept of fraud. It evaluates fraud theories and previous 
empirical work regarding fraud prediction. It also analyses the relationships 
between governance and fraud and the influence of stakeholders on fraud. It 
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then examines the empirical work on fraud in the for-profit, public and not-
for-profit sectors.  
Chapter 5 outlines and justifies the research methods of the study. The chapter 
analyses the research paradigms and philosophies which the thesis could use. 
It also stresses and explains why the mixed methods approach is more 
appropriate for this study than qualitative or quantitative methods alone. The 
chapter, by distinguishing two stages, provides the research methods, 
population sample and data collection techniques. It summarises the first 
stage which involves a qualitative assessment of stakeholders' views on 
charity accountability and fraud. This is achieved by conducting interviews 
with key charity stakeholders. The chapter also assesses the second stage 
which utilises a quantitative examination of charity governance practices and 
their relation to fraud, for which the data is derived from official charity 
documents and is assessed by use of logistic regression analysis. 
Four chapters make up Part IV.  Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the findings of 
the qualitative research, and Chapter 9 the quantitative. The first 3 chapters 
comprise interviews conducted with key charity stakeholders. Chapter 6 is 
organised in line with the first two research questions related to the first 
research objective. The first section of the chapter amplifies the 
accountability dynamics of the charity sector. The second section of the 
chapter discusses how stakeholders identify ownership and stakeholder 
salience in the charity sector. 
Chapter 7 presents the findings of the qualitative research by focusing on the 
reasons of fraud in the charity sector. The chapter is organised in line with the 
third and fourth research questions related to the first research objective. The 
first section of the chapter examines how stakeholders conceptualise fraud in 
the charity sector. The second section assesses the reasons for fraud identified 
by the stakeholders.  
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Chapter 8 provides the findings derived from the qualitative research 
regarding the solutions offered by the stakeholders to the fraud problem in the 
charity sector. The Chapter utilises the same interviews as Chapters 6 and 7. 
The structure of the chapter is formed by the remaining two research 
questions related to the first research objective. The first section evaluates the 
solutions to fraud identified by the charity stakeholders. The second section 
of the chapter focuses on stakeholders’ perceptions of stakeholder oversight. 
Chapter 9 presents the quantitative findings of the study. The empirical 
analysis of 42 fraud and 42 no-fraud charities by using univariate and logistic 
analysis is performed in this chapter. The chapter assesses the governance 
characteristics associated with fraud in charities, the second research 
objective of the study. The chapter has six sections. The first section discusses 
the sample selection and identification of fraud charities and content analysis 
performed for the fraud charity documents. The section also assesses the 
criteria used to match fraud with no-fraud charities. The second section 
examines the content analysis performed for both fraud and no-fraud 
charities’ annual reports and financial statements and then evaluates the 
identification of variances that will be used in univariate and logistic 
regression analysis. The third section focuses on the identified variables to 
test hypothesis and control variables. In section four, in line with the research 
question 2a) the univariate analysis is performed in order to assess the 
differences among fraud and no-fraud charities in terms of governance. 
Section five discusses the findings of the logistic regression analysis again in 
line with the research question 2b) examination of the governance 
characteristics related with fraud. The sixth section assesses the predictive 
accuracy of the logistic regression model. 
Part V comprises Chapter 10 which summarises the findings, provides an 
overview of the thesis and concludes the study. The first section of the chapter 
discusses the findings of the research in line with the research questions and 
also provides a general overview by comprising the findings of the two 
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methods used. The second and third sections of the chapter review the 
contributions of the study and the limitations confronted while conducting the 
research, respectively. Section four evaluates the policy recommendations 
and section five discusses implications for future research. The sixth and last 
section provides a conclusion to the chapter and the research.  
The thesis structure is depicted below in Figure 1.3: 
 
Figure	1.3	Thesis	Structure	
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PART	II	–	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
The second part of the thesis contains the literature review which consists of 
three chapters. Each chapter provides an overview of a contextual assessment 
of previous literature relevant to the thesis. The first chapter of the second 
part, Chapter 2, analyses the meaning of accountability and governance to 
organisations and assesses the importance of accountability and governance 
to the UK charities in particular. Chapter 3 evaluates accountability and 
governance theories and their function in explaining fraud, concentrating on 
agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories. Chapter 4 focuses on fraud 
literature and provides an overview of fraud theories and literature on how to 
tackle fraud in different type of organisations. The chapters do not have a 
ranking in order of importance but rather provide an overview of a broader 
problem of accountability and governance to a more specific problem in the 
charity sector: fraud.  
 
Chapter	2
AN	OVERVIEW	
OF	
ACCOUNTABILITY	
AND	
GOVERNANCE	
LITERATURE
Chapter	3
A	REVIEW	ON	
ACCOUNTABILITY	
AND	
GOVERNANCE	
THEORIES	
Chapter	4
A	REVIEW	OF	
THE	FRAUD	
LITERATURE
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2. 	AN	OVERVIEW	OF	ACCOUNTABILITY	AND	
GOVERNANCE	LITERATURE	
The literature on the accountability and governance of not-for-profit entities 
agrees that the prominence of and concern about accountability and 
governance derives from the increase in the number of highly publicised 
scandals, which damages the public’s perception of and confidence in not-
for-profit organisations (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2003; Ebrahim, 2003b). The occurrence of these scandals has 
resulted in a quest for a more transparent and accountable sector (Connolly et 
al., 2015; Gibelman and Gelman, 2001).  
This chapter provides an overview of the accountability and governance 
literature by first briefly evaluating the environments in which organisations 
operate, and later providing a definition of accountability, assessing the 
concepts of stakeholders (accountability to whom?) and purpose 
(accountability for what?) and analysing how accountability is discharged 
(accountability mechanisms). The chapter than provides definition of 
governance, assessing governance to whom and analysing how governance is 
discharged (governance mechanisms). The chapter also examines the 
relationship between governance and accountability in not-for-profit 
organisations and explains how these terms are used specifically for the 
thesis.  
 The chapter also summarises the UK charities’ accountability and 
governance literature. The structure of this chapter is set out in figure 2.1. 
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Figure	2.1	Structure	of	Chapter	2	
2.1 The	organisation	and	its	environment	
Organisations are set up to accomplish a target but are affected or even shaped 
by their environments (Daft, 2015). The environment in which organisations 
operate is crucial to their success: ignoring the environment while taking 
decisions may lead to devastating failures (Baker et al., 2012). The 
environment constrains and surrounds the organisation and therefore 
influences the judgement and behaviour of the organisation’s participants 
(Dill, 1958). 
Organisation theorists have focused their attention on the environment and its 
impact on organisational functioning (Negandhi and Reimann, 1973). 
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Duncan (1972, p.314) describes the environment as the “totality of physical 
and social factors that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-
making behaviour of individuals in the organization.”  
One of the most influential descriptions of the environment is the physical 
and socio-economic definition (Huang et al., 2015). Differentiation is often 
made between the internal and external environments (Negandhi and 
Reimann, 1973).  
The internal environment is made up of relevant physical and social factors 
falling within the borders of the organisation that have a direct influence on 
decision making (Backer, 2007). Owners, shareholders, the board of 
directors, employees, volunteers, the buildings, work places, offices, 
factories, culture and attitude are some of the main elements of an 
organisation’s internal environment (Daft, 2015). The external environment, 
on the other hand, comprises related physical and social factors that have an 
impact on the organisation outside its boundaries (Baker et al., 2012). 
Compliance or even obedience (Dess and Beard, 1984) to the external 
environment is crucial for the survival and success of an organisation 
(Andrews, 2009).  
The external environment is divided into two: general and task environment 
(Dill, 1958; Huang et al., 2015). The general environment is a broader context 
(Yüksel, 2012) that might impact the organisation in the long run (Dill, 1958). 
Examples of the general environment are political, economic, sociocultural, 
legal and technological environmental influences (Dale, 2000; Yüksel, 2012). 
Although being broad in context, the general environment helps the 
organisation to station itself among other organisations (Daft, 2015)  and to 
forecast and plan its future activities (Duncan, 1972).  
The task environment consists of more specific dimensions that are highly 
likely to impact the organisation, in both the short and the long term, with 
more direct and immediate effects  (Bourgeois III, 1980). Dill (1958, p.410), 
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who used the term task, defined the task environment as “that part of the total 
environment of management which was potentially relevant to goal setting 
and goal attainment.” Dill (1958, p.411) distinguishes between activities, 
tasks and task environment arguing that activities are what the organisation 
does, tasks are set goals, and task environment is stimuli that the organisation 
might respond to. Effective management of the task environment, identifying 
the environmental factors and managing resources, is crucial for success 
(Oliver, 1997). Some of the well-accepted components of the task 
environment for the for-profit sector are customers, suppliers, competitors, 
and government agencies (Daft, 2015). 
The environment can have both positive and negative effects on an 
organisation (Dill, 1958). While the environment may create strengths or 
opportunities, it may also cause threats and weaknesses (Castrogiovanni, 
2002). The management’s ability is crucial in overcoming obstacles with 
strategic responses. Organisational theorists emphasise that organisations 
must adapt to their environment if they are to remain viable  (Duncan, 1972), 
as environmental factors are very important in determining an organisation's 
success or failure (Chet Miller et al., 2006). 
The degree of interaction between the organisation and its environment is 
mutual and as a result the flow of information among the parties directly 
impacts the effectiveness of the organisation (Kearns, 1994). Accountability 
of the organisation to its environment is the way to mutually interact with the 
environment and to demonstrate how efficient the organisation is and in 
which areas it should adapt itself with the environment (Dess and Beard, 
1984). With accountability, while the organisation provides information on 
its activities, it also has the chance to reorganise its activities depending on 
the needs or expectations from its environment (Castrogiovanni, 2002). 
Accountability is also crucial in grasping the actual environmental conditions 
rather than the perception of organisations’ decision makers. As will be 
discussed later in the chapter, the influence of different groups on the task 
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environment depends on their power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 
1997). 
The literature referred to above relates to for-profit entities. However, there 
is no reason to believe that they do not apply, at least in a broad sense, in the 
not-for-profit field. Ostrower and Stone (2010), for example, highlight the 
importance of the external environment of not-for-profit organisations in 
understanding their nature and suggests a contingency-based framework, in 
which one of the three sets of contingent variables is the external conditions 
or environment. Ebrahim (2003b) also emphasises that accountability allows 
to identify and prioritise different groups of the task environment. In section 
2.2, differences in for-profit and not-for-profit sectors are explored. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the environments within which an organisation, whether 
for-profit or not-for-profit, performs: internal environment, task environment 
and general environment. This thesis assesses information and makes 
assumptions based only on the internal and task environments and therefore 
general environment is excluded from analysis.  
 
Figure	2.2	Organisational	Environment	
Internal	
Environment
Task	
Environment
General	
Environment
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2.2 Two	 types	 of	 organisations:	 For-profit	 and	 Not-for-profit	
organisations	
The for-profit sector is composed of organisations whose main aim is to make 
profit from their activities and operations (Fama, 1980). The for-profit sector 
has residual claimants: the shareholders in larger for-profit organisations or 
the owners in smaller for-profit organisations (Berle and Means, 1932). For-
profit organisations operate mainly in a market and face competitors that 
compete for higher profits and market share (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
Organisations in the for-profit sector are conceptualised as a nexus of 
contracts among self-interested individuals with bounded rationality 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) whose identification with the organisation is low (Van 
Puyvelde et al., 2016), who have short-term orientation rather than long-term 
(Olson, 2000), and who will act in order to maximise their own benefits, 
which are not necessarily the same as those of the residual claimants (Fama, 
1980).  
The for-profit sector, which for a very long time was evaluated mainly by 
financial aspects such as profit and bottom-line results, regarded shareholders 
as their ultimate stakeholder (Freeman, 1984b). Although more socially and 
environmentally aware businesses were in a surge, as how the profit was 
gained became a more crucial question, profit is still the focal point for for-
profit organisations and therefore shareholders are always regarded as the 
definitive stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Agle et al. (1999) found 
that the shareholders possess power, urgency and legitimacy and they are the 
core stakeholder affecting managers’ decisions.  
Lack of a residual claimant and clear ownership structure, and absence of a 
market and common performance indicators (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Miller, 
2002) are some important characteristics of not-for-profit sector 
organisations. As the not-for-profit sector is accountable to a more diverse 
group of stakeholders than other sectors (Cordery et al., 2019; Keating and 
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Frumkin, 2003; Ntim et al., 2017), prioritising the stakeholders is a very 
significant issue for not-for-profit organisations.  
The stakeholder dynamics of not-for-profit organisations possess important 
differences from the for-profit sector. Berman and Davidson (2003) argue that 
objectives of donors in not-for-profit organisations are not as clear as those 
of the investors or shareholders in for-profit organisations. The interest of 
donors in a not-for-profit organisation ends or is diminished after the act of 
giving, as most donors are not interested in precisely how the funds they 
donated are used. Berman and Davidson (2003) argue that, because of the 
lack of clear objectives, it is hard to monitor not-for-profit organisations and 
whether they use their funds properly or not. Van Iwaarden et al. (2009, p.19) 
similarly argue that donors are more reckless than investors because, whereas 
investors are interested in their return on their investment, donors are just 
satisfied with making their donations and do not care later on what happened 
with their money.   
Another major difference of the not-for-profit sector is that, although in both 
for-profit and public sectors the funder (investor/taxpayer) is the same as the 
beneficiary (shareholder/public), in the not-for-profit sector the donor and 
beneficiary are different entities and the donors do not, as a rule, receive any 
economic benefit from the organisation (Hyndman, 2017). Also, in both for-
profit and public sectors, shareholders and the public may have other powers 
to sanction such as to vote against the management or government/ legal 
authority. In charities, small donors and especially beneficiaries lack such a 
power to sanction and can only withhold future donations or reject receiving 
the benefits (Cordery and Baskerville, 2005).  
Overall, although some literature suggests that for-profit policies can lead to 
a more effective and efficient not-for-profit sector (Bradley et al., 2003), 
applying for-profit sector policies in the not-for-profit sector is argued not to 
be in line with, and may even hamper, not-for-profit aims and missions 
(Landsberg, 2004). 
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As the subject of this thesis is charities, which are not-for-profit organisations, 
the main focus of the literature will be on the not-for-profit sector. However, 
as will be discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, studies in the for-profit sector 
have been drawn on because key concepts such as `accountability` and 
`governance` derive from the for-profit sector, and most studies of fraud relate 
to the for-profit sector. However, in benefiting from for-profit studies, it is 
necessary to take into account differences in organisational missions and 
objectives, in appropriate accountability and governance structures, and in 
how performance could be evaluated. 
The chapter goes on to analyse in-depth the concept of accountability and 
governance and their impact on especially not-for-profit organisations. 
2.3 Accountability	
To understand the accountability relationship, various questions should be 
answered: to whom is a duty of accountability owed (Najam, 1996), what type 
of accountability is demanded, and through which mechanisms can 
accountability be discharged  (Ebrahim, 2003a). This section first examines 
what accountability means, to help in drawing up a framework for 
accountability, and then assesses accountability regarding stakeholders, 
purposes and discharge mechanisms. 
2.3.1 The	meaning	of	accountability	
In terms of history and semantics, the terms ‘accounting’ and ‘accountability’ 
both derive from the Latin word ‘accomptare’ (to account) and these words 
became part of the English language after the Norman conquest (Bovens, 
2007; Bovens, 2006; Oldroyd, 1995). Broadbent and Laughlin (2013, p.11-
15) state that although accounting and accountability are different terms, they 
are connected to each other as accountability systems are designed to solve 
the problems associated with inefficiencies of ‘traditional accounting’, which 
is incapable of providing sufficient expost information. While accounting 
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deals more with recording and reporting in legal means, accountability is a 
process that is maintained with interaction among the organisation and its 
stakeholders (Ebrahim, 2003b). Hyndman and McMahon (2010) argue that 
accountability is more than accounting, which aims at the transfer of 
information. Tower (1993, p.71) views accounting regulation as an 
instrument of accountability that affects the nature of corporate information 
reported. 
Although many definitions of accountability have been provided by 
researchers, the term lacks clear definition. Accountability has been described 
as complex and dynamic (Ebrahim, 2003b), abstract (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996), elusive (Bovens, 2007, p.449), chameleon-like in nature (Sinclair, 
1995) and vague (Mulgan, 2000). Ebrahim (2005), stressing the difference 
between accounting and accountability, expresses that accountability is 
relational rather than absolute. Pollitt and Hupe (2011, p.642) posit that, with 
governance and networks, accountability is one of the “magic concepts” 
because of “their broad scope, great flexibility and positive ‘spin.'” 
Accountability proposes a relationship between at least two parties in which 
one of the parties provides information on what he/she has done as Bovens 
(2007, p.450-451) defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his 
or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the 
actor may face consequences.” Also the relationship of accountability 
involves justification of actions and, in case of wrongdoing, imposition of 
liability, as Schedler et al. (1999, p.17) state “A is accountable to B when A 
is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to 
justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”.  
Cutt and Murray (2002, p.1) also drew attention to the fact that accountability 
implies the existence of at least two parties “one who allocates responsibility 
and one who accepts it with an understanding to report on, and account for, 
the manner in which it has been discharged.”  
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Overall, accountability in either the private or public sector, or, as will be 
discussed in detail, in the not-for-profit sector, has been seen as a remedy to 
agency problems, the problems which occur among the parties of the agent 
and the principal (Sinclair, 1995). Much of the literature grounds 
accountability within agency theory where the agent is held to account by the 
principal (Bovens, 2007; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Goodin, 2003; Stewart, 
1984). Agency theory, with stakeholder and stewardship theories, will be 
dealt in detail in the next chapter. The framework for accountability will be 
discussed in the next section.  
2.3.2 A	framework	for	accountability	
To understand the accountability relationship, this section will draw the 
borders for what can be deemed to be accountability and what not. Stewart 
(1984) states that accountability needs a link or a bond to be formed. Stewart 
(1984, p.25) tries to distinguish between “bond of accountability” (which 
formally and contractually defines accountability relationships) and “links of 
account” (which is an informal “recognition of responsiveness”). 
Laughlin (1990, p.97), like Stewart (1984), suggests that an organisation’s 
accountability will be based upon the relationship between the organisation’s 
principals and agents, and distinguishes two aspects of accountability: 
“communal” and “contractual”. The “communal accountability” has a less 
formal set of accountability relationships in which expectations and 
information demand and supply are less structured and defined. The 
“contractual accountability” on the other hand brings a formal set of 
relationships in which expectations and information demand and supply are 
tightly defined and clearly specified. Whereas “contractual accountability” 
envisages the use of written commands and strict accounting-type measures, 
“communal accountability” entails unwritten proofs.  
Broadbent et al. (1996, p.274) contribute to this argument by adding a 
dimension on trust. They argue that in case of low trust between the principal 
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and the agent, the principal will aim to exert a stricter control over the agent 
which will lead to formal accountability mechanisms. On the other hand, a 
high trust environment will allow more informal contracts among the parties. 
Broadbent et al. (1996) overall state that if there is a relative alignment of 
values between principals and agents, communal accountability is more 
likely; in contrast, if this is not the case, the principal may employ more 
contractual forms of accountability.  
Roberts (1991, p.363) also categorises two types of accountability: 
hierarchical (where accountability tends to be more formal) and socialising 
(where accountability is based on “mutual understanding and ties of 
friendship, loyalty and reciprocal obligation”).  
Both Stewart’s (1984) and Laughlin’s (1990) works underline the importance 
of power in accountability settings. Stewart (1984) maintains that full 
accountability occurs when an account is given in a form that is understood 
within a power relationship. Stewart (1984) argues that the accountability 
framework needs the accountee, the institution/individual who expects to 
receive information, to hold power over the person/organisation who provides 
account, who is called the accountor. Cooper and Owen (2007) also highlight 
differentials of power between the accountor and the accountee, which they 
argue shape the level of accountability.  
Ebrahim (2005, p.82) stresses the importance of power in accountability 
design saying that accountability is “about relationships of power among 
multiple organizational actors.” Rubenstein (2007, p.616-617), states a 
problem in accountability of power relations and argues that problems in 
accountability occur when the accountee is to impose sanctions on the 
accountor. Rubenstein defines the “standard model of accountability” as a 
two-sided relationship in which those to whom an obligation is owed 
(“accountability holders”) play a significant role in sanctioning those who are 
being held accountable (“power wielders”). He identifies the problem that 
accountability holders lack the power to sanction power wielders, which leads 
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to the inequality of power between the principal and the agent: “However, if 
accountability holders cannot sanction the power wielder, the power wielder 
has no external incentive to report back to accountability holders regarding 
its compliance with standards. Moreover, it can be very burdensome for 
accountability holders to track down (and publicize) this information 
themselves.” Broadbent et al. (1996) also stress that the “communal” 
accountability provides freedom to the agent to act flexibly which can at times 
be abused by the agent by acting in self-interest. Table 2.1 summarises the 
accountability studies defined in terms of accountability’s strength. 
Table	2.1	Strength	of	Accountability	
Author Informal/Weak 
Accountability 
Formal/Strong   Accountability 
Stewart, 1984 Links of Account Bond of Accountability 
Laughlin, 1990 Communal  Contractual  
Roberts, 1991 Socialising Hierarchical 
Broadbent et al., 1996 High Trust/Alignment            
of Values 
Low Trust/ Alignment of Interests 
Rubenstein, 2007 Weak Accountability 
Holders 
Strong Accountability Holders 
 
As discussed in this section, accountability is structured in different levels 
and forms. The next section tries to locate where not-for-profit organisations 
belong regarding the accountability framework.  
2.3.3 The	framework	for	not-for-profit	organisations	and	charities		
Accountability is crucial for not-for-profit organisations as it provides public 
trust and support for such organisations (Cordery and Morgan, 2013). 
Eisenberg (2000, p.45) argues that their economic and social status gives not-
for-profits an advantage of being less accountable: “because they provide 
good works, they need not be accountable to anybody—including the donors 
who support their work.” Hansmann (1980) argues that, compared to the for-
profit sector, the lack of a profit motive attracts donors to the not-for-profit 
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organisations and attaches trust to them. Hansmann (1980) suggests that the 
high level of trust makes it possible to prevent opportunistic behaviour and 
therefore little monitoring is necessary for not-for-profit organisations.  
However, this attitude has been heavily criticised. For example, Burger and 
Owens (2011) found evidence to suggest that many not-for-profit 
organisations are not entirely honest in their accountability. Desai and 
Yetman (2005), who found that effective regulation reduces compensation 
and enhances accountability, argue, contrary to Hansmann (1980), that the 
non-existence of ‘owners’ leads to less effective monitoring and therefore 
opportunism. Breen (2013) argues that the lack of a market in not-for-profit 
organisations leads to an absence of a reaction from the related parties which 
leads to weaker compliance and accountability. Ebrahim (2003a, p.814) 
stresses that having multiple stakeholders with competing demands beclouds 
the situation. Although donors have been found to be the most influential 
stakeholder group (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a; Hyndman, 1990), this 
complexity seems not to be solved. A weakness of not-for-profit 
organisations is that they do not have a clearly expressed accountability route 
to their stakeholders (Najam, 1996); Salamon et al. (2000) defines this 
situation as the ‘accountability gap.' 
Also as Stewart’s (1984) analysis states, in charities, many stakeholders are 
not able to hold the charity to account. Britton (2008) argues that not-for-
profit organisations’ stakeholders are reluctant and lack the incentives to 
monitor the not-for-profits.  Small donors and especially beneficiaries appear 
to have restricted power to hold charities to account (Connolly and Hyndman, 
2013a; Cordery and Baskerville, 2011). Connolly et al. (2013b) argue that 
lack of power of the principal might lead to information asymmetry. They 
argue that this is especially true for small donors as they lack the power to 
request information. Wellens and Jegers (2011) suggest that beneficiaries are 
neglected by not-for-profit organisations in discharging their accountabilities 
because they are believed to possess a limited effect on decision making.  
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Laughlin (1990) suggests that, if there is an alignment of values between 
principals and agents, communal accountability is more likely; in contrast, if 
the opposite holds true, the principal may employ more contractual forms of 
accountability. Connolly and Hyndman (2017) argue that charities due to 
their nature are expected to align with a more socialising and communal 
accountability structure.  
As a result, the accountability structure of not-for-profit organisations, in 
general, is accepted to be less formal in nature, and even in some cases non-
existent, as summarised in Figure 2.1. In the following section an attempt is 
made to answer the ‘accountability to whom’ question for for-profit, public 
and not-for-profit organisations 
2.3.4 Stakeholders	(accountability	to	whom?)	
Organisations are required to discharge accountability in terms of legislation 
for a limited basis, such as disclosing financial information, but can be held 
accountable to a broader variety of groups (e.g. individuals, other 
organisations, communities, governments), called stakeholders, which in a 
healthy relationship make organisations legitimate and will increase their 
reputation leading to competitive advantage (Connolly and Hyndman, 2017). 
Stakeholders are defined as “other groups to whom the corporation is 
responsible in addition to stockholders: those groups who have a stake in the 
actions of the corporation.” (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p.89). 
From the viewpoint of the stakeholder theory, accountability requires an 
analysis of the stakeholder groups and their hierarchy or importance. Freeman 
and Reed (1983, p.93) proposed a two-dimensional grid map to situate the 
stakeholders, in which the first dimension is  “interest” or “stake” of a 
stakeholder and the second dimension is the power of the stakeholder which 
is used to affect the decisions and functioning of the organisation. Mitchell et 
al. (1997, p.854) introduced the notion of stakeholder saliency, arguing that 
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the salience of stakeholders rests upon the stakeholder’s position regarding 
three attributes:  
(1) the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of 
the stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the 
stakeholder's claim on the firm.  Building upon this typology, we 
further propose a theory of stakeholder salience. In this theory we 
suggest a dynamic model, based upon the identification typology, that 
permits the explicit recognition of situational uniqueness and 
managerial perception to explain how managers prioritize 
stakeholder relationships.  
 
Figure	2.3	Qualitative	Classes	of	Stakeholders	
Source  (Mitchell et al. (1997, p.872)	
Mitchell et al. (1997) classified stakeholders as (1) Dormant (2) Discretionary 
(3) Demanding (4) Dominant (5) Dangerous (6) Dependent (7) Definitive and 
(8) Non-stakeholder, as can be seen from Figure 2.3. Stakeholders who hold 
all three of the attributes are accepted to be the most salient (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2017). Scott and Lane (2000) suggested that managers are more 
attentive to stakeholders whom they perceive to be definitive. Magness 
(2008), by using the Mitchell et al. (1997) theory, found that the definitive 
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stakeholder is transient in nature and therefore can change depending on 
different circumstances.  
Three categories of stakeholders have been identified in the not-for-profit 
sector: upward to donors, funders, and regulators; downward to beneficiaries 
and the local community and laterally to themselves and among not-for-profit 
organisations and to either paid or voluntary staff and board members 
(Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006; Najam, 1996). 
Upward accountability is accepted to be the most crucial type because, if done 
properly, it can attract funding (Edwards and Hulme, 1995). However, 
Ebrahim (2005) argues that accountability focused only on donors can 
jeopardize long-term objectives of an organisation and is detrimental. Unlike 
the situation for donors, not-for-profit organisations do not have a legal 
responsibility to account to beneficiaries, as beneficiaries do not typically 
have any legal power to sanction not-for-profit organsations, therefore 
charities often accept downward accountability as an ethical and moral issue 
(Agyemang et al., 2017; Banks et al., 2015; Najam, 1996). Crawford et al. 
(2018) also found that not-for-profit organisations recognise the need for a 
broader accountability (Cordery et al., 2019) to all stakeholders, however they 
especially prioritise accountability to donors and regulators. The 
accountability needs of donors and beneficiaries are not found to contradict 
each other or to be dichotomous but rather to be supportive of each other 
(Uddin and Belal, 2019). For example, Connolly and Hyndman (2017) have 
found that donors are willing to cede their accountability needs in favour of 
the beneficiaries. 
Ebrahim (2003b) analyses the relationship between non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and their key stakeholders: funders/donors, regulators 
and beneficiaries. Figure 2.4 shows that the funder/donor is the principal of 
the organisation and the organisation is the principal for the beneficiaries and 
the regulators. The figure also depicts that the beneficiaries can just exit the 
relationship or voice their concerns but are limited in power. Ebrahim (2003b) 
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argues that the principal-agent relationship is more complicated for 
beneficiaries because NGOs are more powerful as they provide resources to 
the beneficiaries and beneficiaries possess only the threat to complain or 
refuse the service. 
	
Figure	2.4	Relationship	with	stakeholders	
Source (Ebrahim, 2003b, p.201) 
Research shows that stakeholders in not-for-profit organisations and 
especially in charities lack the power to affect the managers or board of 
trustees of the organisations (Valeau et al., 2019). Power of stakeholders plays 
a crucial role in discharging accountability for not-for-profit organisations 
(Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Flack and Ryan, 2004).  
Connolly and Hyndman (2017) argue that, because of restricted powers, 
stakeholders are dependent on charities themselves to gain information. 
Research shows that funders/donors were the primary stakeholder and the 
most effective and powerful one, to whom accountability has to be discharged 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a; Ebrahim, 2003b; Jetty and Beattie, 2009; 
Lee, 2004). Although beneficiaries seem to be catching up with the donors, 
they lack legal or economic power, and the difficulty in measuring and after 
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discharging accountability to beneficiaries means that they lag behind 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a).  
Cordery and Baskerville (2005, p.14-15) used the (Mitchell et al., 1997) 
model to explain charity accountability. They argue that, unlike donors, who 
shift from being more powerful to less, beneficiaries can remain in the 
discretionary or dependent categories as they lack the power to oversee the 
charities. Knox and Gruar (2007, p.123), again using the Mitchell et al. (1997) 
stakeholder salience model, found that grant recipients and donors were 
perceived as the most important stakeholder; beneficiaries, on the other hand, 
had been perceived as having low importance by charity managers, not 
holding any one of the three attributes and therefore  revealed as being 
“unclassified” or “nonstakeholder” in the stakeholder salience model. Ihsan 
et al. (2016) also used the Mitchell et al. (1997) stakeholder salience model 
found donors (waqif) to be definitive, the regulator dominant and 
beneficiaires to be dependent stakeholders. 
Keating and Frumkin (2003) propose a seven-component model to explain 
the accountability process, where external stakeholders (user community) can 
affect the organisation through assessing their performance by financial 
disclosure. Keating and Frumkin (2003) posit that donors’ and beneficiaries’ 
involvement in the process of decision making is limited due to lack of power, 
access and understanding the financial information disclosed.  
Edwards and Hulme (1995) argue that, as a result of the environmental nature 
of the not-for-profit organisations, a variety of stakeholders may lead to 
multiple accountabilities which may result in over- or under-procurement of 
information to the stakeholders. Ebrahim (2003b) also states that the dual role 
of the not-for-profit organisations as both principal and agents makes their 
accountability harder to understand. Connolly et al. (2015) suggest that, 
although a broad discharge of accountability is beneficial for all parties, a 
balance has to be found in meeting accountability needs of some stakeholders 
and not damaging other stakeholders’ priorities and risk misperceptions. It 
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has also been suggested that a ‘holistic accountability’ for not-for-profit 
organisations that is inclusive and aims to reach every stakeholder to ensure 
legitimacy will be more beneficial for the sector (Connolly and Hyndman, 
2017; Ebrahim, 2005; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).   
In this section, the literature on stakeholders (accountability to whom?) has 
been assessed. The importance of identifying and prioritising stakeholders  
(Mitchell et al., 1997), which is crucial in effectively discharging 
accountability was analysed. Also, stakeholder identification for for-profit, 
public and not-for-profit sectors was discussed and the main differences 
among the sectors were highlighted. The next section discusses the purposes 
the literature provides for accountability being discharged for. 
2.3.5 Purpose	(accountability	for	what?)		
Various models have been developed to examine bases of accountability. 
Although each study identified the several purposes for accountability to be 
discharged, under different names, they generally fall under the categories of 
financial, performance (outcome), strategic and fiduciary (legal purposes) 
(Dhanani and Connolly, 2012). In this section, literature on accountability 
purposes will be summarised briefly with an emphasis on the not-for-profit 
sector at the end of the section. 
Stewart (1984) presented a ‘ladder’ relating to public accountability in which 
each ‘step’ demonstrated a different form of accountability. The ladder 
consisted of the steps of accountability for probity and legality, accountability 
for process, accountability for performance, accountability for programme 
and accountability for policy. Hayes (1996) reduces Stewart’s bases to a 
simpler set of four steps: fiscal accountability, process accountability, 
programme accountability and accountability for priorities. Brody (2002) also 
provides four components of not-for-profit accountability: fiscal 
responsibility/avoidance of fraud, good governance, adherence to mission 
and donor direction, and demonstration of the organisation’s programme 
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effectiveness. Stone and Ostrower (2007) suggest performance and delivery 
of programmes, collaboration with partners, and enhanced civic democracy 
as concepts for which accountability has to be discharged. Andreaus and 
Costa (2014) propose three categories of accountability: economic, 
purpose/mission and social impact/stakeholders. 
Bovens (2007) classifies accountability as being based on the nature of the 
forum (political, legal, administrative, professional and social), the actor 
(corporate, hierarchical, collective and individual), the conduct (financial, 
procedural and product accountability) and  the obligation (vertical, diagonal 
and horizontal). Mulgan (2000) distinguishes between institutions and 
devices of accountability in his work regarding public sector accountability. 
Kearns (1996) suggests that the environment of accountability is made up of 
four dimensions, which are legal, anticipatory, negotiated and discretionary. 
Sinclair (1995, p.223) also mentions five forms of accountability: political, 
managerial, public, professional and personal. Sinclair (1995, p.229-232) 
stresses that the discourse of accountability can shift, and provides an 
example: “… even when the former managerial accountability, as the 
property of a contract, is dispensable, there is always personal accountability 
to fall back on. Research also suggests that accountability is continually being 
constructed”. 
For all the sectors, for-profit, public or not-for-profit, accountability has 
shifted to a broader approach than a narrow one (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
Accountability for just compliance and financial aspects has expanded to 
cover performance, efficiency, effectiveness and outcomes (Stewart, 1984; 
Stone and Ostrower, 2007). Rosair and Taylor (2000), distinguish between 
fiduciary and managerial accountability, where the first one emphasises 
compliance with laws and procedures which aims to satisfy a narrower 
stakeholder group, while the second one focuses on efficiency and 
performance to a wider stakeholder group. 
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Regarding not-for-profit organisations there is a tendency to put 
accountability for finance and performance (Kearns, 1994) in the lead, which, 
it is argued, enables the building of community trust (Saxton et al., 2012).  
Connolly et al. (2015) divide managerial accountability into financial 
managerial accountability and non-financial managerial accountability, 
where the first one analyses usage of funds and the second measures 
charitable objectives. Dhanani and Connolly (2012, p.1145-1146) identify 
four themes of not-for-profit accountability:  strategic accountability, 
fiduciary accountability, financial accountability and procedural 
accountability. They argue that strategic accountability deals with what the 
organisations achieved, fiduciary accountability emphasis compliance with 
laws and governance, financial accountability concerns with financial outlook 
of the organisation and procedural accountability deals with how the 
organisation achieves its goals. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) suggest that a 
holistic view of accountability is needed for better discharge of 
accountability. Bovens (2007) states that to be accountable for finances, 
fairness and performance, charities can select from a myriad of informal and 
formal accountability mechanisms.  
As will be discussed later in the chapter, the stakeholders of charities are not 
satisfied with the accountability discharged as they want to be informed more 
about performance rather than financial aspects. 
2.3.6 Discharging	accountability	(mechanisms	of	accountability)	
This section examines how accountability is being discharged towards an 
organisation’s stakeholders. Tower (1993, p.61) argues that the accountability 
is the most appropriate means of communication with stakeholders regarding 
a societal viewpoint because of its broader perspective. Ebrahim (2003a, 
p.815) classifies accountability mechanisms into five categories: “reports and 
disclosure statements, performance assessments and evaluations, 
participation, self-regulation, social audits.” Goodin (2003) argues that 
mechanisms of accountability are devices or instruments that enable and 
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ensure accountability. He distinguishes three mechanisms of accountability: 
hierarchical, competitive and social. According to Dhanani (2009), charity 
accountability was seen to be discharged through disclosures on charity aims 
and objectives; organisational activities; organisational performance; and 
future plans and strategy.   
This section will try to assess accountability mechanisms under the headings 
of: a) disclosure and reporting; b) audit; c) monitoring by the board; and d) 
other accountability mechanisms. 
2.3.6.1 Disclosure	and	reporting	
Accountability is especially discharged by distribution of information and 
therefore disclosure of statements and reports of organisations (Dhanani and 
Connolly, 2012). To comply with legislation, financial statements and annual 
reports are discharged by organisations (Tower, 1993). Lee (2004, p.180) 
argues that disclosure is crucial to reach, increase confidence and discharge 
accountability to the general public (citizenry), which he also identifies as a 
stakeholder. 
Disclosure in the for-profit sector is associated with reduced cost of capital 
(Li et al., 2008) and dealing with information asymmetry (Ntim et al., 2017). 
Healy and Palepu (2001) and Athanasakou et al. (2011) discuss market 
reaction to disclosure and suggest that enhanced disclosure is a remedy to the 
agency problem and they show the positive correlation between transparent 
and efficient reporting and disclosure decisions and increasing capital market 
returns. New trends such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) also aim 
to influence and even manage stakeholders’ views on the organisation 
(Cooper and Owen, 2007; Michelon et al., 2015).   
Disclosure is also used to legitimise actions (Ebrahim, 2003b), and to gain 
support or prevent criticism from key stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 1984b). Also, enhanced disclosure is found to promote 
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greater accountability and transparency and provide access to funds (Deegan, 
2002). Disclosure is suggested to promote credibility (McConville, 2017) and 
to reduce dependence on other monitoring costs (Saxton et al., 2012). 
Disclosure is critical for the functioning of efficiency in not-for-profit 
organisations. Tools such as the annual report, financial reports, annual 
review, press releases, website information etc. are important to discharge 
financial and narrative performance information and to meet stakeholder 
information needs (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013b). The lack of the profit 
aspect in the not-for-profit sector increases the importance of the annual 
report rather than relying only on financial statements (Connolly and 
Dhanani, 2009). Chen (2016) found that in not-for-profit organisations 
disclosure of expense reduces the percentage of misreporting and enhances 
director monitoring. Also, although audited financial statements have been 
extensively provided  for donors, they regard voluntary disclosure, especially 
disclosure and information on performance, as more important (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013b; Hyndman, 1990; Hyndman, 1991). Although the 
mandatory disclosure requirements are determined by the legislation, 
voluntary disclosure practices are prioritised by importance and concern of 
the issue and to legitimise organisations’ actions and strategies (Samkin and 
Schneider, 2010). Voluntary disclosure in not-for-profit organisations 
enhances public trust and legitimacy (Lee, 2004). Behn et al. (2010) found 
that larger not-for-profit organisations which receive substantial donations 
tend to disclose information voluntarily.  Ntim et al. (2017) argue that 
voluntary disclosure reduces the uncertainties and provides a more balanced 
power relationship with the external environment and can become a medium 
of stakeholder management in not-for-profit organisations.  
Research suggests that disclosure is valuable to stakeholders in promoting 
accountability. Britton (2008) suggests that voluntary rather than mandatory 
disclosure is more suitable for not-for-profit organisations, if the government 
acts as a major donor. Simnett (1987) found that the determinants of income, 
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number of members, the presence of a professional administrator, geographic 
dispersion of members, and auditing of financial statements were significant 
factors influencing not-for-profit voluntary disclosure. 
2.3.6.2 Audit	
Independently scrutinised accounts are accepted as tool to demonstrate 
accountability (Power, 1997). Charlton (2002), concurring that we live in the 
‘audit society’ (Power, 1997), states that the coverage of accountability has 
extended through its financial usage and argues that an accountable 
organisation provides a comprehensive presentation of its activities. Tower 
(1993, p.71) states that, although necessary, audit is not a sufficient condition 
for discharging accountability: “The audit role is viewed as only one of the 
parts, albeit an important one, in the accounting regulatory framework for 
corporate reporting.” Audit is also argued to provide assurance and to be a 
condition for an action to be accountable (Power, 1997). There is a consensus 
in the literature that effective audit can deter fraud and misconduct (Agrawal 
and Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Ege, 2013).    
Bovens (2007) argues that auditors are agents of accountability, who are 
public actors deemed to be independent of bias. Moore et al. (2006) state that 
independence of the audit process is essential for an effective role in the 
accountability of an organisation. They argue that the financial scandals have 
proved that the relationship between the auditor and client is not transparent 
and independent enough and harbours conflicts of interest, and therefore this 
deformity causes accountability to be also defective. Baumüller (2013), in his 
study on audits in the not-for-profit sector, argues that a quality audit and 
therefore accountability is related to the skills and also the independence of 
the auditor.  
High-quality audit and the existence of audit committees build trust in 
stakeholders. The existence of an effective audit committee implies more 
monitoring and leads to fewer illegal actions in an organisation (Zaman et al., 
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2011). Efficiency and independence of audit committee (Abbott et al., 2000; 
Dechow et al., 1996) has a positive correlation with fewer sanctions for 
fraudulent or misleading reporting. Ghafran and O'Sullivan (2013) found that 
the more independent the audit committee is, the more the level of external 
audit coverage will increase and the quality of financial statements will be 
enhanced. They also found that the presence of an audit committee provides 
trust to the stakeholders. Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Ntim et al. (2017) 
found a positive correlation between the existence of an audit committee and 
the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Audit (Keating and Frumkin, 2003) and audit committees (Pridgen and Wang, 
2012) are found to enhance accountability and control mechanisms in not-
for-profit organisations. Parsons (2007) argues that disclosure of audited 
financial statements assures stakeholders in not-for-profit organisations. Ntim 
et al. (2017) investigated voluntary disclosures in UK higher education 
institutions’ (HEIs) annual reports and found a positive correlation between 
the level of disclosure and audit committee quality, governing board diversity, 
governor independence and the presence of a governance committee.  
Jetty and Beattie (2012) argue that the existence of an audit committee in not-
for-profit organisations assures quality and meets monitoring expectations 
and deters agency problems by establishing effective communication 
channels among parties. They found that larger board size, higher number of 
trustees and the existence of a two-tier board and receipt of government grants 
were associated with having an audit committee. Independence of the auditor 
also influences the outcome and efficiency of the audit in the not-for-profit 
sector. Kitching (2009) found that donors of not-for-profit organisations value 
more and donate more to high-quality audited not-for-profit organisations.  
Audit in not-for-profit organisations is argued to have some different features 
from audit in the for-profit sector. One of these is the fee difference between 
the two sectors, in which not-for-profit auditors are paid less (Verbruggen et 
al., 2015).  Beattie et al. (2001) examine audit risks in the charity sector, 
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finding that charity auditors charge less than a market-rate audit fee. They 
discuss three reasons for this: lower risk because of trustworthiness of 
charities, altruism by audit companies and lower audit quality. They argue 
that the lack of shareholders reduces the pressure on auditors for litigation 
loss, which impairs accountability. This is because, although the board of 
trustees resembles the board of directors in the for-profit sector, the charity 
lacks the influence provided by the shareholders who can blame and sue 
auditors for litigation loss. 
2.3.6.3 Monitoring:	accountability	provided	by	the	board	
This sub-section begins by discussing the role of a board in for-profit 
organisations. Although the board has a variety of responsibilities (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003), monitoring the management is one of the most important. 
As Coles et al. (2008, p.329) state, “The board of directors of a corporation is 
meant to perform the critical functions of monitoring and to advise top 
management.” Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that the board’s duty is to 
mitigate agency conflicts through monitoring the management of the 
organisation. Scholars (Brown, 2005; Miller, 2002) also suggest that the 
board has a fiduciary duty to monitor the management and be accountable to 
the ‘owners’ of the organisation. It is also expressed that, if used as an 
effective monitoring device, board oversight will prevent opportunistic 
behaviours and misconduct (Gibelman et al., 1997; Miller, 2002). 
The attributes of the board has also been found to related with the accuracy 
and quality of monitoring and therefore accountability discharged by the 
board (Brown, 2002; Williams et al., 2005). For example, Brennan and 
Solomon (2008) identify board governance as a key mechanism of 
accountability and examine the literature regarding board attributes and 
accountability. 
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Board tenure 
Directors’ length of tenure is one of the most common means to analyse 
independence and therefore to assess if monitoring is conducted appropriately 
or not. The literature is divided, as some argue that a long tenure leads to 
effective accountability and monitoring (Beasley, 1996) while others argue 
that longer tenure leads to dependency on the same people and therefore less 
monitoring (Anderson et al., 2004).  
Studies show that, with the passage of time, structural connections affect the 
relations between board members (Davis, 1996; Vafeas, 2003) and even cause 
social distancing against board members who deviate from the ‘norms’ of the 
board (Westphal and Khanna, 2003). Long tenures therefore negatively affect 
independent decision making. Herman (1981) posits that, if boards embrace 
a too cohesive and friendly environment, this will endanger monitoring. 
Williams et al. (2005) found that the longer the tenure, the more risk that 
misconduct will occur. Hillman et al. (2011) argue that shareholders are not 
happy with longer board member tenure.  The longer the tenure, the more 
easily can a director influence other board members and managers (Anderson 
et al., 2004) and lead to excessive relationships with the management  (Ryan 
and Wiggins, 2004). Brown and Guo (2010) found that longer tenure makes 
CEOs more powerful and as a result there is a reduction in the time spent on 
board duties in monitoring and accountability.  
Interestingly, Xu et al. (2017) found a negative correlation between average 
age of the board of directors and CEO financial fraud, as the older board will 
be more experienced and less willing to accept wrongdoing.  Li and Wahid 
(2018) found that, if the tenure of a board is diverse, the less accounting 
restatements and excess compensation occur. They argue that tenure diversity 
will increase the effectiveness of monitoring as it combines the positive 
aspects of long and short board tenure.  
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Now turning attention to not-for-profit organisations, there is little literature 
on board tenure. What there is seems to favour long tenure. Brown et al. 
(2012) argue that increased tenure positively affects the monitoring role of 
the not-for-profit board members.  Olson (2000)  and O'Regan and Oster 
(2005) found that increased tenure of board members has positive influence 
on performance and monitoring up to a certain length of time. In the UK, the 
tenure of non-executives serving on a for-profit board is restricted. According 
to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2016b), after six years non-
executives are subject to rigorous review (B.2.3.). The 2018 version of the 
Governance Code (2018) requires all directors to be re-elected annually 
(Provision 18). However, the Charity Governance Code lacks such a 
provision (Governance, 2017). 
Overall, although studies vary both short and very long tenure seem to have 
a negative effect on monitoring and accountability. 
Board size 
Like other board attributes, research regarding the impact of for-profit board 
size on accountability and monitoring has been inconclusive. Because of free-
riding, larger boards are found to be less efficient in accountability and 
monitoring duties (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996) and smaller 
boards are more enhanced in monitoring (Schnake and Williams, 2008). 
Jensen (1993) argues that the larger the board the harder will be coordination, 
and it becomes easier for the CEO to increase his or her dominance over the 
board, and also that smaller boards will be better in pursuing monitoring 
duties. However, Coles et al. (2008) argue that the impact of board size on 
effectiveness depends on the complexity of the firm; the more the complex a 
firm’s transactions are the larger the board would be to be more effective. 
Therefore it can be argued that there is no one size fits all in terms of board 
size (Cornforth and Simpson, 2002). 
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Compared to for-profit studies, not-for-profit studies favour a bigger board 
and argue that larger boards are better to enhance monitoring. O'Regan and 
Oster (2005) argue that the effect of board size is less ambiguous in the not-
for-profit sector. Larger boards have been found to lead to enhanced 
monitoring in not-for-profit organisations (Bai, 2013; Olson, 2000). Ostrower 
(2007) argues that having a large board in not-for-profit organisations does 
not weaken the board’s effectiveness but enhances fundraising and diversity. 
Williams et al. (2005) found that a larger board is more effective in 
monitoring and therefore prevents wrongdoing better. De Andrés-Alonso et 
al. (2009) suggest that the bigger the not-for-profit organisation gets, the more 
monitoring it needs and so it needs a larger board.  Brown and Guo (2010) on 
their study regarding not-for-profit organisations found that bigger and more 
diversified boards were more enthusiastic about discussing issues of 
monitoring and oversight. The effect of board size on accountability 
discharge through disclosure was less clear, although most research found a 
positive correlation with larger boards and disclosure (Allegrini and Greco, 
2013). 
Board diversity 
As before, this survey begins with for-profit studies. Board diversity 
(meaning board members being not homogeneous in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, age, profession, etc.) has also been argued to influence monitoring 
and accountability (Adams et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2015).  Walt and 
Ingley (2003, p.219) state that, regarding governance, “the concept of 
diversity relates to board composition and the varied combination of 
attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by individual board 
members in relation to board process and decision-making.”  
Board diversity is found to have a positive effect on monitoring (Ntim, 2015). 
Brown and Guo (2010) also found that bigger and diversified board members 
were more enthusiastic about discussing issues of monitoring and oversight. 
The gender balance of the board is an important attribute that has been 
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researched into. Monitoring is found to be increased by gender diverse boards 
(Cumming et al., 2015). For boards which are more gender diverse, the 
occurrence of conflict is lower and so monitoring is enhanced (Nielsen and 
Huse, 2010).  
Turning to the not-for-profit sector, Callen et al. (2003), in line with the 
argument of (Fama and Jensen, 1983b), found that the existence of donors on 
a board enhances monitoring and performance of the organisation. Brown 
(2002) also argues that board inclusiveness enhances monitoring. Wellens 
and Jegers (2016) in their study regarding not-for-profit beneficiaries’ 
influence in decision making and activity, found that, although mechanisms 
that aim to include beneficiaries exist, they are insufficient and there are rarely 
representatives of beneficiaries on the board. 
Buse et al. (2016) argue that the diversity of the board in not-for-profit 
organisations regarding the ethnicity, gender and age enhances and has a 
direct influence on governance practices. Olson (2000) studied boards of not-
for-profit colleges and found that diverse occupational background enhanced 
monitoring capabilities of the organisations. Guo and Musso (2007) posit that 
diversity in terms of stakeholders’ existence on the boards of not-for-profit 
organisations will be more inclusive and therefore will enhance 
accountability. 
Another issue for research is to assess how diverse the boards in not-for-profit 
organisations actually are. Steane and Christie (2001) argue that not-for-profit 
boards compared to for-profit ones are more diverse as women participate 
highly and ethnic groups are represented fairly. O'Regan and Oster (2005) 
also note that not-for-profit boards are typically described as being diverse, 
therefore a more diverse not-for-profit board will not have the same affect in 
terms of accountability and monitoring as it does in the for-profit sector. 
On a quite different point, board diversity is argued to positively influence 
fundraising in not-for-profit organisations (Brown, 2002; Siciliano, 1996). 
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Siciliano (1996) found, based on his work on 240 YMCA organisations, that 
age diverse boards were more effective in attracting more funds. He also 
established that, while occupational diversity of the board members had a 
positive effect on both social performance and fundraising, gender diversity 
among board members only favoured social performance.  
Board independence 
The theory of Fama and Jensen (1983b) regarding for-profit board 
composition suggests that having a higher percentage of independent 
directors increases the monitoring features of the board. Other scholars agree 
that the more independent a board is the more it is efficient and effective in 
carrying out its monitoring duties (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Coles et al., 
2008; Yermack, 1996). Independence of non-executive directors is found to 
have a positive effect on disclosure and accountability (Armstrong et al., 
2014; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). Anderson et al. (2004) found that the 
larger and more independent a board is and the more independent an audit 
committee is, the lower is the cost of debt.  
Independence also makes it possible to align compensation of CEO with 
shareholder priorities (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004) and effective corporate 
social responsibility (Chang et al., 2017) and disclosure (Goh et al., 2016). 
Goh et al. (2016) found that independent boards, which enhance voluntary 
disclosure, have fewer information asymmetry problems. Lehn et al. (2009) 
posit that information asymmetry increases with lack of monitoring and 
outside directors.  
Interlocking and social networks (Heracleous and Murray, 2001) may 
negatively affect monitoring of a board. Bebchuk et al. (2002) state that 
relationships between the board members and executives damage the 
independence of the board. Hong et al. (2016) argue that a CEO who was 
hired earlier than the board members may be sympathetic to the board 
members because of his/her role in the nomination process. Directors being 
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appointed by and having ties with the CEO tend to be more supportive of the 
CEO and less focused on monitoring (Frankforter et al., 2000). Executives 
who are also board members are argued to decrease the independence level 
of the board and therefore monitoring and accountability (Bebchuk et al., 
2011). 
Holding multiple board seats is suggested to prevent directors from focusing 
on their monitoring tasks. Westphal and Zajac (1997) propose that CEOs of 
organisations who also serve as outside directors on other boards are reluctant 
to oppose CEOs, which hinders board independence. Interlocking directors 
are argued to devote less time to monitoring and accountability of the 
organisation (Beasley, 1996; Devos et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 2011; Jiraporn 
et al., 2008). However, Ferris et al. (2003) found that sitting on multiple 
boards do not have a negative affect on board directors’ monitoring or 
accountability duties. They argue that holding multiple directorships do not 
cause to fraudulent actions.  
Miller-Millesen (2003) posits that the increase in professionalisation in the 
executives will have a negative affect on monitoring and therefore monitoring 
activities will be deterred. 
Kang et al. (2007, p.197) argue that ‘independence’ is very vague as “Most 
companies identify their directors in terms of “executive” and “non-executive” 
directors, and disclose very little information regarding their directors to 
external stakeholders. Subsequently, studies examining the independence of 
directors have found it very difficult to compare one company’s definition of 
director independence to other companies.”  
Another special problem that arises for not-for-profit organisations is that all 
board members are expected to be independent. Callen et al. (2010) argue that 
the metrics, such as the proportion of executives on the board, used to measure 
board independence for for-profit organisations are not that appropriate in 
not-for-profit organisations. They argue that it is not common for executives 
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to be found on the board of not-for-profit organisations and only 
exceptionally do executives become the majority of not-for-profit boards.  
Duality of roles 
CEO duality (i.e., one person being both chairman and chief executive) is one 
of the topics where the for-profit literature agrees: duality leads to inefficient 
monitoring (Pi and Timme, 1993). Duru et al. (2016) found that the CEO 
duality, which has an adverse effect on monitoring, can be relieved by a more 
independent board. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that CEO duality 
enhances the power of the CEO on the board and therefore leads to less 
independence and less monitoring. Tuggle et al. (2010) found that CEO 
duality has a negative affect on monitoring duties of the board. They also 
suggest that dual CEOs have a more powerful impact on the agenda and 
location of board meetings and therefore their influence is greater. Ostrower 
(2007) found that CEO sitting on the board of not-for-profit organisations 
negatively effects the governance and accountability roles of the board. 
Other board attributes 
The culture of the board also impacts monitoring and accountability 
discharged to stakeholders. Jensen (1993) argues that a loose board culture of 
control leads to insufficient monitoring of the managers and to opportunism. 
Laksmana (2008) also found that larger boards with frequent meetings are 
more efficient in disclosing information on managerial pay. O'Regan and 
Oster (2005) found in their study of New York City not-for-profit 
organisations that executives apply pressure by using their dominance and 
power over the board to concentrate more on fundraising instead of 
monitoring. Ostrower (2007) on the other hand argues that as a result of the 
board culture, focusing too much on fundraising negatively affects the duties 
of accountability and monitoring, in not-for-profit organisations. 
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Ebrahim (2003a) identifies self-regulation, which includes developing 
standards and codes of conduct, as a complementary accountability 
mechanism. It had been suggested that well-designed codes of conduct are 
crucial to both the success and failure of an organisation’s monitoring and 
accountability (Collier, 2008).  Miller (2002) argued in her study of not-for-
profit board of directors that lack of a clear code of conduct in a not-for-profit 
organisation leads board members to act on their competencies and not focus 
on organisational goals. She also posits that an amiable environment in a 
board may hinder monitoring as she found that not-for-profit board members 
did not indicate that there was a goal conflict between the board and the 
managers. 
Identification with an organisation (Fiol, 2001) and with stakeholders 
(Hillman et al., 2008) are also suggested as leading to enhanced monitoring 
and accountability. The network and social position of the board members 
also affect their attitudes (Westphal, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
2.3.6.4 Other	accountability	mechanisms	
Accountability discharged to stakeholders enables a high level of engagement 
and interaction. Dialogue (Roberts, 1996) and communicative action 
(Habermas, 1984) is argued to build trust among parties and to enhance 
accountability. Habermas (1984) distinguishes between two social action 
models: communicative and strategic. Whereas strategic action is better 
structured and more formal, communicative action tends to focus on 
relationships among parties and uses linguistic communication which is 
participative in nature. Roberts (1996) suggests a ‘dialogue based 
accountability’ which aims to provide an unmediated relationship between an 
organisation and its stakeholders. Saxton and Guo (2011) argue that 
stakeholder participation is a crucial part of an enhanced accountability 
structure in an organisation. Ebrahim (2003a) identifies participation as 
another accountability tool in which stakeholders become involved in the 
daily routine of an organisation. Ebrahim (2003a) distinguishes participation 
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into four stages: a) consultation with the public, b) involvement of public to 
organisational activities, c) influencing decision making process of the 
organisation, and d) direct involvement to social action.  
Social accountability/audit is an accountability mechanism that enables 
stakeholder involvement in the discharge of accountability. For example,  Fox 
(2015) defines social accountability as oversight and monitoring performed 
by citizen (stakeholder) over organisations. Ebrahim (2003a) supports the use 
of social auditing especially by not-for-profit organisations as it enhances 
information systems of social and environmental roots and provides views 
and comments of stakeholders to be taken into account by the organisations. 
Ebrahim (2003a) also suggests that social auditing empowers reputation of 
not-for-profit organisations and provides important feedback derived from 
the stakeholders.  
Dialogic accountability (Denedo et al., 2019)  is also used whose main aim is 
to engage with stakeholders by using different accountability mechanisms in 
order to facilitate emancipatory transformation especially for stakeholders 
whose accountability needs are not met (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gallhofer et 
al., 2015) and who are not able to voice their concerns or views powerfully 
enough (Bebbington et al., 2007). Denedo et al. (2019) found that the not-for-
profit organisations enhance the visibility and power of power deprived and 
vulnerable stakeholders by enabling social and environmental impacts in their 
accounts and reports.  
The rapidly changing technology also allows new mechanisms of 
communication and therefore accountability to be used. Online disclosure 
(Tremblay-Boire and Prakash, 2015), websites (Gandía, 2011), and social 
media (Guo and Saxton, 2014; Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012; Nah and Saxton, 
2013) are all instruments to provide a ‘dialogue’ with the stakeholders and to 
discharge accountability. Saxton and Waters (2014) argue that social media 
enhances dialogue among the parties and provides a new way to communicate 
and discharge accountability. Saxton and Wang (2014) suggest that social 
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network tools enable not-for-profits to engage better with the stakeholders 
and especially to provide funds. Connolly and Dhanani (2009) found that 
charity websites are a tool to reach a wider stakeholder group. Saxton and 
Guo (2011) in their study regarding web-based accountability on not-for-
profit organisations found that websites are more commonly used for 
disclosing information rather than being an interactive platform to engage 
with stakeholders. 
Regulation is also another tool that provides a link and therefore enhances 
accountability between the organisations and their stakeholders. For example, 
donors pay more if the regulation is effective in sustaining transparency, 
accountability and efficiency (Furneaux and Wymer, 2015). Regulation also 
proved to enhance confidence in charities (Cordery et al., 2017) and therefore 
to increase trust in them (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009).  
Table 2.2 summarises the accountability mechanisms discussed in this 
chapter: 
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Table	2.2	Mechanisms	of	Accountability	
Reporting and 
Disclosure 
• Core mechanism to distribute information and discharge accountability  
• Reduces cost of capital and information asymmetry.  
• Voluntary disclosure enhances public trust and legitimacy  
Audit 
 
• Provide assurance and to be a condition for an action to be accountable,  
• Auditors are agents of accountability, who are public actors independent of bias  
• High-quality audit and the existence of audit committees build trust in stakeholders.  
• Existence of an effective audit committee implies more monitoring and leads to 
fewer lawsuits and illegal actions in an organisation  
Board 
Monitoring: 
Board tenure 
• Literature is divided, as some argue that a long tenure leads to effective 
accountability and monitoring while others argue that longer tenure leads to 
dependency on the same people and therefore less monitoring. Short and very long 
tenure seem to have a negative effect on monitoring and accountability. 
• Structural connections affect the relations between board members and therefore 
negatively affect independent decision making.  
Board 
Monitoring: 
Board 
independence 
• Higher percentage of independent directors increases the monitoring features of the 
board. Independence of non-executive directors is found to have a positive effect on 
disclosure and accountability  
• Enhance voluntary disclosure, have fewer information asymmetry problems 
• Special problem that arises for not-for-profit organisations: metrics, such as the 
proportion of executives on the board, used to measure board independence for for-
profit organisations are not that appropriate in not-for-profit organisations.  
Board 
Monitoring: 
Duality of roles 
• Enhances the power of the CEO on the board and therefore leads to less 
independence and less monitoring.		
Board 
Monitoring: 
Size  
• For-profit organisations: larger boards are found to be less efficient in accountability 
and monitoring duties and smaller boards are more enhanced in.  No one size fits all 
in terms of board size  
• Not-for-profit studies favour a bigger board and argue that larger boards are better to 
enhance monitoring.  
Board 
Monitoring: 
Board 
Diversity 
• Monitoring is found to be increased by gender diverse boards  
• Existence of donors on a board enhances monitoring and performance of the 
organisation.  
• Diverse occupational background enhanced monitoring capabilities  
• board diversity is argued to positively influence fundraising in not-for-profit 
organisations  
• However, not-for-profit boards are typically described as being diverse, therefore a 
more diverse not-for-profit board will not have the same affect as it does in the for-
profit sector. 
Board 
Monitoring 
Other Board 
Attributes 
 
• Loose board culture of control leads to insufficient monitoring of the managers and 
to opportunism  
• Well-designed codes of conduct are crucial to both the success and failure of an 
organisation’s monitoring and accountability  
• Identification with an organisation and with stakeholders are enhance monitoring 
and accountability.  
Other 
Accountability 
Mechanisms 
• Dialogue and communicative action build trust among parties and enhances 
accountability. 
• Dialogic accountability’s aim is to engage with stakeholders by using different 
accountability mechanisms in order to facilitates emancipatory transformation 
especially for stakeholders who are not able to voice their concerns or views 
powerful enough    
• Direct participation identified as another accountability tool and mechanism process 
in which stakeholders being involved in the daily routine of an organisation.  
• Social accountability/audit is an accountability mechanism that enables stakeholder 
involvement as it enhances information systems of social and environmental roots 
and provides views and comments of stakeholders to be taken into account by the 
organisations.  
• Online disclosure websites, and social media are all instruments to provide a 
‘dialogue’  
Source: Author 
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Overall all accountability mechanisms play a substantial role, but connectedly 
operated mechanisms will bring the ultimate benefit to both the organisations 
and their stakeholders (Connolly and Hyndman, 2017; Morrison and 
Salipante, 2007).  
In the next section, the literature on governance will be discussed. 
2.4 Governance	
2.4.1 The	meaning	of	governance	
As in the case of accountability, the roots of governance derive from Latin 
origin, from the word ‘gubernare’, “meaning ‘to direct, rule or guide’” 
(Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009, p.6). However, as with many 
organisational concepts and terms the concept of ‘governance’ was first 
developed for the for-profit sector and it is far from having a unified 
explanation and definition (Armstrong and Sweeney, 2002). Governance is a 
vague term that is used in various forms and for different purposes (Solomon 
and Solomon, 2004).  
Governance of for-profit organisations (usually referred to as ‘corporate 
governance’) emerged as a prominent concept especially after the 1980s with 
the impact of hazardous scandals and misconduct (Cadbury Report, 1992).  
The importance of governance was highlighted by scandals such as Enron in 
2001 and others in the preceding years (Vinten, 2002). 
Various governance principles and rules were developed especially after the 
1980s. Sir Adrian Cadbury’s Cadbury Report (1992) was composed of 
recommendations to organisations that were damaged by allegations of 
misconduct such as fraud (Cadbury Report, 1992). The G20/OECD Principles 
of Governance (G20/OECD, 2015) suggest that the organisation should 
safeguard the rights and benefits of shareholders, including the stakeholders 
and should be transparent and disclose relevant information. The principles 
also highlight accountability as an important part of governance success and 
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that the boards are responsible for monitoring the management in order both 
to be accountable to the stakeholders and to ensure high quality governance 
(G20/OECD, 2015).  
Governance can be defined as procedures (Brigham and Daves, 2004), 
authority (Speckbacher, 2008, p.298) systems (Cornforth and Simpson, 
2003)), principles and rules (Ghafran, and Yasmin, 2019) that direct, steer 
(Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009), guide and control (Cornforth, 2003) how 
an organisation is governed (for example, by a board of directors) and how 
the governing body of an organisation is accountable to the stakeholders for 
the decisions and operations of the organisation (Hyndman and McDonnell, 
2009). The Cadbury Report (1992) defined governance as a system “by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (1992, p.7).  
Williamson (1983) suggests that governance is made up of mechanisms that 
protect interests and investments. In for-profit organisations, governance  
increasingly acknowledging a wider stakeholder environment rather than 
focusing only on shareholders (Speckbacher, 2008, p.298). Regarding the 
not-for-profit sector, Hyndman and McDonell (2009) suggest that governance 
should be including all stakeholders in order to diminish conflict of interest 
among the organisation and the stakeholders.  
The next section and the following sections focus on governance in not-profit-
organisations only. 
2.4.2 A	framework	for	governance	in	not-for-profit	organisations	
The term ‘governance’ does not have an exact definition for the not-for-profit 
sector (Ostrower and Stone, 2006, Cornforth, 2012). Dubnick (2003) suggests 
that there is no ‘gold standard’ for governance in the not-for-profit sector, 
when especially it is very hard to determine a definitive governance structure 
where organisational, geographical, and stakeholder needs differ for each 
entity. 
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Fundamental aspects of governance are similar to those relating to for-profit 
organisations. However, unlike the for-profit sector, due to lack of an owner 
or residual claimant (Ostrower and Stone, 2006, Speckbacker, 2008), and the 
absence of markets (Wellens and Jegers, 2014b), not-for-profit organisations 
should be governed in such a way that the needs of multiple stakeholders are 
met (Callen and Klein, 2010, Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). Dellaportas 
et al (2012) and Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that one of the biggest 
differences between not-for-profit and for-profit governance is that while 
stakeholders and especially shareholders legally participate in forming and 
maintenance of governance in for-profit organisations, the wide range of 
stakeholders in the not-for-profit sector are deprived of these rights and 
therefore have limited capability to influence governance making in not-for-
profit organisations.  
Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, p.9) stress the two main components or 
ideas of not-for-profit governance. They argue that the first component is 
based on the view that not-for-profit organisations are grounded on 
relationships between stakeholder groups and the “distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among and within the various stakeholder groups involved, 
including the way in which they are accountable to one another.” The second 
component of governance that Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, p.9) 
highlight is related to the performance of not-for-profit organisations “in 
terms of setting objectives or goals and the means of attaining them”.  Overall, 
Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, p.9) in providing a definition to not-for-
profit governance stress, the importance of stakeholders and accountability as 
well as performance and argue that governance connects two ideas: 
“Governance as the set of relationships between stakeholders with the idea of 
governance as ensuring the organization is effectively run in terms of 
attaining its objectives (which are defined in this case as meeting the needs 
for which the organization was created).” 
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Likewise Sinclair (2010) suggests that governance is built on two main 
components, conformance and performance, and that accountability can be 
regarded as a sub-component of conformance rather than performance. 
Conformance can be defined as the monitoring tasks related to governance 
and is therefore more directly related to accountability mechanisms discussed 
in Section 2.3.6. Monitoring is an important aspect of governance (Ostrower 
and Stone, 2010) which requires monitoring of whether the executives are 
using resources in line with stakeholder expectations.  
Cornforth (2012) argues that conceptualisation of not-for-profit governance 
derives mainly from theories that are developed specifically for the for-profit 
sector. Theorisation of accountability and governance and the theory’s 
usefulness in understanding and building governance and accountability 
structures that may hinder opportunistic behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Bellante et al., 2016) are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Not-for-profit governance studies have especially focused on the board of 
trustees and how the board fulfils its responsibilities (Miller-Millesen, 2003, 
Callen et al., 2003; Jetty and Beattie, 2012).  However Ostrower and Stone 
(2010) and Cornforth (2012) criticise the narrow focus on the board as 
limiting the understanding of not-for-profit governance framework. 
Cornforth (2012) and Ostrower and Stone (2006) suggest that focusing only 
on boards has led researchers to ignore governance structures of multi-faceted 
texture.  
Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) and Harris et al. (2015) suggest that 
governance in not-for-profit organisations is composed of both external and 
internal mechanisms. Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) argue that governance 
encompasses the broader mechanism of various stakeholders’ interaction 
among themselves and with the not-for-profit organisation. Ostrower and 
Stone (2010) also argue that focusing only on boards of trustees is 
insufficient. Not-for-profit governance needs a framework to examine and 
understand the dynamics of governance in the not-for-profit sector. They base 
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the framework on three pillars or contingencies: board attributes, internal 
organizational characteristics and the influence of the external environment. 
They especially stress the importance of the external environment, and its 
effects on board practices.  
Ghafran and Yasmin (2019) identify the board of trustees of a charity as the 
governing body as the trustees bear the responsibility of administering the 
charity (Trustee Act, 2000). The board of trustees has the responsibility of 
ensuring that the funds of the charity be used for the charıtable purpose and 
to benefit the beneficiaries (Charities Act, 2011). Ghafran and Yasmin (2019) 
argue that although the SORP (2015) imposes some requirements on 
governance, there are few mandatory requirements that regulate and organise 
UK charity sector governance. Ghafran and Yasmin (2019) also argue that 
the voluntary Charity Governance Code (Governance, 2017) should be 
mandatory, even though the code is less rigorous than governance codes 
applying to companies. 
Overall, as suggested for accountability (Section 2.3), the governance model 
for the not-for-profit sector should be unique (Dellaportas et al., 2012) due to 
multiple principal stakeholder environment  
2.4.3 Governance	for	whom	
Cornforth (2012) suggests that governance in not-for-profit organisations 
cannot be realised at the organisational level only but needs to be enhanced 
to a wider audience. Ryan et al (2014) argue that because of a wider 
stakeholder base and in order to be able to discharge accountability to this 
wider stakeholder range and to meet governance needs, not-for-profit 
organisations require a unique conceptual framework that meet the needs of 
stakeholders. Wellens and Jegers (2014b) suggest that a successful 
implementation of governance in not-for-profit organisations should involve 
various stakeholder groups. They argue that not-for-profit governance should 
be built on expectations of the stakeholders and on how these various and 
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different stakeholder relationships are managed.  Other literature has also 
stressed the importance of stakeholders and their needs in determining a 
successful governance structure for not-for-profit organisations (Brown, 
2005; Abzug and Galaskiewicz, 2001; Speckbacher 2008). As in the case of 
structuring and building successful and effective accountability in the not-for-
profit sector, stakeholders play a crucial role in building governance 
successfully. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, unlike the for-profit sector, 
the importance of stakeholders in the not-for-profit sector gives prominence 
to a multiple principal framework (Wellens and Jegers, 2014b, Jegers, 2009, 
p. 146). 
Jetty and Beattie (2012) argue that in terms of charities, all stakeholders, both 
internal and external, are involved in governance implementation but that the 
board of trustees is more important than other stakeholders. Cornforth (2012) 
argues that the board of a not-for-profit organisation is only one part of the 
governance structure. Other stakeholders who also can have accountability 
requirements from the organisation, such as the donors, regulators, and 
auditors, are also part of the governance system in not-for-profit organisations 
(Dellaportas et al., 2012).  
Ostrower and Stone (2010) suggest that the multidimensional accountability 
environment composed of various stakeholders should be taken into account 
in structuring governance dynamics in not-for-profit organisations. Wellens 
and Jegers (2014b, p.234) puts “broadened accountability” as a crucial and 
important part of effective governance. They suggest that governance 
structures in not-for-profit organisations should be formed as “information 
exchange platforms” between their various stakeholders, and by enhancing 
and enlarging their accountability base, they should be building their 
governance structures on their “broadened accountability” with various 
stakeholder groups. Exclusion of stakeholders is suggested to be a problem in 
not-for-profit governance effectiveness (Rhoden, 2014).  Dellaportas et al. 
(2012) argue that due to the legitimation risk occurring as a cause of scandals 
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and fraud, not-for-profit governance should not be limited to legal 
requirements but should be a mechanism that can reflect stakeholder interests.  
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) also suggest that stakeholders are widely 
ignored regarding not-for-profit policy making. However the capability of 
beneficiaries has also been questioned by some scholars (Cornwall, 2008). 
Conflicting interests of stakeholders may hinder the establishment of 
functioning accountability and governance policy making (Guo and Musso, 
2007; LeRoux and Wright, 2010). However as Connolly and Hyndman 
(2017) suggest donors for example are willing to share their powers with 
beneficiaries in order for beneficiaries accountability needs to be met. 
Wellens and Jegers (2014a) suggest that although beneficiaries are valued to 
be one of the most important stakeholders, their participation in 
accountability and governance policy making is limited. 
2.4.4 Governance	mechanisms	
Mechanisms of governance are the tools and procedures (Cornforth, 2012) 
that aim to enhance performance, to ensure organisational objectives are met, 
and to ensure that assets of the organisation are preserved and that 
organisational wrongdoing is minimised (Ostrower and Stone, 2010). 
Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) list the possible governance factors or 
mechanisms as “government regulation, production of annual reports, 
monitoring of paid staff by the board, and even monitoring of beneficiaries 
by the charity, to make sure any funds provided are going to their intended 
use.”  
Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) distinguish between internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Whereas mechanisms of internal governance 
consist of the relationships between the internal stakeholders (board, staff, 
management) and internal control, mechanisms of external governance 
consist of the relationships between the charities and their external 
stakeholders such as donors, beneficiaries, and regulators. Harris et al. (2017) 
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suggested that governance benefits from internal and external mechanisms 
which direct the not-for-profit organisation to meet its objectives and to stop 
opportunistic behaviour. As discussed in the previous section, Ostrower and 
Stone (2010) suggest that different internal and external contingencies affect 
the governance and accountability dynamics of organisations. 
Examples of internal governance mechanisms include the board of trustees 
and its composition and attributes, internal audit, separation of CEO and 
Chair (duality), existence of committees, stakeholder participation on the 
board, and existence of a governing document. Examples of external 
governance mechanisms include external audit and reporting, compliance 
with the regulations, disclosure, and stakeholder scrutiny (Jobome, 2006). 
Multiple stakeholders and their accountability needs, regulation, and the 
funding environment were identified as important variables that affect 
governance (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). Atan et al. (2013) emphasise 
the link between accountability and governance by stating that especially 
external governance can be used as a tool to enhance accountability. Most of 
these mechanisms are aspects of accountability. As the mechanisms have 
been covered in detail in section 2.3.6, only brief explanations will be 
provided here. 
2.4.4.1 Board	of	trustees	
The board of trustees in the charity sector is defined by the Charity 
Commision as “the people who lead the charity and decide how it is run” 
(Charity Commision, 2018).  As in the for-profit sector, the board of trustees 
is expected to give direction to the organisation and monitor the management 
(Ostrower and Stone, 2010). However, as the charities do not have owners, 
as in the case of the for-profit sector, and as especially smaller charities are 
both governed and managed by the trustees only, the importance of the board 
of trustees’ governing and monitoring duties increases (Cornforth, 2012). The 
lack of both owners and ‘staff’ however in smaller charities also stresses that 
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the board of trustees also should be monitored in order to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). 
Cornforth (2001) identifies board characteristics such as board size, 
composition of the board, diversity (gender, age, ethnicity), attendance, and 
frequency of meetings. The board characteristics were discussed in detail at 
section 2.3.6.3 with a focus on monitoring, as the thesis examines the 
opportunistic behaviour of charity officials, rather than how the charities 
perform. In terms of performance, larger boards have been found to be better 
at monitoring (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) and to attract more funds, but may 
be inefficient at decision making. For example, Cornforth (2001) found that 
neither board size nor board meeting frequency had an impact on board 
effectiveness. Callen and Klein (2010) and Olson (2000) suggest that larger 
boards will perform better in attracting funds to not-for-profit organisations. 
As discussed in section 2.3.6.4 stakeholder involvement is found to enhance 
performance (Wellens and Jegers, 2011). Board diversity has been found to 
have both positive and negative impact on performance (Wellens and Jegers, 
2011). 
The board of trustees is even more crucial for not-for-profit entities than for 
for-profit entities, as not-for-profits lack mechanisms such as board 
remuneration and the existence of committees to tackle opportunistic 
behaviour (Speckbacher, 2008). The board-management relationship is also 
argued to be problematic. For example, Miller (2002) suggested that the board 
is ineffective at monitoring the managers because the board and managers are 
highly interconnected as discussed in section 2.3.6.3 
Cornforth (2012) criticises the literature on not-for-profit governance as being 
too focused on the board of trustees (Cornforth, 2012). There is therefore a 
need to include other stakeholders to better understand the dynamics of the 
not-for-profit governance (Stone and Ostrower, 2007). This makes it 
necessary to consider further governance mechanisms, from the perspective 
of not-for-profit organisations. 
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2.4.4.2 Self-regulation	
Dellaportas et al. (2012), following a survey of CFOs of not-for-profit 
organisations, concluded that self-regulation, as suggested by Ebrahim 
(2003b), rather than a strong regulator, may also be suitable in the not-for-
profit sector to enhance governance. As discussed in 2.3.6.3, the use of a code 
of ethics is an important part of effective accountability and governance. In 
England and Wales, the governing document is crucial for identifying the 
governance framework of any charity. The governing document sets the rules 
for each charity regarding their charitable purposes and objectives, their 
powers, rules of operation and responsibilities of the trustees. (Charity 
Commission, 2014c). 
2.4.4.3 Stakeholder	participation	
In terms of board structure, stakeholder representation on the board (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983;  (Cornforth and Simpson, 2003), is also another aspect of 
governance that has been studied by scholars. As also discussed in section 
2.3.6.4 Wellens and Jegers (2014a) suggest that participatory policy making 
mechanisms often operate symbolically rather than substantively in not-for-
profit organisations. They conclude that focusing only on formal participation 
policies such as beneficiaries being part of the board may not always be 
effective. In subsequent research, Wellens and Jegers (2016) found that 
beneficiaries taking part in decision making of not-for-profit organisations 
enhance the quality of governance but that beneficiaries are seldom present 
at board of trustee meetings. With respect to donors, Callen and Klein (2010) 
found donor presence on the board to have a decreasing effect on 
administration expense ratio, which therefore enhances governance and 
diminishes excessive use of funds. 
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2.4.4.4 Audit	
Audit is another governance mechanism that enhances the monitoring 
function (Verbruggen et al., 2011). In terms of performance, donations to not-
for-profit organisations were found to increase when audit was performed by 
big audit companies (Kitching, 2009). Audit quality, such as receiving Big 4 
audit is considered to enhance monitoring of not-for-profit organisations 
(Jetty and Beattie, 2012) The existence of an audit committee is also argued 
by Harris et al. (2017) to enhance monitoring and legitimacy in not-for-profit 
organisations. 
2.4.4.5 Committees	
Turley and Zaman (2004), Jobome (2006) and Jetty and Beattie (2012) argue 
that the existence of audit committees can enhance governance 
implementation in the not-for-profit sector. McMullen (1996) and Jetty and 
Beattie (2012) suggest that audit committees can enhance the monitoring 
component of governance and therefore reduce opportunistic behaviour. With 
the exception of the audit committee, there has been little research into the 
role of board committees in not-for-profit organisations.  
2.4.4.6 Reporting	
Disclosure and reporting is another important governance mechanism, which 
aims to minimise information asymmetry among the organization and the 
stakeholders (Ntim et al., 2017) as discussed in section 2.3.6.1. Reporting and 
accounting is described as the most important and common tool used in 
discharge of accountability and in effective governance (Dubnick, 2003). Yeo 
et al. (2017) found that governance disclosure encourages donors to donate 
more. Atan et al. (2013) suggest that transparency and accountability are 
enhanced by use of effective governance mechanisms. They argue that 
governance works as a tool to meet the needs of the charities’ stakeholders 
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and that disclosure, such as by annual return, provides means of 
communication among the charities and their stakeholders. 
2.4.4.7 External	regulation	
Dellaportas et al. (2012) and Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) suggest that 
the existence of an external and independent regulator will enhance 
governance mechanisms in not-for-profit organisations. Over time, the 
charities SORP has been enhanced in terms of governance principles and 
disclosures (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010).  
The mechanisms used in governance are similar and even identical with the 
ones of accountability. The overlap of governance mechanisms was stressed 
by Hyndman and McDonnell (2009), who suggest that accountability 
mechanisms will also be the part of not-for-profit governance mechanisms. 
2.4.5 The	relationship	between	governance	and	accountability	 in	not-for-
profit	organisations	
The relationship between the concepts of governance and accountability is 
assessed by various scholars who agree on the fact that governance and 
accountability are concepts crucial for organisational structure that are linked 
together (Wellens and Jegers, 2014b; Sinclair, 2010). However, there is no 
consensus on how governance and accountability are connected. 
One position suggests that accountability and governance are interconnected 
but separate concepts (Berger, 2009; Palmer and Randall, 2001). A second 
position is that the practice of good governance is a precondition and 
component of accountability (Keating and Frumkin, 2003) and a tool to 
enhance accountability relationships. A third position is that how 
accountability is discharged is a component of governance (Dellaportas et al., 
2012; Cornforth, 2014) and that understanding the accountability framework 
in not-for-profit organisations will enhance governance policies in not-for-
profit organisations (Burger, 2012).  
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Coule (2015) criticises the view that accountability is a function of 
governance but rather suggests that governance and accountability are 
dynamic, interconnected and social processes that have been shaped by 
various dimensions, both internal and external. Jepson (2005), who assessed 
the concepts of accountability and governance in environmental not-for-profit 
organisations, suggested that accountability and governance are linked to 
each other and that accountability cannot be seen as just an element of 
governance but rather accountability is the main goal of governance. Jepson 
(2005) argues that one of the most important purposes of not-for-profit 
governance is to ensure assets are used in the best possible way to complete 
the organisation’s mission by enhancing trust to the public and its 
stakeholders.  
Another important aspect of the connectivity between the concepts of 
governance and accountability is the influence that stakeholders exercise on 
these concepts. Stakeholders play a crucial part in determining both 
accountability and governance policies of not-for-profit organisations as both 
governance and accountability are related to responsiveness to the 
stakeholders (Speckbacher, 2008). Wellens and Jegers (2014b) also suggest 
that, as in the case of accountability, the implementation of governance 
should be based on exchange of information and should also work on 
platforms where stakeholders share information and discuss their needs. 
Wellens and Jegers (2014b) also argue that both governance and 
accountability should be built by enabling interaction and understanding the 
expectations of other stakeholders, and to cover the needs of the various 
stakeholder groups. Governance is also about satisfying the accountability 
needs of the stakeholders (Tricker, 1984). Therefore, it can be argued that, as 
accountability is part of governance, governance is also part of accountability 
as effective governance leads to enhanced monitoring and therefore a more 
successful accountability. 
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As discussed in sections 2.3.6 and 2.4.4 both internal or external governance 
mechanisms also resemble the accountability mechanisms discussed 
previously as they are mainly made up of board attributes and monitoring 
(Stone and Ostrower, 2007), reporting and disclosure (Jobome, 2006), audit 
and control (Beasley, 1996), and other mechanisms such as self regulation 
and participation and enhanced communication with the stakeholders 
(Ebrahim, 2003b). 
Efficient governance as a result, in not-for-profit organisations has been 
argued to enhance performance in terms of donation acquisition (Harris et al., 
2015) and a higher financial performance (Aggarwal et al., 2012), which has 
a close and integral relationship with accountability (Coule, 2015; Atan et al., 
2013). As discussed before, both governance and accountability in the charity 
sector are shaped by various stakeholders (Atan et al., 2013). The purpose of 
governance and accountability is to meet stakeholder needs in areas of 
performance, finance etc., and stakeholders benefit from similar mechanisms 
(Speckbacher, 2008). Also as in the case of accountability, specific 
characteristics of not-for-profit organisations such as lack of an owner, 
performance indicator, market, residual claimant, multiple stakeholder 
environment in not-for-profit sector also applies to governance and therefore 
makes it harder to conceptualise a governance framework (Cornforth, 2012, 
p. 1121; Goodin, 2003).  
In regards to opportunistic behaviour and more narrowly defined in the case 
of fraud the aim of these two concepts is also identical: to tackle, prevent, 
deter and minimise fraud. As accountability, effective governance also 
provides and enhances legitimacy and credibility, which is also argued to 
prevent opportunistic behaviour (Coule, 2015). Jetty and Beattie (2012) argue 
that growth in organisational wrongdoings and opportunistic behaviour has 
increased the importance of effective governance and accountability. One of 
the most important connections between accountability and governance is 
that they both use mechanisms to enhance organisational functioning and to 
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limit organisational wrongdoing (Burger, 2012). Dellaportas et al. (2012) 
suggest that risk of fraud increases with the absence of transparency, 
accountability and governance. They also argue that due to the legitimation 
risk occurring as a cause of scandals and fraud, not-for-profit governance 
should not be limited to legal requirements but should be a mechanism that 
can reflect stakeholder interests. 
Governance has become an important concept for not-for-profit 
organisations, along with accountability (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). 
Although governance also comprises assessing how the organisation is 
performing in regards to its set of rules and objectives (Ostrower and Stone, 
2010), the primary focus of this study is on fraudulent behaviour undertaken 
by charity officials. Therefore, the study focuses more on the conformance 
aspect of governance rather than performance (Sinclair, 2010). Following the 
approach of Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, p.9), the thesis focuses more 
on the stakeholders’ expectations and their accountability relationships. 
It is therefore not feasible, and may even hamper the understanding of 
organisational dynamics of the charity sector, to treat accountability and 
governance as totally different concepts (Stone and Ostrower, 2007; Tricker 
and Tricker, 2015). Therefore, this thesis does not assume that the concepts 
of governance and accountability are different, but rather regards them as part 
of the same system and dynamics that are complementary to each other 
(Soltani, 2014; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). What some researchers identify 
as ‘accountability mechanisms’, especially those discussed in section 2.3.6, 
are often similar to, if not identical to, what other scholars identify as 
‘governance mechanisms’ as discussed in section 2.4.4. As both governance 
and accountability are shaped and affected by various stakeholders, and both 
use largely the same mechanisms to be effective and successful, in this thesis 
the two terms have been used in a way that reflects their interrelationship. 
 The main difference drawn in this thesis is that ‘governance’ tends to be used 
to identify systems and structures, whereas ‘accountability’ tends to be used 
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to refer to actual practices. For example, the membership attributes of a board 
of trustees would be considered as aspects of governance, whereas how the 
board reports on its activities to stakeholders and suffers consequences as a 
result of such reporting would be considered as aspects of accountability. 
Governance mechanisms are usually disclosed in publicly available 
documents such as annual reports, reviews and returns, and are therefore more 
easily observable than accountability practices. Hence Research Objective 2, 
which is assessed through statistical analysis of public data, refers explicitly 
to governance mechanisms. Interviewing stakeholders is more likely to reveal 
insights into how accountability is practised, so the analysis in Chapter 6 in 
particular emphasises accountability. 
Overall, the thesis does not opt for a specific position but suggests that the 
concepts of accountability and governance are interconnected as they 
especially serve the interests of the organisation and use the same 
mechanisms (Crawford et al., 2009; Vinten, 2002). 
The next section provides an outlook on UK charity accountability and 
governance literature. 
2.5 Review	of	 empirical	 literature	 on	UK	 charity	 accountability	 and	
governance		
Charities play a significant part in both the economy and the society in the 
UK, which is one of the most generous societies in the world (Foundation, 
2018). In this section, accountability literature about UK charities will be 
analysed under the headings of types of disclosure (financial, performance, 
narrative), audit, misconduct/fraud, international comparisons, stakeholder 
studies and other studies. Many of these studies address issues of governance 
as aspects of accountability, which means that there are relatively few pure 
governance studies relating to UK charities. 
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2.5.1 Types	of	disclosure	
The contents and readability of charity reporting in the UK began to be 
questioned starting from the 1980s (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). Bird 
and Morgan-Jones (1981) posited that there was a lack of uniformity in 
reporting among charities and the implementations were out-dated and not 
inclusive of the sector. As a result, the arguments of Bird and Morgan-Jones 
(1981) aroused further both academic and regulatory work regarding the UK 
charity sector (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013b).  
Ultimately, following the influence of the critical literature, the first SORP 
(1988) was issued and re-designed several times to meet the changing 
expectations of accountability and transparency of the sector (Palmer et al., 
2001). Through time, the SORP was enhanced in terms of legislation, 
specificity, and focus, and cut down on preparer discretion (Connolly et al., 
2015; Hyndman and McMahon, 2010).  
The charity accountability literature in the UK regarding disclosure will be 
categorised into three sections: financial disclosure, disclosure on 
performance and narrative disclosure. 
2.5.2 Financial	disclosure	and	the	SORP		
After the release of the first SORP (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1), research 
was undertaken that evaluated the level of compliance with the SORP and 
charities’ actual accounting procedures (Gambling et al., 1990). This research 
found that the level of compliance was deficient (Ashford, 1989; Hines and 
Jones, 1992). Although the SORP was still voluntary at the time, the lack of 
consistency among charities brought new studies and led to an upgrade of the 
SORP (Palmer et al., 2001).  
Further research, which focused on compliance with the SORP and financial 
statements, found that although there was an improvement, there were still 
areas to be enhanced (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009; Connolly and Hyndman, 
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2000; Connolly and Hyndman, 2004). Connolly et al. (2013b) found that the 
UK Charity SORP of 2005 was not sufficient for users to derive conversion 
ratios from financial documents provided by charities. They argued that 
charities were successful in disguising their information regarding conversion 
ratios. Hyndman and McConville (2016) posit that although conversion ratio 
reporting have improved whereas efficiency measures are seldom reported by 
the charities. 
Williams and Palmer (1998) stressed the lack of user feedback, which could 
have improved implementation. However, Hyndman and McMahon (2011), 
who assessed the progress of the SORP across several decades, argued that 
with the help of stakeholders the regulator, as being the ‘definitive’ 
stakeholder in law making,  had developed a more enhanced accounting and 
reporting structure for charities in England and Wales.  
Dhanani and Connolly (2015), utilising the theory of communicative action 
of Habermas (1984), examined the annual reporting process of UK charities. 
They found that, although most charities tended to make truthful disclosures, 
some tended to target specific stakeholder groups (e.g., powerful donors) and 
to provide some information that was misleading.  
Scholars also agree that financial statements hold a restricted role in 
discharging accountability because they are focused on monetary means and 
lack information regarding output, performance and outcome (Connolly and 
Dhanani, 2009). In line with the expectations and as a result of academic 
studies, charity reporting and SORP requirements were also improved with 
an enhanced focus on performance and outcome reporting (Hyndman, 2018). 
2.5.3 Performance	information	
The lack of disclosure of charities’ performance led scholars to concentrate 
on this area. Hyndman (1990) found that donors expect charities to disclose 
more information on performance rather than financial information. He also 
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argued that information expectations of donors were not met even though 
their expectations were known by the charity officials. Hyndman (1991) 
continued his previous work and found that both the preparers and auditors 
were aware of the gap but did not perform enough to close it and therefore 
accountability to donors was not discharged appropriately. Connolly and 
Hyndman (2003) also found that little had changed concerning performance 
disclosure since Hyndman (1990) and that disclosure of background 
information was still preferred to performance indicators.  
Connolly and Hyndman (2013b), who based their work on Hyndman (1990), 
found that donors’ information expectations are not met, even though they are 
perceived to be the key stakeholder group. They argue that donors want more 
performance related information than financial information. They also state 
that annual reviews, which include more information on 
outcome/performance, are more relevant for donors than the annual report, 
which is made up of financial information. Compared to Hyndman (1990), 
they found that the information gap has been reduced with time. However, 
they also add that provision of information on the administrative cost 
percentage9 is an area where there is no development. 
Connolly and Hyndman (2013a) assessed the views of charity donors with 
regard to accountability discharged by charities, by using semi-structured 
interviews. They found that, although donors are regarded as the most 
important stakeholder group, their accountability demands are not met. Also, 
larger donors compared to small ones use their power on the charities to 
acquire more information.  
Hyndman and McConville (2016) found that efficiency reporting in the UK 
charities is driven by a desire to sustain legitimacy rather than being ethical 
                                                
9	Conversion ratios are a broader term that also covers administrative cost percentage.	
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and transparent. Boateng et al. (2016, p.6) in their study of UK charities found 
financial measures, client satisfaction, management effectiveness, 
stakeholder involvement and benchmarking as the most important 
performance measures. They argue that using a variety of measures enhances 
the discharge of accountability in a diverse stakeholder environment. 
Overall, the literature states that the user-needs of stakeholders are more than 
financial information, and that these extra needs seemed not be met (Connolly 
et al., 2015). 
2.5.4 Narrative	information	
The annual review, which is exclusively made up of narrative reporting, is 
highly favoured by the charity stakeholders (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009; 
Connolly and Hyndman, 2013b).  The narrative content of annual reports was 
assessed by Connolly and Dhanani (2006), who found that, while compliance 
with the regulation was met by the charities, performance reporting was 
deficient. They also found that the larger a charity is, the more accountability 
is discharged. Descriptive rather than performance was disclosed (Dhanani, 
2009), as was information to meet regulations rather than to meet donor 
expectations (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009). 
Studies on narrative reporting (Baker et al., 2012; Beattie, 2014; Morgan and 
Fletcher, 2013) discussed how accountability could be enhanced (Jetty and 
Beattie, 2009).  Morgan and Fletcher (2013) analysed the public benefit 
reporting in charities and found that enhanced public benefit reporting 
positively affects accountability. McConville (2017) argues that impact 
reporting can enhance transparency and accountability in not-for-profit 
organisations and therefore will benefit stakeholder relationships and gain 
their support.  
2.5.5 Audit	
Independent examination of accounts is found to legitimise the actions of 
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charities in the eyes of the stakeholders and enhance the trust towards them 
and build value for the charity (Morgan, 2017). However, the findings of 
(Hyndman, 1991, p.81-82) stress that both charity officials and auditors knew 
that charity reports should meet donors’ information needs but “there appears 
to be little motivation on the part of information providers to improve the 
accountability of charities to contributors.” Overall the article points out the 
relationship between charity officials and auditors and states that the 
‘relevance gap’ is formed on purpose by those two stakeholder groups. The 
scholars found that auditors are not using their role to channel charities 
towards better reporting quality, or to encourage the charities to comply with 
the SORP (Palmer et al., 2001; Williams and Palmer, 1998).  
Other works examine the role of independent examiners in charities (Morgan, 
2011) and audit fee determinants (Beattie et al., 2001). Beattie et al. (2001), 
in line with the for-profit sector, found that major determinants of fees are 
size and audit firm location. They also observed a positive relationship 
between audit fees and non-audit service fees. Also, they stated that audit is 
more complex especially for fundraising charities. They also found that 
auditors’ audit fee of the charity sector is less than the market-rate audit fee. 
Beattie et al. (2006) found that charities tend to hire auditors that have 
expertise in the sector. They found that appointment of an auditor was more 
likely if an audit committee exists, if the charity revenues had fallen and if 
the existing auditor is top-tier. Cantoni et al. (2011) found that, unlike in the 
for-profit sector, the organisational complexity of charities has no affect on 
audit fees. Jetty and Beattie (2012) assessed the relationship among the 
reporting, the existence of audit committees and board attributes. They found 
that a bigger board size and a two-tier board has a positive correlation with 
the existence of an audit committee. They also stated that no correlation was 
found between the existence of an audit committee and donor dependence and 
the legal structure of the charity. 
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Morgan (2011) found that the independent examination of the charities in the 
UK enhances the accountability discharge of the charities. Kemp and Morgan 
(2019) examined a sample of charities with an income of between £100,000–
£250,000 and assessed how accurately they reported to the Charity 
Commission whether their accounts had been qualified by their auditors. 
They found that 96% of charities which stated that their accounts had been 
qualified had given an incorrect response. They also found that a minimum 
of 7.5% of their 199-charity sample failed to submit and 5% of the sample 
failed to comply with submission regulations. 
2.5.6 Misconduct/Fraud	
There were  recently  a  couple  of  studies  on  fraud/misconduct in  the  UK  
charity sector. McDonnell and Rutherford (2018) focused on Scottish 
charities and found a “disconnect between the types of charities that are 
suspected of misconduct and those that are subject to subsequent regulatory 
action” (p.107). 
Ohalehi (2019), in his work on fraud in small charities, posited that the 
absence of a strong control system and segregation of duties, led to a greater 
threat of fraud. McDonnell and Rutherford (2019) also found, in their study 
on disclosure of serious incidents, that smaller and younger charities are seen 
under more threat for serious incidents to occur by the regulator. Nguyen and 
Soobaroyen (2019) examined earnings management practices in charities in 
England and Wales and found that earnings management is used abundantly 
by larger charities with income over £500,000 in England and Wales. 
2.5.7 International	comparisons	
Scholars also analyse and compare different not-for-profit jurisdictions, 
including the UK (Breen, 2013; Mack et al., 2017) and argue that a more 
unified approach that would enable comparison of not-for-profit organsations 
which would enhance accountability by benchmarking of the best practices 
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made easier. Connolly and Hyndman (2001) compared UK and Irish charities 
and concluded that the financial statements of Irish charities were not as much 
as in line with SORP requirements as the UK ones. Breen (2013) argues that, 
as a result of inadequate reporting, comparability among the UK, USA and 
Ireland is not satisfactory. Cordery and Baskerville (2007) compared the 
history and regulation of UK and New Zealand charities. They argue that the 
UK established a more effective enforcement regulation system for charities, 
whereas New Zealand opted to stay sector neutral. McConville and Cordery 
(2018) assessed the differences in terms of reporting of charities in the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. 
2.5.8 Stakeholder	studies	
Stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997) has also been assessed in UK 
charities. It is suggested that small donors and beneficiaries lack the power to 
scrutinise charities for more effective disclosure (Hyndman and McDonnell, 
2009). Connolly and Hyndman (2017), through interviews with key 
stakeholders (donors, charity managers, auditors and beneficiaries), found 
that donors were regarded as the most salient group and that the donors want 
to share their power with beneficiaries in order their accountability needs to 
be met. Yasmin and Haniffa (2017) found that, although Muslim charity 
organisations in the UK provide accountability, it is not sufficient.   
Crawford et al. (2009) conducted interviews with charity stakeholders in 
Scotland and found that regulations in general targeted larger charities. They 
also found that the costs of some of the regulations are burdensome for 
smaller charities. McDonnell (2017), in his study of the Scottish charity 
sector, assesses a charity accountability monitoring programme, implemented 
by the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR). He found no 
relationship between accountability warnings (or ‘triggers’ 10 ) and 
                                                
10 “The program examines 32 aspects of a charity’s financial status that may be indicative of 
accountability concerns, with a particular focus on fundraising, governance and compliance 
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unfavourable outcomes of such as inquiries by the charity regulators or 
complaints from the public. 
2.5.9 Governance	studies	
The literature discussed in Section 2.4 also covered governance themes. This 
section briefly examines UK charity governance studies that were not 
discussed previously in the thesis.  
Scholars have assessed the structure of the UK charity boards (Gambling and 
Jones, 1998; Harrow et al., 1999; Vinten, 1997; Vinten, 2001). The 
effectiveness of the board of trustees in terms of governance has been 
questioned (Knight, 1993). Clifford and Mohan (2016) classified charities 
depending on their sources of income and found that the majority of charities 
with an income of over £500,000 depended on government funds. Kirkland 
and Sargant (1995) found that larger boards in the charity sector are found in 
larger charities in terms of income. Cornforth and Simpson (2002) examined 
the importance of organisational size for board characterisitics and found that 
larger charities tend to have larger boards and have more subcommittees, and 
larger charities tend to have formal board trustee responsibilities.  
Leadership is another aspect of UK charity governance studies (Wilson-
Jones, 2017). For example, Lambert and Lapsley (2010) examine the 
relationship between governance and leadership in not-for-profit 
organisations and how powerful leadership can both negatively and positively 
affect governance. 
Another topic examined is the remuneration of the trustees and managers. 
Nguyen and Soobaroyen (2020) found that CEO compensation in UK 
                                                
with regulation. Exceptions are triggered automatically during the submission of a charity’s 
annual accounts; if this occurs, the organization is immediately informed and offered the 
opportunity to provide an explanation.” (McDonnell, 2017, p.729) 
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charities is positively correlated with existing nomination or remuneration 
committees and board diversity but negatively with audit committee, 
experience of the CEO and charities that are funded by the government.  Wise 
(2001) assessed if receiving remuneration will have a positive impact on 
trustees regarding their governance responsibilities. Wise (2001) found that 
although a majority of potential trustees will be willing to serve without 
remuneration, providing remuneration to trustees may attract a higher number 
of potential trustees and trustees will perform better regarding their duties. 
Marketisation or benefiting from for-profit governance policies was also 
discussed in the literature (Lambert and Lapsley, 2011). Hyndman and Jones 
(2011) who stress the difference between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations regarding the concept of governance, suggest that marketisation 
of the charity sector is important when assessing governance in the charity 
sector. Scholars highlight the difference of the two sectors and that 
marketisation might bring more harm than good to the sector (Bruce and 
Chew, 2011; Hind, 2011). Toothill (2018), who argued that charities were 
having legitimacy problems due to their damaged reputations, found that 
rather than marketisation of the sector, which even has little effect on 
fundraising, effective governance practices may be the remedy for the 
legitimation problem of the sector. 
2.6 Summary	
This chapter has examined the accountability and governance literature, with 
a focus on not-for-profit organisations and especially on charities in the UK. 
Although the accountability and governance structures (concerning 
stakeholders, purposes and mechanisms) in the for-profit, public and not-for-
profit sectors bear similarities, the literature finds that there are significant 
differences. The special features of not-for-profit organisations include lack 
of residual claimants and explicit identification of ownership (Aggarwal et 
al., 2012; Fama and Jensen, 1983b), a market (O'Regan and Oster, 2005), 
clear objectives (Berman and Davidson, 2003) and a common performance 
98	|	P a g e 	
	
indicator (Miller, 2002). These absences make it harder for not-for-profit 
organisations to be monitored, to ceonceptulaise a single governance 
framework and for the accountability to be discharged effectively. 
The existence of a large variety of stakeholders with different priorities makes 
it imperative for not-for-profit entities to discharge accountability (Cordery 
and Baskerville, 2007). Also, the lack of power of stakeholders (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2017) and focus on reporting to a selected stakeholder group 
exacerbates this problem (Ebrahim, 2005). Although the purpose of 
accountability does not seem to differ too much, the demand from users for 
more information related to performance and outcome seems to be shaping 
how accountability is discharged in not-for-profit organisations (Connolly 
and Hyndman, 2013b; Hyndman, 1990).  
To develop a single governance framework for not-for-profit organisations 
also seems to be a hard task as various internal and external governance 
contingencies (Ostrower and Stone, 2010) should be taken into consideration, 
where especially the stakeholders play an important role in governance 
making and therefore the governance making should not only focus on the 
board of trustees (Miller, 2002; Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). 
In terms of mechanisms, unlike disclosure/reporting and audit/monitoring, 
which have been found to provide a positive influence on the discharge of 
accountability in for-profit organisations, the large variety of board attributes 
in not-for-profit organisations makes it hard to design a conceptual 
framework for governance and the discharge of accountability for not-for-
profit organisations (Holland, 2002; Miller, 2002; Ostrower and Stone, 2010). 
Although the complexity of accountability and governance in not-for-profit 
organisations provides a fruitful area to research, more has to be discussed 
especially theoretically to grasp better and structure the fundamental elements 
of accountability and governance. In the next chapter, theories of 
accountability and governance will be evaluated to provide an integrated 
theory. 
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3. 	THEORIES	OF	ACCOUNTABILITY	AND	GOVERNANCE:	A	
REVIEW	AND	SYNTHESIS		
While accountability and governance are crucial for not-for-profit 
organisations, theories are generally derived from the for-profit sector and 
therefore are more underdeveloped for the not-for-profit sector (Coule, 2015). 
The different structure of the not-for-profit sector, as well as the variety of 
stakeholder groups, makes theorisation for the not-for-profit sector more 
difficult (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012).  
As discussed in Section 2.4.5, governance and accountability are closely 
associated, particularly in not-for-profit organisations. This means that 
theories of accountability may generally be applied to understand and explain 
not only structures and mechanisms of accountability but also structures and 
mechanisms of governance (indeed, the structures and mechanisms are often 
the same). Solomon (2013) discusses three theoretical frameworks for 
explaining and analysing corporate governance: agency theory, transaction 
costs theory (which she considers to be “different lenses through which the 
same problems may be observed and analysed” – Solomon, 2013, p.15), and 
stakeholder theory. In this chapter, agency theory and stakeholder theory are 
considered alongside stewardship theory as perspectives on both 
accountability and governance in charities. Drawing on theories that have 
been developed mainly by reference to for-profit organisations is useful in 
that most studies of fraud have been undertaken in the for-profit sector and 
have often used these theories.  
In this chapter theories that try to provide frameworks for accountability and 
governance will be evaluated and discussed. The chapter argues that agency 
theory, under-gridded with stakeholder and stewardship theory, is efficacious 
to examine misconduct/fraud in not-for-profit entities and therefore charities. 
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Figure	3.1	Structure	of	Chapter	3	
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3.1 	Agency	Theory	
Agency theory is rooted in the work of Berle and Means (1932), who 
suggested that stockholders’ power over the organisation had diminished 
because of companies getting larger with an immense number of 
stockholders. The large quantity of stockholders all having minority interests 
led to the separation of the ownership and control/management of the 
organisations (Miller-Millesen, 2003). The duality of the controller and 
owner led to an analysis of the relationship between managers and 
investors/stockholders. Agency theory builds upon this duality in which the 
manager (agent) is obliged to serve the interests of the owner (principal) 
(Miller-Millesen, 2003). This relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p.308) as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some of the decision making authority to the 
agent.”  
General assumptions of agency theory are that organisations are a nexus of 
contracts among self-interested and bounded rational individuals (Eisenhardt, 
1989) whose identification with the organisation is low (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2016), who have short-term orientation rather than long-term (Olson, 2000), 
and who will act in order to maximise their own benefits (Fama, 1980). The 
theory envisages that the interests of principal and agents will not align and 
this divergence may lead to goal conflicts (Miller-Millesen, 2003). The theory 
also posits that while agents are risk averse, principals are risk neutral, which 
may lead the agent to pursue different expectations than the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Saam, 2007). 
Agency problems may show up resulting from the general assumptions of the 
theory. The agency problem emerges when a) there are conflicts of interest 
among the parties, and b) verifying the actions of the agent is not possible or 
the information held by the parties differs, which is referred to as ‘information 
asymmetry’ (Eisenhardt, 1989). Two of the most important agency problems 
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are adverse selection and moral hazard. Whereas an agent concealing 
negative information of himself before being selected as an agent is called 
‘adverse selection’, misbehaving after being appointed as an agent and 
behaving opportunistically is defined as ‘moral hazard’ (Jegers, 2009). 
Goal conflict between the principal and the agent is a result of different 
priorities and interests  (Eisenhardt, 1989) which may cause opportunistic 
behaviour of the agent. Fama (1980) argues that if each of the parties will try 
to maximise its own utility, the optimal actions of the principal and the agent 
will differ which will lead to different outcomes.  
It is generally assumed that the agent is equipped with better quality of 
information than the principal regarding the organisation (Miller-Millesen, 
2003). Therefore the principal finds it hard to be confident about the agent’s 
performance on designated tasks. Kirsh (1996) argues that the more complex 
the tasks are, the more power the agent will have and therefore more 
complicated agency problems will arise.  
Agency theory posits that the agency problems are quite general, are 
inevitable as a perfect contract between the principal and agent is not possible 
and therefore will occur in every organisation in differing levels where there 
is imperfect monitoring of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory tries to address the agency problems by answering how 
agents’ behaviour can be controlled by the principal to achieve their and not 
the agent's interests (Harris and Bromiley, 2007; McColgan, 2001). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that the principal can restrict and diminish the 
difference in interests with the agent by forming incentives and providing 
monitoring practices in order to limit the opportunistic behaviour of the agent.   
Monitoring (Davis et al., 1997), independent external audit (Davis et al., 
1997; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983), internal control (Jensen, 1983), 
managerial shareholdings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), effective cash and 
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non-cash remuneration schemes (Macey, 1991), boards adequately composed 
of outside directors (Beasley, 1996), selecting the right agent (Caers et al., 
2009), and disclosure (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) are some tools that are 
used to mitigate the agency problem. The board of directors, for example, is 
expected to act in the interests of the principal and to monitor and align the 
interests of the agent and the principal (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). 
However, every organisation will have a different nexus of contracts and 
therefore will be in need of different remedies (McColgan, 2001). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) posit that the agency problem differs due to 
unobserved environmental heterogeneity between organisations. The cost-
benefit of each remedy also needs to be taken into account as remedies having 
more costs than benefits will lead to inefficiency for organisations  
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The agency problem and its remedies bear a cost, that is the ‘agency costs’ 
which are the costs relating to tools and methods that are used to align goal 
congruence between the agent and the principal (Jegers, 2009). Agency cost 
is defined as “the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss” 
by (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308-309). Monitoring costs are expenses 
to assess and control the actions and decisions of the agent like audits, 
remuneration and training costs (McColgan, 2001). Expenditures incurred by 
the agent for establishing the monitoring structure and convincing the 
principal of the commitment and the qualities of service are defined as 
bonding costs (Mason et al., 2006). As it is impossible to completely align the 
interests of the agents and the principals, there will be costs remaining which 
is the loss of welfare for the defective relationship between the principal and 
the agent (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). This ‘residual’ amount is described as 
“residual loss” and is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as “The 
dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due 
to this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this 
104	|	P a g e 	
	
latter cost as the residual cost.” Figure 3.2 below depicts the agency cost 
equation: 
 
Figure	3.2	Equation	of	Agency	Cost	
Source (Author) 
Agency theory is argued to be developed through two routes: the positivist 
and principal-agent streams (Jensen, 1983). The positivist stream deals 
mainly with examining which mechanisms are useful in solving the agency 
problem  (Eisenhardt, 1989) and is more focused on the relationship among 
owners and managers and tends to be less mathematical compared with the 
principal-agent stream (Jensen, 1983). The principal-agent stream, on the 
other hand, is more conceptual and mathematical and can be applied to 
agency relationships other than the for-profit organisations (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
3.1.1 Agency	theory	criticism	
Although agency theory is praised as being universal (Bosse and Phillips, 
2016) it is also criticised as providing a narrow point of view of regarding the 
relationship between the principal and the agent (Coule, 2015; Cuevas-
Rodríguez et al., 2012), not taking into account the social context, 
organisation culture and the organisational environment (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2007); and only focusing on the quantifiable 
impact of the principal-agent contract while ignoring stakeholders other than 
the stockholders (Culpan and Trussel, 2005).   
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Agents may be characterised as being too opportunistic and negative and self-
fulfilling (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Kostova et al., 2018), while agency 
theory is also criticised for not analysing institutional embeddedness (Bosse 
and Phillips, 2016). Agency theory is also criticised for providing only a 
western and particularly USA based world-view and because of that it is 
unclear if the theory is applicable to different culture contexts or not 
(Ekanayake, 2004). Aguilera and Jackson (2003, p.448-449) state three main 
reasons for why agency theory lacks credibility: not taking into account a 
diverse number of stakeholders, overlooking interdependencies among 
stakeholders and providing a loose analysis of the importance of 
organisational environment. Empirical research is also critical of the agency 
theory. For example, (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Sanders and Hambrick, 
2007) found that stock options, which aim to align the interests of the 
principal and the agent, do more harm than good. Also ignoring good 
characteristics of humanity like fairness, cooperation and trust and designing 
incentives just based on the assumption that humans are self-driven and 
greedy exacerbates the agency problem and increases costs (Hoff, 2010). Da 
Silveira (2015) blames the ‘homo economicus’ approach that agency theory 
proposes and argues that rather than monetary incentives, psychological 
motivations and employee awareness are the remedies for agency problems. 
Empirical evidence is also mixed for agency theory as many studies found 
that agency theory is not efficient in coping with agency problems (Chen et 
al., 2016; Tosi et al., 2000). 
Agency theory, envisaging that the owners of the organisation are the only 
principals, is also criticised as the principal-agent relationship is not that 
straightforward and as for each organisation, the agents and principals may 
vary (Davis and Thompson, 1994). Napier (1998) stresses that the board of 
directors can be taken as either principal or agent: as principal along with the 
shareholders or as agent in the form of the management.  Caers et al. (2006) 
also suggest that there are several internal and external principal-agent 
relationships for not-for-profit organisations. The board can be the principal 
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of the management, it can also be an agent of stakeholders. Likewise, the 
management can be both the principal of employees and an agent of the board.  
These criticisms of the agency theory have brought in new approaches to the 
traditional agency structure to be examined,  such as culturally enhanced trust 
(Doney et al., 1998). For example, Bosse and Phillips (2016) argue that even 
in extremely competitive and volatile environments people are driven by 
bounded self-interest, that is, the self-interest of an agent is reshaped and 
softened by reciprocity and fairness. They argue that if incentives are 
designed accepting that agents are boundedly self-interested then the agency 
theory will provide more beneficial designs for both the organisations and the 
society as a whole. Pepper and Gore (2015) propose a behavioral agency 
theory’ which posits that agency problems can be minimised by motivating 
agents to perform at their capabilities.   
Wiseman et al. (2012) oppose the argument that agency theory is not capable 
of comprising social facts. They argue that agency theory is universal and 
non-rigid in nature and therefore can be applied to a variety of settings. They 
along with Wowak et al. (2017) also suggest that the context-specific and the 
heavily US focused analysis led to erroneous inferences and proposed a 
deductive approach which builds on the present agency theory by adding 
specific organisational contexts and social environment that shape the 
principal-agent relationship. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (2007) also posit 
that agency theory cannot be limited to a specific context and therefore is 
applicable to a variety of different contexts if applied appropriately. They also 
argue that the narrow approach of the agency theory should be replaced with 
a broader view extending financial aspects and that the lack of the 
acknowledgment of socially embedded characteristics of the organisation is 
not a failure of agency theory but rather an opportunity to extend the theory 
to new dimensions. Eisenhardt (1989) had argued that agency theory provides 
better observations when coupled with complementary theoretical 
perspectives.  
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3.1.2 Agency	theory	and	not-for-profit	organisations	
Compared to for-profit organisations, not-for-profit organisations are 
believed to be different because trustworthiness is embedded in their structure 
and as a result agents bear fewer desires to act opportunistically (Hansmann, 
1987). Although Fama and Jensen (1983a) argue that the lack of residual 
claimants in the not-for-profit sector avoids agency problems to occur,  this 
assertion has its own defects and is not hassle-free (Herzlinger, 1996). 
Bernstein et al. (2016) found that in line with the agency theory, principals 
and agents have differing interests and act in line with differing incentives 
also in the not-for-profit sector. 
Prakash and Gugerty (2010, p. 25-26) favour the implementation of the 
agency theory for not-for-profit organisations and argue that agency problems 
are enormous in not-for-profit organisations because of: principals not being 
residual claimants as in the case of for-profit organisations and the principals 
(donors) incapable of monitoring the agents, quality of ‘product’ or ‘service’ 
hard to verify and therefore hard to assess, absence of effective information 
flow and lack of communication between the specially small donors and the 
organisation, lack of efficient disclosure and monitoring mechanisms 
(regulation, market, clear owners) which may lead to malfeasance and lack of 
power of stakeholders to judge and evaluate the performance of not-for-profit 
organisations. While for-profit organisations have shareholders and/or 
owners as accepted as the ultimate principal (Jegers, 2008), not-for-profit 
organisations on the other hand are responsible to a broader range of 
stakeholders (Van Puyvelde et al., 2013). Jobome (2006) argues that the 
absence of shareholders or the ‘residual claimant’ (Jegers, 2009) makes 
performance to be measured harder for not-for-profit organisations as 
shareholders are more likely to be effective in monitoring the actions of the 
agents (Caers et al., 2006). Chen et al. (2014) suggest that both not-for-profit 
and public sector organisations face more exacerbated agency problems 
because of principals being less interested in monitoring the actions of the 
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organisations due to absence of clear outcomes and existence of complicated 
and multifaceted objectives which are not easy to quantify. Bernstein et al. 
(2016) found support for the agency theory that self-interest dominates the 
organisations in their study on the governance perceptions of managers and 
boards of charities. 
Miller (2002) also stresses that in charities, it is not clear who ought to be 
regarded as the principal as the variety of stakeholders makes it difficult to 
decide who the definitive principal is. Szper and Prakash (2011) posit that 
reach for information is not easy for the not-for-profit sector stakeholders as 
they lack capabilities to interpret the data but also there is lack of interest from 
the stakeholders even for the readily prepared charity ratings. Preston (1989) 
also found that lower wages in the not-for-profit sector are more common 
than in the for-profit sector because of the belief that not-for-profit sector is 
providing positive social externalities.  
Although agency theory applies to the not-for-profit sector (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a) there is less research on with which remedies can agency problems 
can be mitigated with (Speckbacher, 2013). As a result of the absence of the 
of profit-driven structure, non-monetary rewards (Caers et al., 2006) and not 
the competitive compensation packages build on profit are deemed to be 
effective for mitigating agency problems in the not-for-profit sector (Jobome, 
2006). While both internal and external audit is deemed to be effective in the 
struggle with agency problems board structure and composition is an area of 
controversy as board members of not-for-profit organisations are expected to 
be independent (Commission, 2014b). Callen et al. (2003) found that 
presence of donors on boards of not-for-profit organisations enhance 
confidence and assurance towards other stakeholders and therefore increases 
organisational efficiency by mitigating agency problems.  
Caers et al. (2009) state that the selection of agents is crucial in mitigating 
agency problems and argue that agents’ inherent utility functions are derived 
from both agency and stewardship theory: agent’s personal objectives 
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(agency theory), organisational objectives (internal stewardship), and client 
objectives (external stewardship). Connolly et al. (2011) argue that in the case 
of charities, principal-agent theory may envisage a hierarchical monitoring, 
in which the board of trustees monitors the managers and the management 
monitors other staff like the volunteers, and all other charity stakeholders such 
as donors, beneficiaries and regulators are able to monitor the charities.  
While Cornforth (2012) posits that agency theory neglects the wider 
governance system and multifaceted structures of the organisations, 
Benjamin (2010) argues that philanthropic and accountability relationships 
are different and therefore not-for-profit organisations have special needs and 
agency theory does not perfectly fit for not-for-profit organisations. 
Miller (2002) founds during the interviews conducted with board members of 
not-for-profit organisations that the board disbelieves that managers will act 
opportunistically and therefore she criticises agency theory, noting that the 
relationship between the agent and the principal in not-for-profit 
organisations builds on mutual trust and cooperation and therefore more close 
to the stewardship theory. While there are views that the board of trustees in 
not-for-profit organisations is the main principal (Miller, 2002; Ruggiano and 
Taliaferro, 2012); donors are accepted as the core principal by (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). Miller (2002) criticises Fama and Jensen (1983b) and 
Hansmann (1987) for proposing that the donors are the owners of the not-for-
profit organisation. She suggests that as unlike for-profit sector in which 
shareholders are the owners, donors do not pose all the characteristics of 
ownership and criticises the agency theory by arguing that it has restricted 
explanatory power to explain not-for-profit organisations. Also, Callen and 
Falk (1993) suggest that donors lack the motivation to oversee because of 
nonmonetary relationship with the not-for-profit organisation. 
Overall, the apparent differences among not-for-profit and for-profit sectors 
and that the traditional agency theory being argued to be insufficient in 
explaining the dynamics of not-for-profit organisations has led scholars to 
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favour an extended and reformed agency theory (Jegers, 2008). Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) argued that agency theory should be developed by taking 
wider stakeholder interests into account and therefore proposing a multiple 
principal agency theory. While Coule (2015) argues that with an enhanced 
agency theory the stakeholders who are less powerful will be heard more, Van 
Puyvelde et al. (2012) suggest a more comprehensive principal-agent theory 
for not-for-profit organisations, adding aspects of stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory. Mason (2015) proposes a ‘common agency framework’ 
among multiple principals/stakeholders in which each principal aims to 
control the one and only agent – the ‘common agent’.  (Mason, 2015, p.301) 
exemplifies the common agency framework for not-for-profit organisations 
as; 
“For nonprofit organizations engaged in advocacy, the leader 
(whether that’s paid executive director, or a volunteer board president) 
should be considered the agent, while the organization’s various 
stakeholders are the principals – including donors, volunteers, board 
members, and policymakers. Each principal is assumed to have their 
own expectations for organizational outcomes and creates its own 
“contract” with their agent. What differentiates a traditional principal-
agent problem with a common agency framework is that the principals 
are uncoordinated in their efforts to manage their common agent, and 
may often be in conflict, leaving the agent to manage the diverse 
demands of his or her various principals.”  
3.1.3 Agency	theory	and	fraud	
Despite its drawbacks (Greve et al., 2010) agency theory is one of the most 
prominent theories in explaining fraud (Albrecht et al., 2004; Macey, 1991) 
by trying to explain goal conflicts between the principal and the agent 
(Albrecht et al., 2015).  
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Macey (1991) suggests that fraud is a rare case because agents are risk-averse 
and agents will be in a position to face immense personal costs if they act 
fraudulently. However, fraud does occur and cannot be disregarded (Farber, 
2005; Hendry, 2005). The existence of fraud in not-for-profit organisations is 
against the argument of Hansmann (1980) that the no distribution constraint 
prevents opportunistic behaviour. Davis et al. (1997) argue that in line with 
the assumptions of agency theory, self-interest and the short-term focus of 
agents are the main causes of fraud.  
Miller (2005) argues that agency problems provide an opportunity to 
purposeful wrongdoing of agents or by being ignorant to threats. Agency 
theory posits that agents have a tendency to be fraudulent as they are self-
driven and looking for opportunities to cheat and distort (Cuevas-Rodríguez 
et al., 2012). Saksena (2001) suggests that agency theory provides insights 
into when fraud is likely to take place and agents may found further 
opportunity and courage to take risks if the monitoring is inefficient in the 
organisation. Raelin and Bondy (2013) stress that agency theory endeavours 
to restrict managerialism and opportunistic behaviour of the agent and to align 
the goals of the principal and the agent.  
Culpan and Trussel (2005) assess the ‘Enron debacle’ by using the agency 
and stakeholder theories. They argue that the Enron incident proves the 
agency theory to be right as the failure to detect and cope with the agency 
problems and unable to effectively monitor them caused the agents to act in 
malfeasance. They also posit that agency theory is fundamental in exploring 
fraudulent practices in accounting and financial areas but should be supported 
by other theories like the stakeholder theory if the aim is to grasp a broader 
understanding.  
While Alexander and Cohen (1999) argue that the agency theory capably 
explains fraud may occur in organisations, Amara et al. (2013) identify 
information asymmetry as the principal cause of agency problems and that 
the fraud risk increases with perpetual information asymmetry. Szper and 
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Prakash (2011) also argue that the information asymmetries among the 
principal (donors) and the agent can cause the funds to be used for personal 
interest. 
While components of ‘residual loss’ change based on the organisation 
(McColgan, 2001), Alexander and Cohen (1999) argued that corporate 
crime/fraud is also an agency cost as it cannot be eliminated by the 
organisation and is, therefore, a residual loss. Remedies of agency problems 
such as audit, compensation, independent board, etc. are also directly related 
with fraudulent activity. As will be examined in more depth in the next 
chapter, inadequate audit committees (Beasley et al., 2000), lower 
percentages of outside board members (Farber, 2005) and inadequate internal 
and external audit are some indications of potential fraud.  
Greve et al. (2010) criticise agency theory as focusing only on actors lower 
in a hierarchy (agents) against higher ones (principals), and not addressing 
misconduct against colleagues or other stakeholders. Integration of agency 
theory with other theories is deemed to provide more explanatory power as 
will be discussed in section 3.5. Machado and Gartner (2014) posit that if 
intensified with other theories, such as the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953), 
agency theory will form a suitable mechanism to evaluate and assess the 
occurrence of organisational fraud. 
Although not being evaluated enough (Greenlee et al., 2007) and the belief 
that not-for-profit managers will not act out of self-interest (Miller, 2002), in 
reality not-for-profit organisations are exposed to misconduct/fraud 
(Steinberg and Gray, 1993) and the exposure may even be more dangerous 
compared to for-profit organisations because of the absence of  clear principal 
control, existence of a variety of stakeholders and lack of efficiency metrics 
(Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Brickley and Van Horn, 2002; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 
1997). The absence of the residual claimant causes agency relationship 
among principals and agents to be clouded and therefore managers have 
enhanced opportunity to shirk and pursue self-interest (Olson, 2000). 
113	|	P a g e 	
	
Nikolova (2014) examined if stakeholder monitoring (donors, beneficiaries, 
regulator and board of directors) had an effect on financial misconduct or not. 
She found that the nature of the not-for-profit sector is not immune to 
opportunistic behaviour. She also found that especially donor monitoring 
restricts risk of misconduct and diminishes executive pay and therefore 
agency problems. Nikolova (2014, p.681) posits that agency theory is not 
applicable directly for the not-for-profit sector and needs to be extended with 
“stakeholder, stewardship, social capital, and intrinsic motivation theories” 
3.2 Stewardship	theory		
Stewardship theory follows a different path from agency theory in assessing 
the relationship between stewards and principals (Bacq and Eddleston, 2018). 
Stewardship theory builds on the view that managers of an organisation are 
‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ (Davis et al., 1997). The theory suggests that 
the steward will possess interests in line with the objectives of the 
organisation and will cherish working in the organisation (Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003). Some of the theory’s specifications are that the stewards 
are committed to the organisation and adorned with moral values (Hernandez, 
2012),  such as self-esteem, loyalty, mutual trust (Van Slyke, 2006), shared 
goals, self-achievement and cooperation (Karns, 2011), the steward takes 
decisions that will be in the principal’s best interest (Davis et al., 1997).  
Stewardship theory also suggests that the steward should be supported by the 
organisation and its board to improve his/her skills, and training of the 
steward should be undergirded to enhance the potential performance of the 
steward (Viader and Espina, 2014). Also, the theory envisages that in the case 
of conflict of interest between the principal and the steward, the steward will 
align himself/herself with the goals of the organisation (Davis et al., 1997) as 
this alignment will favour both the principal and the steward (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991).  
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Stewardship theory is positioned as the opposite and a counterweight of 
agency theory (Van Slyke, 2006). The self-interested agent of the agency 
theory becomes the steward who is pro-organisationally positioned (Davis et 
al., 1997). Stewarts are intrinsically motivated and they believe that putting 
the organisation first will also provide personal satisfaction (Segal and 
Lehrer, 2012). Also unlike agency theory, which proposes that the agent will 
behave opportunistically and is short-term focused, stewardship theory 
suggests that stewards aspire for collective interest and are long-term oriented 
(Caers et al., 2006). In contrast to agency theory, which is a ‘control system’, 
stewardship theory is defined as a ‘collaboration system’ in which interests 
of the steward and the principal align together (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003; Viader and Espina, 2014). Hernandez (2012) and Seyama (2015) also 
argue that contractual mechanisms that try to align the objectives of the agent 
and the principal and incentivise the agent are harmful to the relationship 
between the steward and the principal and therefore damage the overall 
objectives of the organisation. 
3.2.1 Stewardship	theory	criticism	
Stewardship theory is criticised as being formalised just to be an opponent of 
the agency theory rather than structuring an own framework (Hernandez, 
2012) and for being too idealistic and optimistic (Dicke and Ott, 2002) and is 
applicable to only smaller and family businesses where cooperation and 
mutual trust are already expected values (Bernstein et al., 2016). Van Slyke 
(2006) criticises stewardship theory for suggesting that trust and cooperation 
exist from the start of the principal-steward relationship and argues that 
stewardship theory can only be relevant after mutual time is spent among the 
parties. Van Puyvelde et al. (2016, p.224) state there is a very thin line 
between pursuing a steward or agent policy: “More specifically, if too much 
controlling takes place, managers’ intrinsic motivation may be crowded out. 
Too little controlling, in contrast, may result in increased opportunism.” A 
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major number of studies have criticised stewardship theory as not effectively 
explaining fraud and misconduct, which is assessed in section 3.2.3.  
As in the case of agency and stakeholder theories, stewardship theory is 
suggested to be integrated with other theories to broaden its coverage 
(Schillemans and Bjurstrøm, 2019). While Amara et al. (2013) argue that 
agency and stewardship theories are complementary to each other, Hernandez 
(2012) suggests that in line with the stakeholder theory, stewardship theory 
aims to meet expectations of multiple stakeholders in order to succeed in 
communal welfare. Caers et al. (2006) argue that stewardship and agency 
theories does not contradict but rather complete each other. 
3.2.2 Stewardship	theory	and	not-for-profit	organisations	
Stewardship theory envisages the steward will act in accordance with 
organisational objectives even there is lack of alignment of interests (Tosi et 
al., 2003), or principal and steward’s goals are already aligned and therefore 
the steward is selected by the principal (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
Carman (2011) argues that by their nature not-for-profit organisations possess 
the specifications of stewardship theory such as collective action and 
cooperation and therefore stewardship theory fits well with the not-for-profit 
sector and donor-not-for-profit relations will flourish if steward-like policies 
are pursued. Kelly (2001) and Hon and Grunig (1999) suggest in line with the 
stewardship theory that, not-for-profit managers are motivated to perform 
their duties favoured by the donors and propose four stewardship strategies 
that not-for-profit organisations can use to improve a favourable fundraising 
link with the donors: reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and relationship 
nurturing. Waters (2009) found that donors favour Kelly’s stewardship 
strategies. Segal and Lehrer (2012) found that stewardship theory is also 
applicable in large organisations in which individuals do not know each other 
and that the theory is not limited to small groups where trust is already 
embedded. 
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Findings, whether not-for-profit organisations are in line with stewardship 
theory, are ambiguous. While Jobome (2006) favoured stewardship theory, 
Caers et al. (2006) argue that stewardship theory is not sufficiently capable of 
reflecting management behaviour. Kluvers and Tippett (2011), who 
conducted interviews with not-for-profit staff, argue that extrinsic incentives 
are not useful in the sector and therefore stewardship theory rather than 
agency theory has a higher explanatory power for not-for-profit governance. 
Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) and Van Puyvelde et al. (2016) on the other hand 
suggested that agency theory and stewardship theory do not compose 
competition but rather they complement each other.  Van Slyke (2006) found 
a shift of not-for-profit organisations from a principal-agent to a principal-
steward relationship with time and the relationship bearing partnership and 
mutual respect. Jobome (2006) and Sinclair et al. (2010) posit that not-for-
profit stewards are partially at least intrinsically motivated.  
3.2.3 Stewardship	theory	and	fraud	
Stewardship theory envisages that stewards will act with high moral values 
and will not behave opportunistically (Davis et al., 1997). Cuevas-Rodríguez 
et al. (2012) argue that intrinsic incentives envisaged by the stewardship 
theory such as identification with an organisation and personal satisfaction 
will provide better restraints towards opportunistic behaviour than extrinsic 
incentives proposed by the agency theory.  
Segal and Lehrer (2012), in analysing the case of Edmonton Public Schools, 
argue that organisations can establish their governance structures on intrinsic 
motivation and monitoring systems and therefore even in large organisations 
fraud can be reduced, but they also state that ‘corruption prevention’ is the 
most vulnerable part and a real concern for the stewardship theory and posit 
that (p.175) “no combined treatment of stewardship and corruption exists.”  
Choo and Tan (2007) argues that stewardship theory is incapable of 
explaining the acts of fraud and misconduct and posit that the close 
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relationship between the board and the management envisaged by the 
stewardship theory to be the reason of providing a ground for opportunistic 
behaviour. The theory’s suggestions of self-control and moral values in 
managing fraud are criticised as being not sufficient in combating fraud 
(Dicke and Ott, 2002). Galle and Walker (2016) also found that managers of 
not-for-profit organisations who pursue a stewardship approach take 
advantage of the lack of monitoring and act opportunistically and pursue 
remuneration over donor expectations. 
3.3 Stakeholder	theory	
The stakeholder theory, which especially gained momentum after the book 
by (Freeman, 1984a)  ‘Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach’, is 
based on the assumption that organisations affect and are affected by the 
group or individuals called stakeholders (Ferkins and Shilbury, 2015). 
Different from the shareholder view in which only the shareholders or the 
‘owners’ of the organisation are given prominence, stakeholder theory offers 
a broader approach that argues that multiple ownership is possible  and posits 
that there are other parties which possess a stake in the organisation (Parmar 
et al., 2010). Also, unlike agency theory, which envisages a bilateral 
relationship only between the principal and the agent, stakeholder theory 
provides an extensive perspective and examines the relationship between the 
organisation and stakeholders and among stakeholder groups (Cuevas-
Rodríguez et al., 2012). Organisations are perceived in a social context in which 
their responsibilities towards their stakeholders exceed their fiduciary duties  
(Ambler and Wilson, 1995), with management as the core of the nexus (Hill and 
Jones, 1992). 
Culpan and Trussel (2005) posit that organisations have moral reasons to 
satisfy the needs and interact with stakeholders. The theory also argues that 
organisations are in need of the approval of their stakeholders in order to 
survive, enhance reputation and legitimise their activities (Connolly and 
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Hyndman, 2013a). Loyalty, mutual trust, responsibility and cooperation are 
some key attributes in a healthy organisation-stakeholder relationship (Fassin, 
2012). The progress and future of the organisation is shaped by the 
relationships between the organisation and the stakeholders  (Culpan and 
Trussel, 2005) and therefore how these relationships are managed by the 
organisation is important (Wellens and Jegers, 2014a).  Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) suggest that both the organisation and the stakeholders will 
benefit from efficient stakeholder management policies.  
Belal (2002) distinguishes stakeholder theory into two approaches: 
stakeholder management and normative. The normative approach suggests 
that the organisation must not restrict itself to only satisfy the needs of the 
key stakeholder  but should attempt to establish a fair balance among different 
interests of various stakeholders (Ntim et al., 2017). The stakeholder 
management approach on the other hand posits the identification and 
prioritisation of stakeholder groups with regard to their power and interest 
towards the organisation (Connolly et al., 2013c), and designs actions for 
different types of stakeholders (Brammer and Millington, 2004). Mitchell et 
al. (1997), as discussed in the previous chapter, suggest that prioritisation of 
stakeholders should be performed depending on their salience, which will be 
determined by each stakeholders’ power, legitimacy and urgency attributes. 
Different variations of stakeholder prioritising have been proposed by several 
scholars (Agle et al., 1999; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Speckbacher, 
2008). Bryson (2004) mentions 15 different stakeholder identification 
techniques including power versus interest grids, building a winning coalition 
around proposal development, stakeholder influence diagrams, etc.  
3.3.1 Stakeholder	theory	criticism		
Although providing a broad stakeholder approach is beneficial, the existence 
of multiple stakeholders is challenging and is a portent to a variety of 
principal-agent problems (Miller, 2002). Therefore, stakeholder theory has to 
deal with various issues but is criticised as being incapable of doing so.  
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Stakeholder theory has been described as a ‘vampire’ (Orts and Strudler, 
2009) that expands and impacts every discipline and therefore it is overblown. 
Orts and Strudler (2009) especially criticise the theory for not providing 
sufficient definition of stakeholders and therefore having vagueness attached, 
and for being unreliable, as every organisation can define its own stakeholders 
in the way they desire (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). Ambler and Wilson 
(1995) indicate the problem areas of stakeholder as hard to determine 
stakeholders, measuring the stake, measuring the success of the policies and lack 
of how representation of stakeholders will be achieved. They also argue that the 
identification and prioritisation process envisaged by stakeholder theory is 
spoilt as it enables rights to those stakeholders who do not contribute or 
participate may also benefit from the actions of the organisation.  
Fassin (2008) and Fassin (2012) posit that reciprocity is being neglected in 
the stakeholder theory literature, with only the liability towards stakeholders 
being considered, rather than stakeholders’ liability towards the organisation. 
Fassin (2008, 2012) argues that stakeholders also bear duties to the 
organisation as well as demands and needs.  
Abzug and Webb (1999), aiming at to give an answer to the criticisms, favour 
a more comprehensive stakeholder theory which can be enhanced by 
embodying and building on various bilateral relationships among the 
stakeholders of the not-for-profit organisation.  They also argue that 
stakeholder theory provides a more flexible approach compared to the agency 
theory with suggesting that conflict of interest is not key regarding the 
relationship between principal and the agent. Jegers (2009) argues that 
contractual interests among different stakeholders should be designed similar 
to the principal-agent relationship which is envisaged under agency theory. 
3.3.2 Stakeholder	theory	and	not-for-profit	organisations	
Stakeholder theory is highly utilised in theorisation of the not-for-profit sector 
such that Valentinov and Iliopoulos (2013) defines not-for-profit 
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organisations as ‘stakeholder coalitions.' Not-for-profit sector organisations 
have a diverse range of stakeholders such as beneficiaries, management, 
donors, board members, government, volunteers and other non-managerial 
staff members (Wellens and Jegers, 2014a) and therefore identification and 
prioritising of them is crucial for the wellbeing of the organisation (Wellens 
and Jegers, 2011).  
Aligning stakeholder expectations is argued to have a positive effect on 
governance and performance of not-for-profit organisations (Herman and 
Renz, 2008). Determining user needs (Dhanani and Connolly, 2015) and 
prioritising stakeholders (Connolly and Hyndman, 2017) in such a sector of 
various stakeholders is found to be very beneficial for not-for-profit 
organisations (Jegers, 2009). Dainelli et al. (2013) in their study regarding 
accountability in museums found that accountability is designed by variety 
and power of various stakeholders which they conclude validates stakeholder 
theory.  
Cordery and Baskerville (2005) by utilising the Mitchell et al. (1997) 
stakeholder salience model proposed that due to their lack of power, 
beneficiaries will never be the definitive stakeholders. Donors, on the other 
hand, have been identified by several studies as the most significant group of 
stakeholders (Connolly et al., 2013c; Hyndman, 1990) as a result of their 
power to supply funding to the not-for-profit organisations. In terms of 
legislation and decision making the importance attached to donors and 
ignorance of beneficiaries is also apparent (Candler and Dumont, 2010).  
It has been argued that implementing stakeholder theory for not-for-profit 
organisations is not easy due to competing interests of multiple stakeholders 
and vagueness of who the prime principal is (Caers et al., 2006; Nikolova, 
2014). Miller (2002) stresses the importance of determining the ‘principal’ of 
each not-for-profit organisation as existence of multiple stakeholders with 
different objectives creates vagueness of ownership in not-for-profit 
organisations, and beclouds monitoring which hampers the struggle with 
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opportunisms and misconduct. Wellens and Jegers (2014a) posit that donors 
as well as beneficiaries, board of trustees, regulators and other stakeholder 
groups can be accepted as ‘principal’ in not-for-profit organisations and 
therefore they propose an extended stakeholder theory for not-for-profit 
organisations in which demands and needs of different stakeholders are 
prioritised and shape the actions of the not-for-profit organisation. Wellens 
and Jegers (2014a) even argue that beneficiaries are ‘intended residual 
claimants’ in not-for-profit organisations because their needs drive the actions 
of the not-for-profit organisation. They also stress that not assessing 
perceptions of stakeholders, stakeholder theory’s assumptions will be 
incomplete.  
Hill and Jones (1992), Abzug and Webb (1999) and Jegers (2009) argue that 
principal-agent relationships may be regarded as a subgroup of the overall 
stakeholder relationship and an enhanced principal-agency theory that 
encompasses a multiple principal framework is more appropriate. Van 
Puyvelde et al. (2012) suggest that by utilising stakeholder perspective, 
possible principal-agent relationships in a not-for-profit organisation can be 
structured. They distinguish between external and internal not-for-profit 
principal-agent relationships and provide three subgroups for each:  
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Table	3.1	Principal-agent	relationships	in	not-for-profit	organisations	
External	not-for-profit	principal-agent	
relationship	
Internal	not-for-profit	principal	agent	
relationship	
Donors	as	principals	and	the	managers	
and/or	board	as	its	agents	
Board	as	principal	and	managers	as	its	
agents	
Consumers,	clients	(beneficiaries)	and	
members	as	principals	and	managers	
and/or	board	as	its	agents	
Managers	as	principals	and	employees	as	
agents	
Other	organisations	(auditors)	as	agents	
and	the	not-for-profit	organisation	as	the	
principal	
Managers	as	principals	and	volunteers	as	
agents	
Source Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) 
3.3.3 Stakeholder	theory	and	fraud	
Trust is very important in stakeholder theory (Harris and Wicks, 2010) and 
trustworthy relationships among the organisations and its stakeholders are 
expected to mitigate misconduct and fraud (Arvidsson, 2010). Culpan and 
Trussel (2005) posit that stakeholder theory is useful in providing insights of 
determining unethical practices that have an impact on the stakeholders. 
Kaptein (2008) also utilises stakeholder theory to assess unethical behaviours 
in workplaces. While Kolk and Pinkse (2006) suggest that neglecting 
stakeholder demands caused opportunistic behaviour like in the Enron case, 
Mulligan (2007) argues that because of the absence of shareholders a 
Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulation is not appropriate for not-for-profit 
organisations and therefore stakeholder theory should be used to formulise a 
regulatory approach to determine the needs of each stakeholder and to fight 
with misconduct. Cordery and Baskerville (2011) argued that fraud is 
sustained in charities when charities do not have a powerful relationship with 
especially salient stakeholders.   
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However relying only on stakeholders in overcoming misconduct may not 
provide effective outcomes (Dunn, 2010). Heath and Norman (2004) criticise 
stakeholder management because of scattering the focus and causing less 
monitoring and indirectly to misconduct and therefore proposed a more 
shareholder-focused approach. Carson (2003) argues that stakeholder theory 
lacks preventive measures against fraud and deception and enables a 
rationalisation of acts of opportunistic behaviour. He argues that stakeholder 
theory provides an illusion of a loft aim which depicts agents as ‘moral 
arbiters.' He suggests that stakeholder theory should be re-formulised to fit up 
well with the moral codes. Barnett (2014) criticises the belief that 
stakeholders will oversee the organisation continuously and that the 
stakeholders have their limited attention and bounded rationality and 
therefore will assess misconduct differently for each case and judge 
misconduct inappropriately. He also argues that social control is not sufficient 
in dissuading misconduct and therefore even when stakeholders are informed 
by the opportunistic behaviour, the perpetrators may not be punished. 
Although stakeholder theory is good at envisaging well-structured and 
balanced management of stakeholder relationships, its deficiencies to explain 
and solve opportunistic behaviour steer especially not-for-profit scholars to 
extend the theory with other theories (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012).    
3.4 Other	theories	
In this section resource dependency and institutional theory will be examined. 
Resource dependence theory interprets how organisations diminish 
environmental dependence (Bryant and Davis, 2012). The theory’s important 
assumptions are that organisations depend on resources to survive (Hillman 
et al., 2009), they are open systems, their aim is to reduce dependence on the 
external environment and uncertainty (Bryant and Davis, 2012; Johnson et 
al., 1996) and requirement for resources determine an organisations activities 
(Reheul et al., 2014).  Viader and Espina (2014) state that resources could be 
tangible or intangible ranging from goods and services to reputation and 
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networking. The resource dependence theory is widely used especially in the 
analysis of the boards (Hillman et al., 2009; Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009).  
The theory was especially very useful in understanding how boards obtain 
resources they need for survival (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The theory also 
provides guidance on merging (Malatesta and Smith, 2014) and in lobbying 
(Ruggiano and Taliaferro, 2012). 
The theory is criticised as assumptions are taken for granted (Wry et al., 2013) 
and becoming a subsidiary theory rather than being its own (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) and dwarfed by the applications of the agency theory. Miller-
Millesen (2003) argues resource dependence theory assumptions may not 
fully be implemented in the not-for-profit sector as resource access is more 
complicated and that the theory assumes a non-complicated external 
environment. 
The resource dependence theory focuses more on how the resources are 
obtained rather than on how they are used (Bryant and Davis, 2012). Gales 
and Kesner (1994) suggest that resource dependence theory is not sufficient 
to explain governance policies in cases of bankruptcy and situations other 
than existence in a healthy environment. They argue that agency theory is 
better in explaining the policies of the organisation in such ‘abnormal’ 
situations. The theory especially assesses how organisations are affected by 
fraud but does not provide an explanation of how fraud actualises (Cowen 
and Marcel, 2011). The theory is accepted to be more useful when used with 
other theories. For example, Callen et al. (2010) found that agency and 
resource dependence theories are complementary to each other and point 
various issues of not-for-profit organisations. 
Institutional theory is based on the assumption that organisation’s external 
environment shapes the structure and actions of the organisation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). The theory argues that regulations, sector rules, organisation 
culture, traditions, industry norms, cultural beliefs and all other internal and 
external factors influence the organisation (Carman, 2010; Cuevas-Rodríguez 
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et al., 2012; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Institutional theory posits that 
compliance with the social and cultural forces provides legitimacy and 
survival to the organisation  (Chen et al., 2016; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Institutional theory is also used to examine not-for-profit organisations and 
how well they are adaptive to their institutional environment (Benjamin, 
2008; Carman, 2011).  
Institutional theory is criticised for neglecting how individual abilities of 
decision making and acting incentives other than to comply with the external 
environment (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). Helmig et al. (2004) also stress 
that activities without institutional thought are overlooked. They argue that 
stakeholder, resource dependence and institutional theories can be used 
together in not-for-profit organisation studies.  
Both the resource dependence and institutional theories and other theories 
such as legitimacy are used to assess how good the organisation is at 
accommodating itself to its environment and raising funds. However as the 
thesis is assessing how the funds are used and how fraud is building up rather 
than how they are raised, these theories are less relevant and offer little insight 
when compared with especially agency theory. Nevertheless, the thesis aims 
to benefit from other theories where applicable. 
3.5 Integration	of	theories	
Although special problems exist for the not-for-profit sector, the theorisation 
of accountability and governance is still conducted using theories structured 
for the for-profit sector. While Coule (2015) argues that the nature of the not-
for-profit organisations makes it harder to directly apply theories developed 
especially for the for-profit sector, other scholars also posit that it is not 
appropriate to directly apply theories like agency that are specifically 
designed for the for-profit sector (Caers et al., 2006; Van Puyvelde et al., 
2012). 
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Stone and Ostrower (2007) argue a broader view of relationships within an 
organisation’s wider environment will provide a more enhanced 
understanding of not-for-profit governance. Brown and Guo (2010) argue that 
all theories if applied alone are incapable of capturing all aspects of not-for-
profit behaviour. Finding an appropriate theory becomes much more difficult 
especially for this study as the aim is to analyse fraud/misconduct in charities, 
a highly sensitive issue.  
Agency theory, which assumes that individuals are self-interested and act 
opportunistically, has been the leading theory in explaining the relationships 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Fama and Jensen 
(1983a) argue that the survival and success of the not-for-profit organisation 
rest upon how wisely the donations or funds it receives are spent and not being 
exploited. The theory provides important explanations on why funds may be 
spent unwisely or even be a target of fraud (Callen et al., 2010). Agency 
theory also guides how to prevent fraudulent activities with incentives and 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the different nature of the 
not-for-profit organisations makes it harder for a direct application of the 
agency theory (Caers et al., 2006). 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that when used with complementary approaches 
agency theory provides valid results and also enhances understanding of 
uncertainty and risk. Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. (2012) propose that agency 
theory should be incorporated with other theoretical perspectives to empower 
predictions of agency theory.  Hill and Jones (1992) argue that the relationship 
between principal and the agent could be seen as a sub-group of a wider group 
of stakeholder links.   
Stewardship theory, even though it seems to place itself at the opposite of 
agency theory, as it posits that goals of the steward and the principal are 
aligned, is argued to complete the features of agency theory and therefore the 
two theories together provide a better-structured framework. Van Puyvelde et 
al. (2013) and Caers et al. (2006) and CuevasRodríguez et al. (2012) and 
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Seyama (2015) argue that this case is especially favourable for not-for-profit 
organisations where the organisational structure is more complicated. Du 
Bois et al. (2009) found that aligned and not-aligned goals exist together in 
the not-for-profit organisations and therefore argue that agency and 
stewardship theory do not contradict. 
Stakeholder theory, which is again formalised for the for-profit sector, argues 
that the policies of the organisation should include a variety of stakeholders 
and must not be focused to a particular one (Culpan and Trussel, 2005).  The 
theory is deemed to be a response to the agency theory who depicts a one-
dimensional principal-agent relationship, which only focuses on managers 
and the board (Van Puyvelde et al., 2013). Hill and Jones (1992) argue that 
nexus of contracts among the stakeholders can be used as a restructured 
agency theory model. Wellens and Jegers (2014a) argue that an extension of 
the stakeholder theory especially designed for not-for-profit organisations is 
more appropriate to reflect the multiple principal nature of the not-for-profit 
organisations. Jegers (2009) also proposes a multi-principal approach where 
each stakeholder can be depicted as a principal.  
Different aspects of agency, stakeholder and stewardship theory complete 
each other especially regarding the special circumstances for not-for-profit 
organisations. Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) argue that supplementing aspects 
of stakeholder and stewardship theory to agency theory provides 
identification of the broad range of principals in the not-for-profit sector and 
as a result may establish a more holistic approach. 
The agency theory forms the backbone of the theory part of this study, as it is 
especially useful in explaining the unethical accounting and financial 
practices in not-for-profit organisations. However stewardship and 
stakeholder theories also have their own merits to grasp a better 
understanding of not-for-profit fraud and therefore an integration of these 
three theories into an ‘extended agency theory’ will provide a better 
theoretical framework (Callen et al., 2010).  Miller-Millesen (2003, p.522) 
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argues every theory provides a contribution that broadens the understanding 
of not-for-profits and their actions: “Each theory paints an incomplete picture 
of a highly complex phenomenon because each theory focuses on a different 
set of activities and functions.”  
Integrating the theories for assessment of fraud is also widely utilised. 
Albrecht et al. (2004) also combined aspects of agency, stewardship and the 
fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) theories and formalised the ‘Broken Trust 
Theory’. Nikolova (2014) proposes an integrated agency theory with 
stakeholder, stewardship, social capital and intrinsic motivation theories for 
not-for-profit organisations in order to assess the influence of multiple 
stakeholders (principals). She argues that only concentrating on a limited 
agency theory perspective is insufficient in analysing how the organisation is 
affected by misconduct and if multiple principals are monitoring well enough.  
Overall, in line with the recent theoretical stream to integrate several theories 
to better fit for the not-for-profit organisations (Andreaus and Costa, 2014; 
Caers et al., 2006; Choo and Tan, 2007; Du Bois et al., 2009; Miller-Millesen, 
2003; Nikolova, 2014; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012; Van Puyvelde et al., 2016) 
this study argues that an integrated theory is more suitable for analysis of 
fraud/misconduct in not-for-profit organisations.  
Figure 3.3 below summarises the structure of the integrated theory with 
mentioning key aspects of each theory:  
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Figure	3.3	Integrated	Theory	
Source (Author)	
3.6 Summary	
This chapter has assessed agency, stewardship and stakeholder theory in 
detail regarding their fundamental features, criticised aspects and power to 
explain fraud and not-for-profit sector accountability and governance. After 
the assessment, in line with the recent theoretical framework suggested by 
not-for-profit scholars (Nikolova, 2014; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012) the study 
argues that integrating the theories rather than using a sole theory to examine 
fraud in charities will provide a broader and a more generous approach that 
can cover both the internal and external environment aspects of fraud in 
charities.  
The next chapter analyses the term ‘fraud’ in detail and provides identified 
research gaps that will be assessed. 
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4. A	REVIEW	OF	THE	FRAUD	LITERATURE	
This chapter builds a theoretical framework for fraud and provides a literature 
review on fraud in organisations. First, the concept of ‘fraud’ is analysed. The 
chapter focuses on theories that aim to understand the causes of fraud and 
then assesses models predicting fraud. Afterwards, the mechanisms used in 
tackling fraud are discussed. Empirical literature is examined for for-profit, 
public and not-for-profit sectors in the chapter. The research in this thesis is 
about fraud in charities. However, for charities in England and Wales, there 
have been only a few academic studies on fraud, and such studies are scarce 
even for the wider not-for-profit sector. Therefore, stressing the differences 
between for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, the chapter draws on for-profit, 
public sector and not-for-profit sector fraud studies to discuss the theories of 
fraud and tools used to mitigate fraud, with fraud literature in the not-for-
profit sector discussed in the last section of the chapter.  
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Figure	4.1	Structure	of	Chapter	4	
4.1 Definition	of	Fraud	
Fraud11  can be defined as “the quality of being deceitful; criminal deception; 
the using of false representations to obtain an unjust advantage or to injure 
the rights or interests of another; a dishonest trick” by the Oxford Dictionary 
(2003) and “any act, expression, omission, or concealment calculated to 
deceive another to his or her disadvantage” by  Merriam-Webster (1996). 
Deception (Albrecht et al., 2010), abuse (Dellaportas, 2013) and self-benefit 
                                                
11 The study focuses on charities accused of acting fraudulently. In this respect, although 
earnings management and restatements, and fraud share certain traits, they are not the same 
and therefore earnings management and restatements are not assessed in this study.  
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(Simpson, 2013) are the key concepts for fraud.  As this study assesses charity 
fraud carried out by charity officials12, occupational fraud will be included, 
which is using an occupation to be enriched by abuse of the organisation 
(Greenlee et al., 2007). Archambeault et al. (2015) state that occupational 
fraud consists of three types: corruption, financial statement and asset 
misappropriation, among which asset misappropriation is the most common 
fraud type in charities. The fraud identification of the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) suggests again three types of occupational fraud: 
Corruption, Asset Misappropriation, and Fraudulent Statements (ACFE, 
2019). 
The UK legislation on fraud, the Fraud Act (2006), separates the definition of 
fraud into three categories, which all involve the person acting against the law 
if the person acts dishonestly and with the aim to make a gain or cause a loss: 
"Fraud by false representation" is defined as “untrue or misleading 
representation which was expressed or implied.” (Provision 2) 
"Fraud by failing to disclose information" is defined as “failure to 
disclose to another person information which the person is under a 
legal duty to disclose.” (Provision 3) 
"Fraud by abuse of position" is defined as “abuses of the position 
where the person occupies a position where expected to safeguard the 
financial interests of another person.” (Provision 4) 
Although not defined in the Charities Act (2011), financial crime and 
financial abuse has been identified by the Charity Commission as one of the 
strategic risks facing charities. The Commission’s definition of fraud is 
exactly derived from the the Fraud Act (2006), whereas misconduct is defined 
                                                
12 Charity officials are all employees and board members of the charities	
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as follows: “Misconduct includes any act (or failure to act) that the person 
committing it knew (or ought to have known) was criminal, unlawful or 
improper”  (Commission, 2016b, p.2). 
In this research ‘fraud’ as well as ‘financial misconduct’ rather than 
‘mismanagement’ will be used, as the term ‘mismanagement’ includes 
actions not being deliberate and therefore has the potential to dilute the 
research. Although fraud may be categorised differently, the scope of the 
research is limited to internal charity fraud, that is fraud performed by 
members of the organisation. The study analyses frauds which have been 
detected and also publicly exposed.  
4.2 Fraud	theories	
This section embraces theories that study the nature of fraud. Although fraud 
was examined by different scholars, fraud committed in organisations was 
theorised by Edwin Sutherland (1949, p.9) who defined white-collar crime13 
as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in 
the course of his occupation.” Sutherland (1940, p.12) disagreed that poverty 
is the only reason for crime and posited that white-collar crime was in need 
of theorisation.  He also developed the differential association theory, which 
argues that to behave criminally and the motivation for it is a process acquired 
through contact with other people (Sutherland, 1949).  
Donald Cressey, who was co-author with Sutherland in Principles of 
Criminology (Sutherland et al., 1992), developed the theory of the “fraud 
triangle” in 1953. Cressey identifies the factors that form the triangle as 
pressure, opportunity and rationalisation.  
                                                
13 Sutherland first used and described the term “white collar crime” in a speech in 1939.  
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Pressure, which Cressey (1953) defines as being financial, derives from ‘non-
shareable’ problems that can only be solved by acquiring the resources of 
others. The pressure is perceived by the perpetrator and leads him or her to 
commit fraud (Albrecht et al., 2008). Some examples of pressure are debt, 
health related needs, addictions (drugs, gambling, alcoholism etc.); desire for 
possession, work related pressures to be successful, loss of employment, 
issues of health, , financial demands of relatives, child support (Burke and 
Sanney, 2018). Competition over social status is also identified as a pressure 
factor positively related with fraudulent behaviour (Ramamoorti et al., 2009). 
The second factor is opportunity, in which the fraudster has the belief that 
there are chances to act fraudulently without being caught (Benson et al., 
2009). Gottschalk (2019) suggests that the perpetrator is able to create and 
expand opportunity over time.  Dorminey et al. (2012) argue that weakness 
in monitoring and control and the remoteness of being caught creates the 
perceived opportunity for the fraudster.  Opportunity can derive from internal 
sources such as weak internal audit system or external sources such as 
regulatory weakness (Power, 2013; Skousen et al., 2009). Crawford and 
Weirich (2011) posit that industry nature, lack of monitoring, unstable 
organisation and insufficient internal control activities are reasons of 
opportunity. Schuchter and Levi (2015) found, during their interviews with 
‘white-collar’ fraudsters, that they only perceive opportunity as the real 
precondition for fraud.  
Rationalisation, the third factor, identifies the actual reasons for fraudulent 
behaviour, or the underlying motivation and a moral excuse for the fraudulent 
action (Dellaportas, 2013). A particular mind-set which justifies committing 
fraud is rationalisation by the perpetrator (Morales et al., 2014). The fraud act 
is justified by reasons and beliefs such as being unpaid, or underpaid, being 
under appreciated, personal reasons such as revenge, borrowing (Burke and 
Sanney, 2018). Some other rationalisation factors positively related with 
fraudulent behaviour are job dissatisfaction and unfavourable workplace 
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conditions (Hollinger and Clark, 1983).  The theory can be depicted as in 
Figure 4.2: 
 
Figure	4.2	The	fraud	triangle	
Source (Cressey, 1953) 
Cressey’s work  (1953) was tested and largely supported by many scholars  
(Abdullahi and Mansor, 2018; Bell and Carcello, 2000; LaSalle, 2007) and it 
led to further work to examine fraud (Roden et al., 2016).  
Theories developed further to try to enhance the fraud triangle model 
psychologically by focusing on new components especially those related to 
personal traits and competence of the perpetrators. Albrecht et al. (1984) 
proposed to add personal integrity to Cressey’s theory and to replace it with 
the rationalisation component which creates ‘the fraud scale’. They argue that 
higher pressure and opportunity and lack of personal integrity will cause the 
scale to shift towards the occurrence of fraud. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) 
enhanced the fraud triangle model with the addition of a fourth factor, 
capability, and came up with the ‘fraud diamond.’ The factor ‘capability’ 
posits that the fraudster also has to be able to commit fraud. Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004, p.39-40) argue that this capability is determined by a 
fraudster’s function in the organisation, intellect, ego and confidence, 
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influence over other people to coerce or conceal fraud, effectiveness and 
consistence and ability to deal with stress. Another theory that is derived from 
the fraud triangle is the triangle of fraud action, which posits that act, 
concealment and conversion are the three elements that are necessary for an 
action to be fraudulent (Dorminey et al., 2012).   
Marks (2009) added the components of arrogance and competence to the 
fraud triangle and derived the ‘fraud pentagon.' Like Marks (2009), Sorunke 
(2016) suggests a different fraud pentagon model that adds ‘personal ethics’ 
as a fifth component to the fraud diamond in which fraudsters are motivated 
by lack of ethical stance. Soltani (2014) also suggests modifying the fraud 
triangle especially emphasising the importance of the component opportunity, 
by taking into account themes such as control environment, regulation and 
organisational ethical climate. 
Huber et al. (2015) suggest the fraud triangle should be extended by the crime 
triangle, which also has three components: offender, target and lack of 
guardian/oversight (Tillyer and Eck, 2011). They argue that the fraud triangle 
only focuses on the perpetrator and therefore, by coupling with the crime 
triangle components, fraud can be assessed in a broader environment to 
include the target/victims, the people who are responsible for overseeing the 
perpetrator, and where the crime occurs. 
M.I.C.E. (money, ideology, coercion, entitlement) is the acronym to elaborate 
the pressure factor, which expands the definition by including other elements 
than the non-shareable financial pressure (Dorminey et al., 2012; Kassem and 
Higson, 2012). Ramamoorti et al. (2009) in their ‘ABC analysis’ argued that 
fraud is made up of three aspects: the bad apple which is the individual who 
acts fraudulently, the bad bushel which symbolises collusion in fraud 
behaviour, and the bad crop which is the organisational and social dynamic 
that leads to fraud.   
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Dorminey et al. (2012, p.565) criticise the fraud triangle theory as being only 
a descriptive model and argue that rationalisation and pressure are temporary 
factors and that the fraud triangle only concentrates on the ‘accidental 
fraudster’ “who under normal circumstances would never consider theft, 
break felonious laws, or harm others.” Dorminey et al. (2012, p.566) argue 
that the factors of pressure and rationalisation which were identified by the 
fraud triangle should be replaced by criminal mind-set and arrogance. They 
propose that the fraudster may also act as a predator, an individual whose 
permanent purpose is to conduct fraud and who only needs ‘opportunity’ to 
complete his/her act. Dorminey et al. (2012) posit that opportunity is the main 
element of risk that organisations and regulators should assess when planning 
to prevent fraud. The fraud triangle that builds on the argument that the 
perpetrator is a ‘predator’ is depicted in Figure 4.3: 
 
Figure	4.3	The	new	fraud	triangle	
Source (Dorminey et al., 2012) 
The literature provides ample integration of theories to explain fraud. While 
Albrecht et al. (2004) integrate agency, stewardship and fraud triangle theory. 
Choo and Tan (2007) enhance Albrecht’s (2004) theory by adding features of 
the American Dream theory, which are: importance of success in terms of 
money, disregarding regulation and justification of the fraudulent act. Raval 
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(2016) proposes a ‘disposition based fraud model’ which criticises the fraud 
triangle theory for ignoring the human side of fraudulent behaviour and 
emphasises that human desires and intentions determine the act of fraud or 
absence of it. Lokanan (2015, p.6) argues that the “multifaceted and 
interrelated complexity of fraud makes it difficult to come up with a 
unidirectional causal theory that can explain all occurrences of fraud” and 
posits that the macro social environment should also be elaborated in 
discussing fraud and fraudulent behaviour. The theory is also criticised as 
treating fraud as being only incidental (Free and Murphy, 2015), and 
political and economic institutions (Morales et al., 2014) social dimension 
(Murphy and Free, 2015) and collusion (Free, 2015) of fraud is not 
explained enough. 
Trompeter et al. (2014) surveyed the non-accounting academic literature on 
financial crime and argued that nearly all of the research is consistent with 
the three factors of the fraud triangle. Overall, although fraud theories are 
very useful in explaining fraud, they still cannot adequately explain all the 
features of white-collar crime. As will be discussed in section 4.5, the social 
dimension and influence of stakeholders still need to be further discussed.    
Table 4.1 below depicts the key aspects of some fraud theories with an 
emphasis on the fraud triangle: 
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Table	4.1	Theories	of	Fraud	
Theory Key Aspects 
Fraud Triangle 
Cressey (1953) 
Pressure: ‘non-shareable’ problems that can only be solved by 
acquiring the resources of others. Examples are debt, health related 
needs, addictions, desire for possession, work related pressures to be 
successful, , health issues, or loss of employment etc.  
Opportunity: the fraudster has the belief that there are chances to act 
fraudulently without being caught. Examples are weakness in external 
and internal monitoring and control, the remoteness of being caught, 
weak internal audit system, regulatory weakness, industry nature,  
unstable organisation etc. 
Rationalisation: identifies the actual reasons for fraudulent 
behaviour, or the underlying motivation and a moral excuse for the 
fraudulent action. Examples are being unpaid, being under mobbing, 
personal interests such as revenge, job dissatisfaction, unfavourable 
workplace conditions etc. 
Fraud Scale 
Albrecht et al. 
(1984) 
The component rationalisation is replaced by the component personal 
integrity. Examples are lack of honesty, diligence, work ethic etc. 
Fraud Diamond  
Wolfe and 
Hermanson 
(2004)  
A fourth component, capability, is added to the fraud triangle. 
Capability is determined by a fraudster’s function in the organisation. 
Examples are intellect, ego and confidence, influence over other 
people to coerce or conceal fraud, effectiveness and consistence and 
ability to deal with stress etc. 
 
Fraud Pentagon 
Sorunke, (2016)  
Marks (2009) 
 Adds personal ethics as a fifth component to the fraud diamond in 
which fraudsters are motivated by lack of ethical stance. 
Adds the components of arrogance and competence to the fraud 
triangle. 
 
ABC Analysis 
Ramamoorti et 
al. (2009):  
Argues that fraud is made up of three aspects 
the bad apple: which is the individual who acts fraudulently 
the bad bushel: symbolises collusion in fraud behaviour 
the bad crop: organisational and social dynamic that leads to fraud. 
 
Fraudster as 
‘predator’ 
Dorminey et al., 
(2012) 
Suggest that opportunity is the main element of risk that organisations 
rationalisation and pressure are temporary factors and that the fraud 
triangle only concentrates on the ‘accidental fraudster’. Argues that 
the components of rationalisation and pressure should be replaced by 
criminal mind-set and arrogance as the fraudster may also act as a 
predator, an individual whose permanent purpose is to conduct fraud 
and who only needs ‘opportunity’ to complete his/her act.  
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4.3 Models	predicting	fraud	
In this section, models either quantitative or qualitative that aim to predict 
fraud in organisations will be examined. Financial ratios such as profitability, 
liquidity and gearing have been seen as signs of a problem (du Jardin, 2015). 
Inventory, accounts receivable (Beasley et al., 1999) and revenue recognition 
(Rezaee, 2005) are some accounts frequently used to commit fraud. 
Trompeter et al. (2012) also argues that degenerated and misused documents 
such as journal entries are other signals of a fraudulent event. Fanning and 
Cogger (1998) found that in cases where gross margin percentage or accounts 
receivable exceed 110% of the value for the previous years, then fraud may 
be suspected.   
Apostolou et al. (2001) found that red flags regarding the management are 
twice as important as financial red flags of fraud.  However, the accuracy of 
red flags is doubtful (Albrecht et al., 1986; Patterson and Noel, 2003), and 
ratio analysis is also criticised as being subjective (Hogan et al., 2008). For 
example, Kaminski et al. (2004) assessed 21 financial ratios for their 
capability of predicting fraud and found no consistency through the seven 
years examined. 
Predicting failure and bankruptcy with more enhanced formulas began in the 
1960s. While Beaver (1966) formulated a predictive model emphasising cash 
flow and debt coverage, Altman (1968) developed the Z-score in which a 
variety of different financial ratios are used to predict failure and bankruptcy. 
The Z-score, which did not take account of ‘unexpected factors’ such as fraud 
or political or economic crises, posits that a Z-score of 1.8 or less (calculated 
by weighted coefficients of different ratios) means that the organisation is in 
danger of bankruptcy. Argenti (1983) developed a qualitative model, which 
utilises a management-scoring approach that rates management risks that may 
lead to organisational failure. Apart from the models, audit reports, credit 
ratings and other external reviews are widely used to predict business failure 
(du Jardin, 2015).  
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Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) were some of the first who tried to predict 
fraud and proposed a model which analyses the likelihood of management 
fraud. The model is consistent with Cressey’s fraud triangle where conditions 
(C), motivation for fraud (M) and attitude (A) replace pressure, opportunity 
and rationalisation. The model envisages that, in case of simultaneous 
existence of each attribute, then management fraud is very likely: P(MI)=f(C, 
M,A). Loebbecke et al. (1989), by using the model found that, in 86% of the 
fraud cases, at least one factor out of the three components was present. Bell 
et al. (1991) also found that fraud occurrence had an apparent link with the 
components and that the ‘attitude’ component provided the strongest 
relationship.  
Fanning et al. (1995) used Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) to predict fraud 
and found that neural network usage is better than earlier models built using 
logistics analysis. Bell and Carcello (2000) on the other hand investigated 
fraud using logistic regression and found logistic regression to be a better 
predictor of fraud risk than auditors’ risk assessment.  
While Phua et al. (2010) posit that logistic models are the most utilised, Ngai 
et al. (2011) assessed the use of data-mining techniques between 1997 to 2008 
and found that 26 techniques have been used to the detect financial fraud. 
They found that logistic models, neural networks, the Bayesian belief network 
and decision trees were the most used,with logistic models leading by 21.3%. 
Sharma and Panigrahi (2013) provided a review of fraud data-mining 
techniques and found that decision tree, Bayesian network, neural network 
and regression analysis are frequently used to detect fraud. Albashrawi (2016) 
again, by analysing data mining techniques to detect financial fraud between 
the years 2004 to 2015, found that the logistic regression model was the most 
utilised technique with 13% out of a total of 41 techniques. Albashrawi (2016)  
also found that supervised learning tools have been used more frequently than 
unsupervised ones. Multiple uses of data-mining techniques are also very 
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popular and are argued to yield better outcomes (Ata and Seyrek, 2009; Dutta 
et al., 2017; Kotsiantis et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2015).   
Brazel et al. (2006) and Brazel et al. (2009) also suggest that non-financial 
measures, such as employee number and warehouse space, are beneficial in 
assessing fraud. They found that fraud firms either had differences and 
variance in financial or non-financial measures when fraud is assessed. 
LaComb et al. (2007) argue that fraud can be assessed through content 
analysis. 
This section briefly summarised the models that aim to predict fraud 
occurrence in an organisation. Although all of the models used are found to 
be useful in predicting fraud, logistic regression models have been favoured 
by scholars due to their easy formulation (Ngai et al., 2011). Logistic 
regression model is also utilised by this study, which is discussed in Chapter 
5 on methodology. 
Figure 4.4 depicts the models that are mostly utilised to predict fraud 
occurrence in organisational setting: 
 
Figure	4.4	Models	Predicting	Fraud	
Source (Author) 
 
Models	used	to	
predict	fraud
Qualitative	
Models
Artificial	Neural	
Networks	
(ANNs)	
Logistic	models Bayesian	belief	network	
Non	financial	
models Decision	trees
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4.4 Prevention,	deterrence	and	detection	of	fraud	
The campaign against fraud is carried out through measures of prevention, 
deterrence and detection (Dorminey et al., 2012). While prevention aims to 
stop the fraudster by reducing the opportunities for fraud (Farber, 2005), 
deterrence aims to discourage people from committing fraud by creating 
suitable working environments (Dorminey et al., 2012). Fraud detection on 
the other hand, is the ex-post reaction that aims to uncover the results and 
reasons for fraud (Beasley et al., 2000). Although deterrence, prevention and 
detection of fraud in organisations are different, they can benefit from same 
general measures against fraud (Baucus and Near, 1991). Tackling fraud can 
either be attempted by legislative and sector level implementations by 
regulators and policy makers or by individual organisations (Button et al., 
2012). Anti-fraud policies are also implemented by goverments and sector 
regulators by using mandatory anti-fraud measures for each organisation or 
by implementing penalties and sanctions that who commited fraud. For 
example, Hogan et al. (2008) argue that efficiently structured governance 
aspects have crucial roles in diminishing fraudulent opportunities. These 
include audit committee, internal and external controls and audits, monitoring 
of board of directors, tone at the top and ethical codes. This section will assess 
the sanctions and penalties that are used to deter fraudulent action (Becker 
and Stigler, 1974)  and  governance tools such as internal and external 
controls and audit (Abbott et al., 2000), corporate culture and ethics (Schein, 
1996), remuneration (Efendi et al., 2007), board composition and structure 
(Uzun et al., 2004) reporting and disclosure (Beasley et al., 2000). 
4.4.1 Sanctions	and	penalties	
Regulation to deter or prevent fraud is done either by a) facilating mandatory 
requirements or recommendations to tackle fraud at the organisational level, 
or b) sanctions or punishment to deter fraud at the sector or even at the country 
level. The measures applied by organisations to tackle fraud are elaborated in 
the following sections. 
144	|	P a g e 	
	
Deterring fraud with sanctions and penalties has long been in use (Becker and 
Stigler, 1974). Murphy (2005) suggests that deterrence policies, such as 
sanctions and penalties and other authority driven measures, can only be 
successful because the perpetrators will be confronted by these policies. The 
sanctions are either monetary only, which aim to recover the defrauded 
amount, or also in most cases involve a criminal sentence. However, the 
effectiveness and success of deterrence policies is debatable (Murphy, 2005; 
Ogren, 1972). While some studies found that punishment leads to compliance 
(Maxwell and Gray, 2000), others found that punishment is not effective in 
deterring fraud (Alt and Lassen, 2012). Button et al. (2012) argue that 
effective sanctions should be inevitable, unavoidable and should be severely 
and speedily administered. They argue that failure of sanctions and penalties 
as fraud deterrents occur because only a very small number of frauds are 
reported and sanctions are not applied properly and effectively. Murphy 
(2005) argues that excessive and disproportionate and unwarranted 
prosecutions cause counter effects and may lead to increase in criminal 
behaviour. 
Regarding the UK, conviction of fraud and financial crime is applicable 
according to the UK Sentencing Council's Definitive Guideline for Fraud, 
Bribery and Money Laundering Offences (Council, 2014).  The Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have the powers to 
prosecute relevant acts of fraud. However, there is no specific fraud sanction 
legislation that is specific to the charity sector. 
4.4.2 Control	and	audit	
Efficient control and audit have been seen as the most accurate way to prevent 
and detect fraud (Greenlee et al., 2007), as lack of control and audit paves the 
way for fraud (Doyle et al., 2007).  
Internal audit is accepted to be the first line of defence against fraud as it 
makes it possible to identify wrongdoing earlier than other anti-fraud 
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measures (Chambers and Odar, 2015). Dellaportas (2013) argues that an 
important factor contributing to fraud is insufficient internal control. Jokipii 
(2010) argues that internal control is designed to cope with external 
uncertainty and eliminate wrongdoing. Trompeter et al. (2012), who provide 
a fraud review of accounting literature, argue that internal control is a 
mechanism that can hinder fraud opportunity but full benefit from internal 
control can only be achieved with time as the organisational culture settles. 
Coram et al. (2008) also found that a more enhanced internal audit structure 
enables self-reporting of fraud to increase. Archambeault et al. (2008) argue 
that stakeholders are not able to view and analyse internal audit reports and 
suggest that internal audit reports shared with the stakeholders would benefit 
the organisation by enhancing stakeholder trust.  
Bell and Carcello (2000) found lack of effective audit to be one of the main 
risk factors. External audit is also found to be important, as an ‘independent’ 
mechanism overseeing the organisation and preventing and detecting fraud 
assures trust for the stakeholders (Arens et al., 2012; Cullinan and Sutton, 
2002; Power, 1997). Lennox and Pittman (2010) discovered that working 
with the biggest audit firms reduced the risk of fraud. Knapp and Knapp 
(2001) found that experience is important in detecting fraud, as audit 
managers were more efficient than audit seniors.  Lee et al. (2008) stress the 
role shift of audit from being detective to being preventive.   
Audit is not without problems. Beasley et al. (2001) stress that auditors can 
fail to detect fraudulent transactions as they found that auditors were unable 
to detect a problem in 27% of their sample. The lack of full understanding 
between the organisation and the auditors (Abbott et al., 2000) and more 
importantly the absence of auditor independence hinders the function of audit 
(Carcello and Nagy, 2004). While Shockley (1981) posits that audit tenure 
has no effect on audit quality and auditor independence, Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) found that the first three years of the auditor-client relationship are the 
most dangerous as there is a greater risk that fraud will happen then. Beasley 
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et al. (1999) discovered that fraud firms can be spotted by the fact that they 
switch their auditors twice as often as firms with no fraud. They also found 
some cases where auditors were in collusion with the fraudsters and providing 
assistance to them.  
Audit committees also play a crucial role in the fight against fraud. While 
Beasley (1996) found no relationship between the existence of an audit 
committee and fraudulent behaviour, Abbott et al. (2000) argue that firms 
with audit committees made up of independent directors which come together 
at least twice a year have a lower risk of fraud. Beasley et al. (2000) found 
that fraud firms were likely to have fewer audit committee meetings than non-
fraud firms. Abbott et al. (2004) analysed the characteristics of audit 
committees and found that restatement of financial statements decreases with 
a more independent and frequently meeting audit committee. James (2003) 
found that internal auditors who reported directly to the audit committee were 
more likely to detect fraud than the ones who informed the management. 
4.4.3 Board	composition	and	structure	
Fama and Jensen (1983b) posit that the highest and most effective monitoring 
mechanism is the board of directors. Beasley (1996) provided information 
that as the percentage of outside directors and their tenure increases the fraud 
risk decreases. He posits that board composition and not the existence of an 
audit committee have an impact on financial statement fraud. Dechow et al. 
(1996) also show that the percentage of outside directors and misleading 
reporting are negatively correlated. Uzun et al. (2004) found that increase of 
independent directors on boards and audit and compensation committees 
reduces the risk of fraud. Farber (2005) posits that fundamental aspects of 
fraud firms are few independent board members, lack of an adequate number 
of audit committee meetings and higher CEOs also being the chairman. Gao 
et al. (2017) found that, while fraud is happening, the turnover of independent 
directors accelerates, more independent directors leave and being appointed 
during that timeframe. 
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Zhao and Chen (2008) found that boards that are made up of members elected 
for a long time correlated with higher risk of fraud. Xu et al. (2017) argue that 
there is a negative correlation between age of the board and occurrence of 
fraud.  
CEO duality is also another aspect that is correlated with fraud. Albrecht et 
al. (1984) argued that being unable to segregate duties may exacerbate the 
fraud risk.  Fanning and Cogger (1998) also argue that, if the chairperson has 
an influence on the committee appointing the CEO, this decreases the 
effectiveness of the committees in terms of monitoring.  
The existence of committees has been found to have a negative correlation 
with fraud occurrence (Fanning and Cogger, 1998).  Houston et al. (2016) 
found a positive correlation between fraud and former employees being 
appointed as independent members of the board. 
4.4.4 Reporting	and	disclosure	
Fama (1980) posits that effective reporting and disclosure helps to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour and agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that the absence of disclosure will result in higher levels of asymmetric 
information and may be signs of a problem. Disclosure enables an 
organisation to sustain trust with its environment and is a means to show that 
the organisation is free of error, such as fraud (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Keeton (1936) argues that not disclosing enough may be suspicious and may 
be a sign of deliberate concealment. Donelson et al. (2016) found that there 
is a positive correlation between low reporting quality and fraud. Purda and 
Skillicorn (2015) developed a model that distinguishes between fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent annual and interim reports. Hoberg and Lewis (2017) also 
found that fraud companies have ‘abnormal’ disclosure which uses ample 
verbal disclosure about the performance of the organisation but fewer details 
regarding the resources used. Agyei-Mensah (2017) found that as the level of 
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fraud and corruption increases disclosure of forward-looking information 
decreases.  
4.4.5 Remuneration	
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that compensation and other incentives 
that aim to align the interests of the management and the owners are useful.  
However badly designed compensation packages may bring more harm than 
good. Burns and Kedia (2006) and Lie (2005) found that stock options can 
trigger misreporting and fraudulent behaviour.  Johnson et al. (2003) found 
that managers of companies who are accused of fraud have larger unrestricted 
stock incentives than not accused ones. Efendi et al. (2007) empirically 
discovered a positive correlation between CEO having large quantity of stock 
options and financial statements being restated.  
Coffee (2006) identified stock options as the main reason for the scandals 
occurring in the 1990s and 2000s. Harris and Bromiley (2007) argue that 
wrongly formulated incentives coupled with insufficient organisational 
performance cause misreporting and fraud. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) on the other hand found that a high level of equity 
incentives are successful in preventing accounting irregularities and 
fraudulent behaviour. Erickson et al. (2006) who analysed equity incentives 
of companies accused of fraud between 1996–2003 found no proof that fraud 
and equity incentives are correlated. Ndofor et al. (2015) found that, in highly 
complex environments, the risk of fraud increases with more stock options 
and decreases with enhanced audit committee control.  
4.4.6 Corporate	culture	and	ethics	
Organisational climate is the combination of attitudes, beliefs, religion 
(Koerber and Neck, 2006) norms and values (Ashkanasy et al., 2006) of an 
organisation that affects how individuals working in it behave (Tseng and 
Fan, 2011).  Schwartz et al. (2005) posit that the corporate culture and ethics 
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of the organisation especially designed by the board of directors influence 
governance of the organisation and prevention chances of corporate scandals 
and fraud. Trompeter et al. (2012) argue that in case of collusion, tone at the 
top and ethical conduct rather than preventive measures such as monitoring 
and internal control are useful. 
Organisational practices and culture may also exacerbate fraud or make it 
possible for wrongdoing to be hidden (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). Reed and 
Yeager (1996) and Pinto et al. (2008) argue that some organisational cultures 
are inclined to wrongdoing and therefore committing crimes and fraud are 
endogenised. Law (2011) and Krummeck (2000) suggest that both board of 
directors and management are in need of a code of ethical conduct and 
commitment to provide an ethical stance and tone at the top to act against 
fraud. A well-established ethical code is necessary to protect the organisation 
against any personal opportunistic traits (Cohen et al., 2012; Kaptein, 2011b). 
Dorminey et al. (2012) argue that ethical sensitivity in working environments 
has the power to deter fraud. Lack of an appropriate code of ethical conduct 
and management acting opportunistically may also result in concealment of 
wrongdoing (Erben and Güneşer, 2008). Therefore, tone at the top and a 
deterrent leadership style will help to prevent wrongdoing in an organisation 
(Ghosh, 2008; Grojean et al., 2004). 
Whistleblowing is another important tool in the struggle with fraud (Kaptein, 
2011a). Bowen et al. (2010) argue that whistleblowing coupled with other 
measures can reduce fraud risk. Seifert et al. (2010) found that organisational 
culture affects the aspiration for whistleblowing. While Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran (2005) suggest that whistle-blowers will not come forth if 
management is not supportive or even forbidding, Vandekerckhove and 
Commers (2004) argue that distinguishing between the physical organisation 
and its values and mission will enhance whistleblowing. Miller and Thomas 
(2005)  found that whistleblowing was less likely for subordinates than for 
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peers and therefore argue that the position of an employee also affects 
whistleblowing attitude.  
Figure 4.5 depicts the measures assessed in this study to prevent or deter 
fraud: 
 
Figure	4.5	Measures	to	deter	or	prevent	fraud	
Source (Author) 
4.5 The	external	environment	and	stakeholders	
The governance approach, which used to be shareholder or owner-centric, has 
shifted to a more stakeholder-oriented attitude (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) 
which encompasses policies such as a broader accountability discharge, 
corporate social responsibility (Harjoto, 2017), environmental and social 
sustainability and a triple-bottom-line approach (Soltani, 2014). The 
importance of stakeholders, external environment and social dimension has 
also risen in the fraud literature too (Trompeter et al., 2014; Zyglidopoulos 
and Fleming, 2008).  
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Pinto et al. (2008) suggest that misconduct not only covers the features of 
individuals inside the organisation but also organisations’ external 
environment too. Colvin et al. (2002) posit that crime is only possible if 
coercion and support from social environment exists. Vaughan (1999) 
suggests that misconduct is a product of interaction between personal 
cognition, individual choice, organisational structure and environmental 
dynamics. The sophistication and dynamism of the environment is believed 
to play a role in illegal activities, while Baucus and Near (1991) and Saksena 
(2001) found a complex environment exacerbates illegality, Staw and 
Szwajkowski (1975) found the opposite. Chau and Siu (2000) also found that, 
in turbulent and hostile environments, entrepreneurial and ethical decision 
making conflict with each other. 
Mon (2002) argues that one of the aspects that contributes to corporate crime 
is the absence of public concern such as the absence of regulation and low 
self-control. He posits that the public attitude towards corporate crime is 
complacent and therefore provides an opportunity for illegality. Brazel et al. 
(2015) suggest that most investors do not see a need for their own fraud risk 
assessments as they believe that it is not their duty.  
Cullen et al. (2009) argue that public interest in white-collar crime has 
increased since the 1970s but that, when compared to street-crime, it still 
lacks the attention of the public. Zahra et al. (2005) posit that fraud has 
societal, as well as industrial and organisational antecedents. Maynard (2001) 
also suggests that lack of public transparency encourages the managers 
towards misconduct. Ndofor et al. (2015) see information asymmetry 
between executives and owners as the main reason for fraud.  
Stakeholder attention to organisational issues might vary depending on the 
stakeholder and the dynamics of the specific organisation (Chandler, 2015). 
Schnatterly et al. (2018) suggest that stakeholders’ lack of information and 
lack of attention to organisational events provide opportunities for CEO 
wrongdoing. Fombrun et al. (2000) suggest that the idea of corporate 
152	|	P a g e 	
	
citizenship assumes that stakeholders of organisations benefit by overseeing 
the organisation by not being alienated. As a result, the reputation of the 
organisation is improved by this oversight. Barnett (2014), on the other hand, 
criticises stakeholder oversight by arguing that their rationality is bounded. 
He states that (p.694) “stakeholders’ attention is directed in certain ways that 
bound where they look, limit what they notice, bias their assessment, and 
constrain their willingness to act. As a result, firms’ bad behaviours may not 
be consistently extinguished through social control”. Carberry et al. (2018) 
on the other hand argue that stakeholders are very attentive to misconduct 
especially if the wrongdoing is brought up by the media or by adequate 
measures to attract their attention. Daudigeos et al. (2018) define 
organisational scandals as ‘catalysts’ and suggest that especially vulnerable 
stakeholders are attentive to scandals as they view scandals as an opportunity 
for their voices to be heard and their views to be reflected in decision making.  
Engdahl (2008) also argues that strong social networks may create an 
opportunity for fraud. Zona et al. (2013) assessed a corporate scandal of the 
Italian bank of BPL, argue that a broader analysis is needed to understand the 
roots and reasons of fraud. They criticise previous fraud models as static and 
one-dimensional as they focus only on the perpetrators of scandals and ignore 
collaborators. Zona et al. (2013) found that cohesion of stakeholders enables 
the management of an organisation to pursue a risky and opportunistic 
strategy. They state that “we clarify the role that stakeholders may play in 
supporting the processes and strategies leading to corporate scandals. We 
suggest that stakeholders’ support increases the amount of additional 
resources available to the CEO (i.e., support, legitimacy, financial resources), 
fostering his/her proclivity to undertake imbalanced, risky strategies.” 
(p.280).   
Trompeter et al. (2014) and Trompeter et al. (2012) argue that non-accounting 
rather than accounting research provides a focus towards the external 
environment and the influence of stakeholders on fraud. To this end, 
153	|	P a g e 	
	
Ramamoorti (2008) suggests use of non-accounting sciences such as  
criminology, psychology and sociology, to enhance the fraud studies in the 
accounting discipline. The impact of power is also assessed in non-accounting 
fraud literature as power may lead to the deviance of the organisation and 
even to misconduct and fraud if not used appropriately (Soltani, 2014; 
Vaughan, 1999). While Overbeck and Park (2001) identify social power as 
the skill to govern others’ funds and decisions, Albrecht et al. (2015) posit 
that fraud offenders used their power to find collaborators. They argue that as 
the power increases it becomes easier to construct an opportunity to commit 
fraud. Dellaportas (2013) through interviews with accountants who 
committed fraud argue that fraudulent accountants used their oversight power 
and professional reputation and deceived people to accompany their crimes.   
Trompeter et al. (2012) posit that collusion inside the organisation to commit 
fraud also can find external support.  Free (2015) argues that, although fraud 
is theorised as an individual action, all major frauds were realised with 
collusion, and he calls for future research to focus on collusion.  McBarnet 
(2006) identifies accountants and attorneys as ‘enablers’ of financial crime 
who participate in promotion of such activities. Albrecht et al. (2008) stress 
the role of auditors in the occurrence of fraud and argue that auditors used to 
their advantage the vulnerability of fraudulent companies. Gordon et al. 
(2007) also suggest that auditors fail to detect fraud occurring as a result of 
transactions with related parties.   
Especially for the for-profit sector, external pressures such as financial 
distress (Fanning and Cogger, 1998), need for growth (Loebbecke et al., 
1989), lack of dividend payment (Caskey and Hanlon, 2013) and meeting 
analyst forecasts (Bell and Carcello, 2000) play a crucial part in raising the 
risk of fraudulent behaviour.  
So far in this Chapter, the theories and anti-fraud measures discussed have 
mainly come from literature related to the for-profit sector, as this sector has 
been the principal location for fraud studies. The next two sections provide 
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literature on public entities and especially the not-for-profit sector. 
4.6 Empirical	work	on	fraud	in	public	sector	
Fraud in the public sector has important differences when compared to the 
for-profit sector. Economic efficiency, cost of monitoring, regulation, growth 
and bribery seems to be the main concerns in the public sector (Monteduro et 
al., 2016; Treisman, 2000).  
One of the most important fraud types in the public sector is bribery, money 
given to civil servants to reduce red tape (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), which 
does not diminish public sector resources but causes to inefficiency, cronyism 
and hampers trust in the public sector (Duvanova, 2014). Bribery and other 
public sector fraudulent behaviour vary across different  cultures, 
socioeconomic factors and historical development (Agyei-Mensah, 2017). In 
contrast, Timofeyev (2015) argues that fraud happens everywhere irrelevant 
of countries and cultures.  
Corruption in the government is an example of financial misconduct in the 
public sector (Campos and Pradhan, 2007; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 
2016). While LaPalombara (1994) argues that a high budget and therefore a 
bigger government is positively correlated with corruption, Themudo (2014) 
argues that corruption risk diminishes with larger governments. La Porta et 
al. (1999) and Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose (2007) also found that larger 
governments are inclined towards less corruption.  
Another fraud type in public sector organisations is misappropriation of 
assets, public assets used for personal interest (Coram et al., 2008). 
Unauthorised use of public organisations’ assets such as vehicles, stationery 
and other facilities are very common which creates waste of public money 
(Ab Majid et al., 2014).  
Stalebrink and Sacco (2007) argue that entrepreneurship can be a source of 
deception and may provide incentives and opportunities especially for the 
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public sector organisations to act fraudulently. They propose a framework in 
which political and nonmonetary incentives play a part in fraud and that it is 
committed by elected individuals. Wesley Lane (2010) argues also that 
political aspirations of people cause the occurrence of fraud and provides a 
comparision among public sector entities such as the London local 
authorities, National Health Service (NHS) and the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP). He found that all entities are similar in their reactions 
towards fraud and in investigating fraud. 
4.7 Empirical	work	on	fraud	in	the	not-for-profit	sector	
Trust is a crucial relationship between not-for-profit organisations and their 
stakeholders and, if damaged with an incident like fraud, not-for-profit 
organisations have much to lose (Arshad et al., 2015; Fleckenstein and 
Bowes, 2000; Lauck and Brozovsky, 2018). Zack (2003) posit that in addition 
to being sensitive to fraud, not-for-profit organisations are also more 
vulnerable to fraud than compared to for-profit sector organisations due to 
lack of ownership and therefore weak monitoring by the board and also from 
donations being nonreciprocal which diminishes the monitoring incentives of 
donors.  
Although fraud plays a negatively crucial role in the not-for-profit sector, the 
literature is very limited compared especially to the for-profit sector. One of 
the earleist works on fraud in not-for-profit sector is by Gibelman and Gelman 
(2001), who analysed nongovernmental organisations14 (NGO) which have 
experienced wrongdoing incidents. They assessed the data derived from 
newspapers and newsletters and listed the incidents in terms of participating 
parties, impact on the NGO and status of the incident. Gibelman and Gelman 
(2001) argue that the absence of effective accountability and control 
                                                
14 “NGOs are referred to as not-for-profit, nonprofit, or voluntary organizations, all generally 
referencing the same group of agencies.” Gibelman and Gelman (2001, p.50) 
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mechanisms were the causes of wrongdoing. Gibelman and Gelman (2002) 
found that there were no differences among religious and secular not-for-
profit organisations in terms of wrongdoing. In another study, Gibelman and 
Gelman (2004) suggest that the remedies for not-for-profit wrongdoing are 
watchdog agencies, oversight by the government and enhanced ethical codes. 
Fremont-Smith and Kosaras (2003) and Fremont-Smith (2004) also assessed 
fraud events occurring in not-for-profit organisations from newspapers.  
Greenlee et al. (2007) tried to identify perpetrators and victims of fraud in 
not-for-profit organisations in the USA. They found that, in a typical fraud, 
the fraudster was a woman with no previous criminal offences who has 
worked in the organisation for a minimum of three years, and the median size 
of the fraudulent event was below $50,000. They also found that, at least in a 
quarter of the cases, the perpetrator was the manager. Further, while asset 
misappropriations constitute 97% of frauds, the loss from each case of 
financial statement fraud was 30 times bigger than the loss from asset 
misappropriations.  
Holtfreter (2008) used survey data on auditors of not-for-profit organisations 
in which fraud had taken place, based on the findings of the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). She found that there was a negative 
correlation between fraud loss and organisational size and effective control. 
Holtfreter (2008) also found that the majority of frauds are committed by 
female employees. Archambeault et al. (2015) also found that female 
employees were the leading fraudsters and the size of loss correlates with the 
organisational role of the fraudster.  Sze and Talib (2018) posit CEO or 
founder power as the reason for fraud in not-for-profit organisations. 
Archambeault and Webber (2018) assessed the characteristics of not-for-
profit organisations that survived after they were found to be fraudulent. They 
found that organisations which are younger and smaller were less likely to 
survive compared to larger and older not-for-profit organisations.  
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Petrovits et al. (2011) assessed internal control in not-for-profit organisations 
and found that unfavourable financial condition, being small and growing and 
existing in a complex environment exacerbates internal control problems. 
They also posit that donors and government grants react negatively to internal 
control problems in not-for-profit organisations.  
Kummer et al. (2015) assessed data from a survey of not-for-profit 
organisations in Australia and New Zealand. They posit that vulnerability to 
fraud, insufficient internal controls and inability to detect fraud (especially in 
small not-for-profit organisations) show that fraud prevention and detection 
tools in not-for-profit organisations are not appropriate. Harris et al. (2015) 
found that fraud occurrence has a negative correlation with duties managed 
internally, audit, debt and government grant holder monitoring. McDonnell 
and Rutherford (2018) analysed 25,611 charities in Scotland and, by using 
multivariate analysis, found that charities which are susceptible of 
misconduct are not the ones subject to regulatory supervision. They also argue 
that charity misconduct is driven by the opportunity to act illegally. 
Bradley (2014) argues that the most effective way to cope with fraud in not-
for-profit organisations is to empower the employees, while Rothschild 
(2013) suggests that misconduct in not-for-profit organisations is only 
reported by whistle-blowers after it is identified and witnessed on more than 
one occasion, owing to fear on the part of whistle-blowers that they will be 
discredited. Kummer et al. (2014) argue that not-for-profit organisations 
which have been exposed to fraud in the past tend to enhance their monitoring 
and control mechanisms and utilise measures such as enabling 
whistleblowing and risk assessment. On the other hand, organisations not 
exposed to fraud tend to utilise tools such as external audit and tone at the top.  
Kummer et al. (2015) suggest that risk registers, whistleblowing and 
control policies are tools that should be used against fraud in not-for-
profit organisations. Bromley and Orchard (2016) argue that the not-for-
profit sector is also in need of effective codes of conduct to cope with fraud 
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and misconduct as environmental factors make adoption of the codes 
necessary.  
Nikolova (2014) found that effective monitoring by donors and a higher share 
of government grants (which leads to increase in monitoring by the 
government and decrease in CEO compensation) reduce the opportunity for 
misconduct. Lauck and Brozovsky (2018) found that enhanced board of 
director oversight was the only tool that led donors to donate after fraud 
caused by material misappropriation of assets. 
Cordery and Baskerville (2011) provide one of the only studies which shows 
how stakeholders are affected by fraud in a charity and how ineffective they 
are in preventing the opportunity for charities to act fraudulently.  They argue 
that lack of power makes even the most important stakeholders destitute of 
information. 
4.8 Summary	
This chapter has examined the fraud literature, with a focus on for-profit 
sector, due to lack of study in the not-for-profit sector. The definition of fraud 
provided from various sources shows that the term is used to describe 
something sinister with many features and kinds. The definition section also 
clarifies the borders of fraud which will be used for this study only with 
providing citations from Acts and other relevant official documents. 
The fraud theories which mainly derive from Cressey’s (1953) work provide 
a conceptual framework on how fraud in organisations emerge. Although 
Cressy’s (1953) fraud triangle is built on the three angles of pressure, 
opportunity and rationalisation,  the literature argues (Dorminey et al., 2012) 
that opportunity and its sources should be assessed more in detail. This thesis 
does so. The next section summarises briefly the models used to predict fraud 
in organisations.  
The governance mechanisms used to prevent, deter and detect fraud caused 
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by opportunity are generally the governance mechanisms also used to 
enhance accountability. Audit (Beasley, 1996), board monitoring (Uzun et al., 
2004)  disclosure (Donelson et al., 2016)  remuneration (Harris and Bromiley, 
2007) and ethical codes (Schwartz et al., 2005) are the most well-known 
governance mechanisms used to struggle against fraud. 
The influence of the external environment and the stakeholders on fraud is 
where a research gap is prevalent, especially in the accounting literature. 
Complexity of the external environment (Saksena, 2001), stakeholders 
attitudes towards fraud (Mon, 2002) and possible collusions within the 
organisation, between it and its stakeholders (Zona et al., 2013), are some 
areas at which further studies should aim.  
While public sector fraud has its own sub-divisions such as bribery (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993) and corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016), not-
for-profit sector lacks an adequate number of studies (Bromley and Orchard, 
2016). This is despite the fact that the not-for-profit sector is argued to pose 
more danger of fraud because lack of ownership and adequate monitoring 
(Zona et al., 2013). The literature shows that nearly all not-for-profit fraud 
studies were conducted in the last decade with a great emphasis on US studies, 
whereas misconduct and fraud studies that focus on charities in the UK are 
only very recent (McDonnell and Rutherford, 2018; Ohalehi, 2019).  
The next section discusses the research gaps in the literature covered until 
now. 
4.9 Identified	Research	Gaps	
The literature concerning accountability and governance theories and fraud 
on not-for-profit organisations demonstrates that there are problems specific 
to the not-for-profit sector which need to be assessed further. In this section, 
the research gaps identified in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will be discussed. These 
relate to the substantive topic of the thesis (fraud in charities), the underlying 
theory used to understand fraud in charities, and the research methods to be 
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used to gain a deeper understanding of stakeholders’ views on fraud in 
charities and the governance structures that make fraud easier or more 
difficult. 
Fraud, accountability and governance 
The review in this chapter of the literature on fraud and the review in Chapter 
2 of the accountability and governance literature reveal some important gaps 
in our knowledge relating to fraud in the charity sector. We have very limited 
knowledge of how charity stakeholders conceptualise fraud, and their views 
on why fraud occurs and how it can be dealt with effectively. This suggests 
the first research objective: “To assess how stakeholders conceptualise 
charity fraud and their views on the reasons for and solutions to fraud”. 
This research objective covers three important aspects: a) stakeholders’ views 
on ownership, stakeholder salience and accountability, b) stakeholders’ views 
on the causes of fraud, and c) stakeholders’ views on the solutions to fraud. 
In the context of views on ownership, stakeholder salience and accountability, 
two specific research questions are suggested: RQ1a “What are the 
accountability dynamics in the charity sector?” and RQ1b “How do 
stakeholders identify ownership and stakeholder salience in the charity 
sector?” With respect to the causes of fraud, two research questions emerge: 
RQ1c “How do stakeholders conceptualise fraud in the charity sector?” 
and RQ1d “What reasons are identified by charity stakeholders for 
fraud?” Two questions also emerge in relation to the solutions to fraud: 
RQ1e “What solutions to fraud are identified by charity stakeholders?” 
and RQ1f “What are stakeholders’ perceptions of stakeholder 
oversight?” 
The governance mechanisms of the not-for-profit sector, apart from 
disclosure, audit and CEO duality, are different from those in the for-profit 
sector. The variety of board attributes that influence governance and 
monitoring activities in the for-profit sector, such as size, diversity, and 
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tenure, does not seem to produce the same effect in the not-for-profit sector. 
Therefore, there is a research gap regarding board attributes and their impact 
on governance in not-for-profit organisations. This suggests the second 
research objective: “To assess the governance characteristics associated 
with fraud in charities”. To respond to this objective, two research questions 
emerge: RQ2a “What are the differences between fraud and no-fraud 
charities in terms of governance?” and RQ2b “Which governance 
characteristics are related to fraud?” 
Overall the accountability and governance literature acts as crossing stone 
and brings forward many issues that are early signs of a bigger problem: 
fraud.  
Theories 
All the accountability and governance theories examined in Chapter 3 were 
developed specifically for the for-profit sector. As there is no specific theory 
designed for the not-for-profit sector, it seems more appropriate to integrate 
the theories and create a framework suitable for the not-for-profit sector (Van 
Puyvelde et al., 2012). Although integration of theories has been proposed 
before (Wellens and Jegers, 2011), it has not been tested much. Therefore, 
there is a research gap to assess if integration of theories can succeed for not-
for-profit organisations. Research question 1b, which aims to identify 
ownership in the charity sector, benefits from the use of the integrated theory.  
Also, assessing fraud with a multiple theory approach is not something 
frequently tried. Agency theory, although accepted as the ultimate 
organisational theory to explain fraudulent behaviour, is also criticised for 
being old-fashioned (Da Silveira, 2015) and one-sided (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). With the existence of a multiple principal environment 
(Nikolova, 2014), not-for-profit organisations seem to be the optimal sector 
to assess if an enhanced agency theory produces better explanatory outcomes 
for fraud. As the enhanced agency theory broadens the frontiers of the agent-
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principal relationship to include the stakeholders, the integrated theory 
enables assessment of the stakeholders’ views and influence, in line with the 
research objective. More specifically, the integrated theory also provides to 
assess the perceptions of stakeholder oversight, in line with research question 
1f. Therefore, the study tries to fill the research gap of providing a unique 
integrated theory to understand better the fraudulent activities in not-for-
profit organisations. 
Method 
Integration of the theories also enables the study to use mixed methods in 
assessing fraud in charities. The charity accountability and governance 
literature utilises either qualitative or quantitative research methods, and 
using them together in one single study is rare. The fraud literature, especially 
the accounting literature on fraud, is dominantly quantitative. Therefore, this 
study aims to provide a broader understanding by examining fraud in charities 
by utilising mix methods.  
The research gap for fraud in not-for-profit organisations is apparent as, 
although stressed as an important proof of the need for an increase in not-for-
profit sector accountability, studies of not-for-profit sector fraud are few 
(Kummer et al., 2015; McDonnell and Rutherford, 2018). As stated before, 
there have been only very recent fraud studies of charities in England and 
Wales, so this study aims to contribute to the studies in this area. In line with 
the lack of research into fraud in the charity sector, the study elaborates how 
fraud is conceptualised in the charity sector by the stakeholders. Secondly, 
the fraud literature as discussed before is predominantly quantitative methods 
based. The external environment and the stakeholders’ influence have not 
been assessed in detail (Trompeter et al., 2014). The study therefore aims also 
fill the gap in the accounting fraud literature by conducting interviews with 
charity stakeholders in order to examine reasons identified by charity 
stakeholders for fraud and the solutions to fraud identified by charity 
stakeholders, in accordance with the fourth and fifth research questions.  
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Third, logistic regression analysis is used extensively to analyse fraud in the 
for-profit sector (Beasley, 1996) but studies on fraud in the not-for-profit 
sector are deprived of this. Logistic regression analysis is utilised to assess 
the governance characteristics associated with fraud in charities, in line with 
the second research objective. The research questions examine the differences 
between fraud and no-fraud charities in terms of governance and elaborate 
governance characteristics that are related to fraud. As the test variables used 
in fraud logistic regression analysis (such as board independence, existence 
of an audit committee, compensation package effectiveness, impact of 
publicly traded stock options) are not relevant in the not-for-profit sector, new 
independent variables specific to the not-for-profit sector will be assessed and 
used for the first time in this study. 
Overall the aim is to provide a holistic approach to charity fraud and to 
understand the organisational features of fraud in not-for-profit organisations. 
The next chapter will provide methodology on how these research gaps will 
be assessed, setting out the research philosophy and research methods and 
design. 
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PART	III	
5. METHODOLOGY	
This chapter assesses the research methodology and identifies the research 
paradigm, explains the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies 
employed in the research, especially clarifying the need for mixed methods. 
Data collection methods and the sample that is used in the research are 
discussed in the last part of the chapter.  
 
Figure	5.1	Structure	of	Chapter	5	
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5.1 The	research	paradigm	and	philosophy	
Research, whose purpose is to present a new perspective to events and facts 
(Crotty, 1998) is described by Saunders et al. (2016, p.5) as “a process that 
people undertake in a systematic way in order to find out things, thereby 
increasing their knowledge.” The methods used for the research can be 
distinguished as either qualitative or quantitative. However, it is not the 
methods used but the complexion of knowledge and the perception of the 
researcher that constructs science (Howell, 2012; Sassen, 2013). A position 
of philosophy becomes crucial in order to determine the framework of 
methodology (Alasuutari et al., 2008; Broadbent and Unerman, 2011).  
Ontological and epistemological stance has to be clarified in order for the 
researcher to formulate the methodological framework (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000). The structures derived from epistemology and ontology 
permit researchers to evaluate conformability of different research 
methodologies by assessing the outputs and value of research (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Therefore, the attitude of the researcher towards 
epistemology, ontology, and methodology defines the paradigm that he/she 
will use and will be the basis for the research framework (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2017). 
Paradigm is identified as researchers’ intellection of social phenomena (Collis 
and Hussey, 2013) and presuppositions on the nature of knowledge (Saunders 
et al., 2016). Paradigm aims to uncover how to perform the research 
(Shannon-Baker, 2016) by defining the values and practices of the researcher 
and enlightening the reader about the research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017).  
Dualism is utilised frequently by social science, as contrast making is the 
route to develop social concepts (Llewelyn, 2003). The subject/object 
dualism makes it necessary to choose a stance on a continuum for the 
researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017). Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.2-4) 
depict the continuum ranges as “a belief that the researcher’s own subjectivity 
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has no influence on the recording or interpretation of empirical data, to a 
belief that all these observations will be filtered through the subjective life 
experiences of each researcher.”  
5.2 Positivist	and	interpretivist	approaches	
Francis Bacon, who posited that empirical observations are the basis for 
science, and Auguste Comte, who proposed that objective quantification is 
applicable to human behaviour, are deemed to be the first advocates of the 
positivist approach  (Bryman, 2015; Crotty, 1998).  
Positivist approach has an objectivist epistemological approach and realist 
ontological one. Some significant specifications of positivist approach are 
generalisation of research findings and facts, world, structures and social 
phenomena being independent from individual perceptions and social actors, 
value-free research nature, reality being in existence independent of the 
researcher and discovered by the researcher (Collis and Hussey, 2013; Crotty, 
1998; Gephart, 2004). 
The positivist approach also does not distinguish between social or natural 
sciences and favours experiments and observations and larger and more 
quantitative data sets (Bryman, 2015). Researchers’ subjectivity does not 
pose an influence on the research itself in positivist approach as researchers 
are investigators of the realities, as described by Johnson and Duberley (2000, 
p.5): “data collected, rather than the processes of observation, dictate the 
findings and theories of science.” Reality is aimed to be found by using 
quantitative data in positivist approach, which are utilised in natural sciences 
especially and the approach envisages replicable methods to be used (Collis 
and Hussey, 2013; Howell, 2012). 
Qualitative methods and interpretative approach are criticised by positivists 
as insufficient to validate the truth and therefore is a fiction and not science 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2017). Objectivist approach is animadverted for being 
attenuated, not focusing enough the complicated dimensions of reality and 
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being faulty in distinguishing social context from the research (Bryman, 
2015; Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
Hermeneutics 15  makes the basis for the interpretative approach which 
constructs its position against the natural order (Bryman, 2015).  Max Weber, 
one of the pioneers of interpretative approach, argues that social sciences are 
different from natural sciences as they do not have to make absolute 
judgements but rather assess the social inquiries “on the meanings and values 
of acting persons and therefore on their subjective meaning-complex of 
action.” (Crotty, 1998, p.68-69). 
The interpretative approach uses an ontology of relativism and an 
epistemology of subjectivism (Howell, 2012). Important features of the 
interpretative approach are that social phenomena cannot be analysed in a 
laboratory as natural science does, researchers are not machines but human 
beings who reflect their own beliefs and world of views on their research, to 
make generalisation is not rational as each single social phenomenon can be 
interpreted in multiple ways, human subjectivity is the source of 
understanding the culturally and historically shaped world (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Gephart, 2004; Llewelyn, 2003). Johnson and Duberley 
(2000, p.59) define interpretative approach as “subjective in nature of text, 
role of the researcher is insider, validity checks are qualitative.” Crotty (1998) 
stresses the importance of subject as arguing that subject is imposing the 
meaning over the object and not the other way round as in the positivist 
approach. 
Qualitative research and interpretative approach form a proximity between 
each other as individual’s perception of the world is aimed to be assessed by 
the qualitative research (Collis and Hussey, 2013). Denzin and Lincoln (2017) 
                                                
15  “The method of the interpretation of human action” (Bryman, 2015, p.15) 
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state that the perspectives of subjects are being captured by the qualitative 
research. 
The totally opposite arguments of the positivist and interpretative approaches 
lead researchers to position themselves on different points on the continuum 
(Crotty, 1998). Intermediation and integration of  these conflicting 
approaches opened the way to new approaches such as critical realism, post-
positivism, feminism etc. (Bryman, 2015).  This intermediation allows to link 
new concepts to existing ones by both testing hypothesis but also being 
tentative in nature  (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). This middle range 
approach also has its reflections on the methods used, either to select between 
the quantitative and qualitative methods, using them or mixing them together 
is also possible (Howell, 2012; Saunders et al., 2016). 
5.3 Mixed	methods	
Mixed methods, also called integrative research, triangulation, multimethod, 
blended research is first to be used by Campbell and Fiske (1959) (Johnson 
et al., 2007). Mixed methods is defined as a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to validate data and findings in the same study 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). 
Mixed methods usage is rising in many disciplines as theoretical design, data 
collection, and analysis all can be utilised by mixed methods (Shannon-Baker, 
2016). Research in accounting also shifted from a dominant positivist stance 
to a more enriched positivism with qualitative methods usage (Hopper and 
Hoque, 2006; Modell, 2010).  
As mixed methods is a mix of qualitative and quantitative data, it is being 
promoted for leveraging the negative and positive aspects of both methods in 
order to provide a new body of method (Creswell, 2013). Alise and Teddlie 
(2010) posit that mixed methods aim to enable the researcher to obtain data 
more smoothly than either quantitative or qualitative research methods alone. 
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Mixed methods by reconciling quantitative and qualitative methods and 
providing a ‘third route’ is argued to increase validity (Modell, 2010), 
overcome bias of solo methods (Saunders et al., 2016), enhances credibility 
of the research and data (Collis and Hussey, 2013). Mixed methods also both 
allow researcher values to be reflected to the research (Hopper and Hoque, 
2006) and also dissolves the view that qualitative data is very subjective by 
promoting it with quantitative data (Creswell, 2013). Johnson et al. (2007) 
also argue that mixed methods is especially useful in identifying and 
assessing less investigated, controversial and insufficiently theorised and 
examined social phenomena.  
Modell (2009) argues that the effectiveness of mixed methods will be 
enhanced if also the theoretical basis of the research is based on multiple 
perspectives as findings will be complementary to each other. Ahrens and 
Chapman (2006) suggest that agency theory can be improved if coupled with 
qualitative methods such as interviews. Overall mixed methods brings 
breadth and depth to the research by extending findings (Grafton et al., 2011; 
Modell, 2005). Table 5.1 summarises the features of qualitative, quantitative 
and mixed methods. 
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Table	5.1	Qualitative,	Quantitative	and	Mixed	Methods	Approaches	
 
Source (Creswell, 2013, p.18) 
Mixed methods is also criticised for being too complicated and demonstrating 
a lot of data but not inferring enough (Creswell, 2013).  Some other important 
disadvantages of mixed methods are that mixed methods requires skills in 
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis (Grafton et al., 2011), 
requires access to diverse data (Saunders et al., 2016), requires capacity to 
justify embracing mixed methods, requires capacity to reconcile 
different/diverging paradigms, worldviews and results (Creswell, 2013). 
Mixed methods is also criticised as not putting too much emphasis on the 
integration of theories and focusing only on the empirical observations 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). 
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5.3.1 Mixed	methods:	the	paradigm	
Regarding the paradigm, mixed methods as a result of its nature encourages 
the researcher to take a stance in the middle and not to be on the edges (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2017). In this section two paradigms that are being favoured by 
mixed methods (Mertens, 2010; Modell, 2009; Modell, 2010; Shannon-
Baker, 2016) will be assessed: pragmatism and transformative-emancipation.  
5.3.1.1 Pragmatism	
Pragmatism can be defined as a paradigm that is flexible to use whichever 
methodology and method that works for the research and which often favours 
mixed-methods to ease problematic research areas (Morgan, 2007). The 
research question is pivotal for pragmatism as it focuses on the outcome and 
improving the research and making it more powerful and efficient by bringing 
together various research methods (De Loo and Lowe, 2011). Therefore 
pragmatist paradigm favours mixed-methods research as it enables the 
extremes to be mixed and provide a more holistic approach (Modell, 2009). 
Pragmatism also assumes that theories can be transferred to suit in another 
event and “qualitative and quantitative approaches can be combined in order 
to “compliment” the advantages and disadvantages present within each” 
(Shannon-Baker, 2016, p.325).  
Pragmatism utilises abduction to address the connections between theory and 
data, which can be defined by Morgan (2007, p.71) as “moves back and forth 
between induction and deduction—first converting observations into theories 
and then assessing those theories through action.” The use of abduction makes 
integration and transferability of theories and methods easier and therefore 
generalisability of the research findings becomes more probable (De Loo and 
Lowe, 2011). However pragmatism is being criticised as focusing on 
integrating methodologies and methods only, and setting aside ontological 
and epistemological considerations (Modell, 2009; Modell, 2010). 
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5.3.1.2 Transformative-emancipation	
Transformative-emancipation paradigm can be defined as a paradigm which 
requires precision on power relations among stakeholders and the need and 
necessity of collaboration within less powerful and neglected groups in a 
community (Mertens, 2003). It requires researcher to identify the community 
and its characteristics and sub-groups that he/she is analysing (Mertens, 
2010). Mertens (2007) also argues that the research should inform and reflect 
how the research would be in favour of the community, and especially the 
less powered stakeholders. 
Shannon-Baker (2016, p.327) states that “a sequential explanatory design 
could be used to highlight the voices of the participants in terms of how they 
understand the research phenomenon from their own perspective” by using 
the transformative-emancipation paradigm. Overall the transformative-
emancipatory paradigm lets the researcher establish a broader perspective by 
investigating the power relations in a community and therefore bring the 
stakeholders and their views right in the middle of the research.  
5.3.1.3 Integrating	the	paradigms	
Overall, use of mixed methods is demonstrated to empower causal links 
among variables, thus strengthening both internal and external validity of the 
research. Because this study is multi-focused and utilises integration of 
theories, utilising mixed methods is believed to enhance the research. 
Regarding the research paradigm, like the mix of theories the paradigm will 
also be integrated to gain benefit from the perspectives of pragmatist and 
transformative-emancipatory perspectives (Breakwell, 1993; Caracelli and 
Greene, 1997). Pragmatism is utilised because the research questions are 
leading the way to the research and the method of abduction is believed to be 
used immensely. The paradigm is also transformative-emancipatory as the 
researcher believes that charity stakeholders are the real force that designs 
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accountability and governance mechanisms in charities and therefore may 
have a strong impact in understanding fraud occurrence. 
5.4 Research	design		
This research identifies organisational factors affecting the reasons and 
solutions for fraud in charities. The research assesses the influence of the 
stakeholder environment and governance mechanisms on fraud.  As a result 
of the multiple research objectives, use of mixed methods was deemed more 
appropriate in assessing the objectives.  
As the research provides an extended understanding of fraud in charities, both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods are utilised. The research first 
pursued interviews and then focused on content analysis and quantitative 
research. The reason to first conduct interviews was to first grasp an 
understanding of the fraud phenomena in the charity sector and also to 
provide insight and focus on governance elements which are perceived to be 
crucial by stakeholders and analyse them in the logistic regression model. 
The qualitative research provides an in-depth assessment of charity 
stakeholders’ views and influence on fraud. External environments’ influence 
on fraud in charities is identified as a research gap as it is being neglected and 
therefore needs further evaluation. Also, research in charity accountability 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2000) is suggesting of utilising more qualitative 
methods to assess charity stakeholders’ views. 
The questions that were asked at the qualitative stage of the research 
generated answers that will provide information to the quantitative research. 
While the transformative-emancipation paradigm helps to design a research 
that takes in to account and utilise stakeholders’ views, the pragmatist 
approach enables to provide the link between the qualitative and quantitative 
research and findings and to abduct between the two models. 
The quantitative research, using content analysis and logistic regression 
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analysis finds if any, governance practices’ relationship with fraud. As 
especially performed in the for-profit sector (Beasley, 1996) certain 
governance specifications increase/decrease the occurrence of fraud in an 
organisation. The model is developed by assessing of previous logistic 
regression models tested for the for-profit-sector, outcome of the content 
analysis regarding the available secondary data for charities and directive 
answers derived from the interviews which reveal important governance 
aspects that may have an influence on fraud.   
5.4.1 Qualitative	research	
Bryman (2015) posit that qualitative research emphasises an inductive 
approach and envisages that constant change realises social reality. 
Qualitative research comprises various types of research methods which in 
nature are subjective and aims to grasp an extended understanding (Walliman, 
2006).  
In this section first merits and deficiencies of interviews’ as a qualitative 
research method will be discussed. Than data selection and interview 
utilisation in this research will be evaluated.   
5.4.1.1 Interviews	as	a	qualitative	research	method	
One of the most highly used research methods is interviews. Although 
interviews are based on dialogue and therefore seems easy to be realised 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015),  Alvesson and Ashcraft (2012, p.255) posit that 
interview is not as simple as it seems as “interviewing is a complex social 
activity that calls for careful, intensive and skeptical reflection.” Interviews 
can be designed based on researchers’ worldviews. However, a prospering 
interview has important aspects to be taken into account and some aspects 
that must not be utilised (Roulston, 2010). 
Important features of a successful interview are maintaining 
representativeness of the sample group (Saunders et al., 2016), being able to 
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cope with compelling interviewees  and to provide efficient listening talents 
(Kvale, 1996), acquiring the consent of the respondents and informing them 
before the interview (King and Horrocks, 2010), short and simple questions 
being asked (Cassell, 2005), use of technology to record and transcribe 
accurate interviews (Alvesson and Ashcraft, 2012). 
There are advantages of interviews such as that they allow for a deeper and 
more powerful analysis of the sample group which leads to better assessment 
(Walliman, 2006). King and Horrocks (2010) posit that interviews put less 
pressure on the interviewees than observations and provide and enables more 
detailed responses to be acquired compared to questionnaires. Interviews also 
make it possible to examine the emotions, mimics and nods of the interviewee 
(Roulston, 2010) and even understand if something is being disguised by the 
interviewee (Miller and Glassner, 1997). 
Interviews also pose tasks that are not easy to achieve such as designating the 
sample right, obtaining consent from the interviewee and conduct the 
interview in an appropriate environment and timeframe for the interviewee 
(Walliman, 2006). Having adequate interview skills such as ability to conduct 
and sustain a dialogue (Kvale, 1996), avoiding researcher bias (Saunders et 
al., 2016), if the questions are understood equally by the respondents 
(stimulus equivalence) or not (Cassell, 2005), tackling with transferring the 
findings to other research and therefore achieving generality are important 
obstacles (Collis and Hussey, 2013). As Bryman and Bell (2015) suggest that 
for one hour of interview at least five hours of transcription is required, 
therefore it is also a time-consuming method.   
The number of interviews is also another important aspect which there is no 
consensus in the literature. While at least six in-depth interviews is suggested 
by Guest et al. (2006) if the population sample is homogeneous, Creswell and 
Poth (2017) posit that if the aim is to compare distinct groups than a minimum 
of at least 15 interviews are required in total.  
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5.4.1.2 Data	selection	and	qualitative	research	
This research assesses perception of charity stakeholders regarding fraud in 
charities. The research design and method is developed in order to assess the 
perception of stakeholders regarding reasons and solutions to fraud in the 
charity sector and assess their impact on the problem.  
Since there is a lack of literature that assesses stakeholders’ influence on 
charity fraud, interviews were used to provide an in-depth analyses of the 
environmental reasons/opportunities for fraud in charities. To examine the 
impact of stakeholders’ potential influence on fraud in charities, semi-
structured interviews were performed.  
Interviews with stakeholders, including the charity officials themselves, have 
been frequently used to in charity literature especially to assess accountability 
mechanisms and to learn more on stakeholder’s perceptions on charity 
governance (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a; Miller, 2002; Wellens and 
Jegers, 2014a; Yang et al., 2017). Interviews were selected to provide most 
profound analysis because were recommended the by previous studies 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2000). For example, Connolly and Hyndman 
(2017) conducted semi-structured interviews with charity stakeholders, 
between 6 to 8 with each auditors, donors, charity officials and beneficiaries, 
by anonymising respondents in order to have efficient interview outcomes.  
Five groups of stakeholders were identified to provide a broader picture of 
the sector and its stakeholders (regulator-watchdog, charity officials, 
auditor/accountant, donors, beneficiaries). To maintain generalisability, a 
wide variety of stakeholders in each sub group was selected. For example, 
along with income being the main selection criteria, interviewees were 
grouped according to their specific sector and area. Charity officials were 
selected among trustees, managers, audit committee members, and fraud 
specialties and finance directors. While auditors/accountants were identified 
according to their income in the charity sector, donors were selected through 
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their income and different type of donors such as funds, for-profit 
organisations, national authorities, local authorities and individual donors. As 
to determine ‘benefit’ was hard for all beneficiaries, benefits such as 
scholarship, direct monetary benefits, accommodation, food and cloth 
benefit, use of libraries, religious places and benefit from other, non-material 
charity benefits were used. 
Sampling was purposive for regulators and charity watchdog organisations 
due to their restricted quantity (Walliman, 2006), and sampling was random 
for the other four stakeholder groups (Saunders et al., 2016). While the 
charities were identified from the database of the Charity Commission, apart 
from a number of auditors and larger donors, the rest of the respondents were 
found with use of previous connections and the snowballing effect. Emailing, 
direct telephone call, attendance to conferences and events and approaching 
the beneficiaries while being benefiting the charities were performed. As a 
high percentage of responses were negative due to the topic being ‘sensitive’, 
most of the respondents were identified after the interview process began.  
The preparation of the questions was realised in order to obtain the broadest 
and most fruitful possible answers. Questions were generated regarding the 
sensitivity of the topic and also after reviewing the previous work on charity 
accountability (Connolly and Hyndman, 2017; Dhanani and Connolly, 2012). 
Groundwork (clear instructions and scheduled appointments for the 
interviews), interview guide including consent request for recording were 
realised before the interviews took place (Creswell, 2013; Walliman, 2006).   
The interviews spanned from February to July 2018. Interviewees’ needs such 
as timing and consent (King and Horrocks, 2010) were taken into account and 
as ‘own setting of respondents’ is argued to provide better outcomes 
(Walliman, 2006) the interviews were conducted in respondents’ own 
settings. Pilot testing and redesign of questions were utilised (Guest et al., 
2006). Both open and closed-ended questions were used as only utilising 
closed-ended question is deemed to restrict the interviewee's responses (King 
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and Horrocks, 2010). An overwhelming majority of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face. Telephone and skype interviews were performed in 
three cases because of health issues and an interviewer being outside of the 
UK. In total 41 interviews were conducted and the interviewees were given 
unique references, to maintain anonymity of the interviewee and to provide 
identification of comments made by the same interviewee. 
The sequence of the questions were from easy to tough in order to allow 
information flow (Collis and Hussey, 2013). As over two hours impairs the 
efficiency of the interviews (Pezalla et al., 2012), a maximum of 90 minutes 
were aimed. The length of the interviews changed between 25 minutes to 105 
minutes with the interviews of the beneficiaries being generally lasting less. 
All the interviews were recorded with a hand-held audio recorder, with the 
permission of the respondents. Immediate recording and transcribing to 
enhance comprehension and accuracy (Kvale, 1996; Miller, 2002) was 
utilised. The analysis of the transcribed documents was done by classifying 
the responses in accordance with the questions. Table 5.2 summarises the 
number of interviewees for each stakeholder group: 
Table	5.2	Stakeholder	Interviews	
Stakeholder Group Sample Size Sub-Groups 
Regulator-Watchdog  5 No sub-groups 
Charity Officials  9 Large (3): Income over £10million 
Medium (3): Income between £1million-£10 million 
Small (3): Income below £1million 
Auditors-
Accountants 
9 Large (3): Revenue over £4million  
Medium (3) Revenue between £1million-£4 million 
Small (3) Revenue below £1 million 
Donors 
 
9 Large (3): Donation/grant over £1million  
Medium (3): Donation/grant between £1,000-£1million  
Small (3): Donation/grant below £1.000  
Beneficiaries 9 As to determine ‘benefit’ was hard for all beneficiaries, benefits 
such as scholarship, direct monetary benefits, accommodation, food 
and cloth benefit, use of libraries, religious places and benefit from 
other, non-material charity benefits were used. 
Source (Author) 
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5.4.2 Quantitative	Research		
Cohen et al. (2013) posit that quantitative research is the empirical 
investigation through a collection of numerical data and examining the data 
with mathematical and statistical methods. In order to make inferences from 
the obtained data statistical and mathematical hypotheses are tested 
(Walliman, 2006). Quantitative method differs from the qualitative methods 
as it is deductive in nature (Bryman and Bell, 2015), reality is perceived to be 
external to the researcher (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), a relationship is 
formed between variables to define the link among them (Saunders et al., 
2016). 
5.4.2.1 Documents	 (secondary	 data)	 analysis	 and	 logistic	 regression	 as	
quantitative	research	methods	
Documents are collective social products (Prior, 2003) that are frequently 
used as a source of analysis for quantitative research. Lee (2012, p.391) 
defines documents as “durable repository for textual, visual and audio 
representations that may be retained and used, creating the possibility that the 
meanings of the representations may be interpreted differently”. While 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning are measures to 
assess document quality (Scott, 1990), documents history, completeness, the 
purpose of production and other methods to support the verification of the 
document also designates if the document is in a quality to be useful or not 
(Walliman, 2006). 
Documents possess important positive features. As most of the documents 
were not produced to be used for research, researcher bias is overwhelmingly 
eliminated (Lee, 2012). Also, the research subjects are in general not being 
affected by the research directly and as a result documents can form an 
unobtrusive inquiry (Walliman, 2006, p.84). Documents are also cost and 
time efficient, enable data transmission irrelevant of time and space 
(Reissman, 2008), can be assessed in different studies for different purposes 
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(Saunders et al., 2016), and are suitable for both quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  
Some disadvantages of the documents are accessing (Scott, 1990), being sure 
that it is adequate and representative of the sample population and sometimes 
hard to assess the contents (Hodder, 1994). Also documents should be 
evaluated in a context-specific manner to prevent anachronism, which is 
applying modern-day implications and thought to older materials and people 
(Forster, 1994, p.149).   
A form of a quantitative method is regression analysis, which is a statistical 
method that assesses the relationships between dependent and independent 
variables (Field, 2009). A special version of regression analysis is logistic 
regression in which dependent variable can only be ‘0’ or ‘1’ as it is binary 
(Ketchen and Bergh, 2009; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). This research 
utilises logistic regression analysis in order to examine the relationship among 
the test variables and FRAUD (the dependent variable) (Collis and Hussey, 
2013).  
As also discussed in Chapter 4, logistic regression is advantageous because it 
has higher generalisation accuracy and therefore is adaptable to a variety of 
different contexts (Hair et al., 2010), easier to construct and structure a model 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008), works well with a variety of data sets (Dreiseitl 
and Ohno-Machado, 2002), and has great ability to identify casual 
relationships (Tu, 1996). Disadvantages of the logistic regression are: 
variable selection is very crucial and may impact the model immensely 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015) and it is also hard to construct very complex models 
with large number of variables (Tu, 1996).  
5.4.2.2 Data	selection	and	quantitative	research	
Content analysis and logistic regression are utilised to quantify data derived 
from the documents and to determine aspects of charity governance that are 
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influential in fraudulent behaviour. 
Content Analysis  
Content analysis usage is favoured in the not-for-profit organisation studies, 
especially regarding annual report, annual reviews and websites (Hyndman 
and McConville, 2016; Manetti and Toccafondi, 2014). Also content analysis 
is frequently mixed with other methods such as interviews (Boateng et al., 
2016; Crawford et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2017; Zona et al., 2013). As 
secondary data form the basis for the quantitative research in this study the 
annual reports and any relevant information disclosed voluntarily by charities 
was aimed to be examined (Field, 2009).  
The research utilised the use of content analysis to derive the test variables 
determined for the logistic regression hypothesis (Walliman, 2006). The 
documents were obtained using the Charity Commission’s website, the 
official institution one of whose duties is to oversee charities, which promoted 
reliability, credibility and authenticity of the data used (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Multiple documents were examined to enhance validity of the research 
(Blumberg et al., 2014).  
Population sampling was purposive sampling to maintain representativeness 
by assessing 42 fraud charities (Cohen et al., 2013), therefore one-to-one 
matching of fraud and no-fraud charities was utilised as the populations from 
which the samples were selected were different (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004). 
The examination of the documents was aimed to be time and cost efficient 
and without any difficulties or hardship in accessing them as they are open to 
the public (Hodder, 1994; Maitlis, 2012). A checklist was employed in 
designing and collecting data and afterwards information gathered was 
classified and grouped such as analysed sections etc. (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2004; Hodder, 1994). 
Chapter 9 provides a more detailed explanation of document content analysis, 
matching of the fraud and no-fraud charities and identification of variables. 
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Logistic Regression 
The dependent variable is dichotomous (FRAUD) therefore logistic 
regression analysis was utilised (Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996; Collis 
and Hussey, 2013; McDonnell and Rutherford, 2018; Ndofor et al., 2015; 
Uzun et al., 2004). The research makes use of 84 charities as a sample which 
are established in England and Wales, which half (42) of the charities are 
representing fraud charities as these charities were inquired by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales for reasons of fraud/ financial 
misconduct within the time frame of 2008-2018. Matching these fraud 
charities with charities of no fraud experience formed a sample of half fraud 
(42) and half no-fraud (42) charities (Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996).  
Foundation years, geography, income, field of activities of fraud charities 
were assessed to specify the 42 no-fraud ones (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; 
Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Xu et al., 2017). The data was analysed by using 
the software package of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
5.4.2.3 Hypothesis	formulation	
In developing a statistical model to test the relationship between governance 
variables and fraud in charities, three hypotheses have been developed, based 
on three different test variables. The variables and hypotheses are explained 
in this sub-section. In addition, five control variables were identified, and 
these are discussed in the following sub-section. The logistic regression 
model is set out in sub-section 5.4.2.5. 
TRUSTEE 
Independence is an important feature of a board that aims to prevent and deter 
wrongdoings and fraud. A board with an adequate number of independent 
members is found to increase the monitoring capabilities and therefore 
incidence of fraudulent events tend to decrease where the percentage of board 
member’s independence increases 
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Yetman and Yetman, 2012). 
It is much easier to define ‘independence’ in the for-profit sector as the 
distinction between the executive and non-executive directors is more clear-
cut when compared to not-for-profit trustees. Terms of reference and 
remuneration are the main means that provides to define ‘independence’ more 
easier in the for-profit sector (Uzun et al., 2004). However, the special case 
of the not-for-profit sector where the trustees are not expected to have 
remuneration, it has to be arranged by the Charity Commission or the courts 
specifically (Commission, 2013b), makes the definition of ‘independence’ 
much more troublesome.  
The number of trustees is used to measure the influence of the board of 
trustees’ size on charity fraud. Unlike for-profit sector studies, which tend to 
find in favour of smaller boards, not-for-profit studies have posited that larger 
boards enable enhanced independence and therefore monitoring and as a 
result reduce the occurrence of wrongdoing, which was discussed in Chapter 
2 (Bai, 2013; Olson, 2000; Williams et al., 2005). Larger board size has 
especially been argued to be beneficial to disclosure practices of the not-for-
profit organisations (Bradshaw et al., 1992). It was found by de Andrés-
Alonso et al. (2006) that there exists a positive correlation between larger 
boards of trustees and enhanced disclosure in not-for-profit organisations. 
Jetty and Beattie (2012) found that a higher number of trustees in the charity 
sector is associated with the existence of an audit committee, which may be 
expected to enhance monitoring. While Harris and Neely (2018) found a 
positive correlation between transparency and board size in not-for-profit 
organisations, Chen (2009) also found that not-for-profit organisations that 
have larger boards are more effective in terms of performing the monitoring 
function.  
This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1: Fraud risk is lower when the board of trustees is larger 
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GRANT16  
As a variable specific to not-for-profit organisations, receiving grants17 is 
assessed. As suggested by Nikolova (2014), effective monitoring by donors 
and a higher share of government grants18  (which was found to lead to 
increase in monitoring by the government and decrease in CEO 
compensation) reduce the opportunity for misconduct. Ostrower and Stone 
(2010) found a high rate of correlation between government funding and 
compliance with enhanced documentation and policy formation and they 
suggest that higher government funding would require enhanced monitoring. 
Ostrower and Stone (2010) and Ostrower (2007) also argue that receiving 
government funding may lead to an enhanced reporting culture and a more 
formalised accountability. 
 
Reheul et al. (2014) and Yetman and Yetman (2012) argue that donors and 
grants are useful enhancing monitoring in not-for-profit organisations. Zainon 
et al. (2012) found that not-for-profit organisations who are dependent on 
funding from the government face scrutiny and monitoring from the 
                                                
16 Grants and restricted funds in more than half of the cases were found to exist together. 
However, there were grants which did not require restriction and there were funds which did 
not require grants but were part of a donation. As a result, it was possible to identify 
separately grant and restricted funds received.  
17  “Grant income is any voluntary income received by the charity (or other transfer of 
property) from a person or institution. The income or transfer may be for the general purposes 
of the charity, or for a specific purpose. It may be unconditional or be subject to conditions 
which, if not satisfied by the recipient charity, may lead to the grant property acquired with 
the aid of the grant or part of it being reclaimed by the grant-maker. Entitlement to grant 
income may be subject to performance conditions, in which case it is classified as a 
performance-related grant and is recognised as the performance conditions are met.” (SORP, 
2015) 
18 “Government grants represent the assistance by government in the form of a transfer of 
resources to a charity in return for past or future compliance with specified conditions relating 
to the operating activities of the charity (or its subsidiary). Government refers to government, 
government agencies and similar bodies whether local, national or international.” (SORP, 
2015) 
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government, which leads to enhanced disclosure of financial and outcome 
performance. Jetty and Beattie (2012) also suggest that charities will be under 
greater scrutiny when they are receiving government grants. Trussel and 
Parsons (2007), also argue that government grants provide important 
monitoring duty in the not-for-profit sector, as they require enhanced 
disclosure and audit.  
 
Hodge and Picollo (2011) also suggest that fundraising not-for-profit 
organisations need a more effective board of trustees than not-for profit 
organisations that rely on grants for financial stability. Therefore, if a charity 
has any grants as part of its income, it is expected that there will be better 
supervision by the donors and therefore fraud will be less likely. This suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: Fraud risk is lower when a charity has a higher percentage of grants 
in its income  
RESTRICTED 
Distinction is made between the sources of income of restricted 19  and 
unrestricted 20  funds. While the unrestricted funds can be used for any 
charitable purposes, restricted funds are held for use under conditions 
                                                
19 Restricted funds may be either endowment or restricted income funds, depending on the 
nature of the restriction. Where the fund is not an endowment fund and is held on trust for 
spending on specific purposes, it is known as a restricted income fund. The resources (the 
assets and liabilities) of each restricted fund are held and maintained separately from other 
funds. This is in recognition of the circumstances in which the resources were originally 
received, and/or the restrictions on that fund that determine the way those resources are 
subsequently to be treated. (SORP, 2015) 
20 Unrestricted fund is a legal term for the unexpended resources held by a charity on trust, 
comprising money and other assets that can be used for any of the charitable aims of the 
charity. The use of unrestricted funds is not restricted to any particular charitable purpose of 
the charity. (SORP, 2015) 
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generally designated by the donor (Wilke, 2003). Bac (2002), de Andrés-
Alonso et al. (2009), and Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) also suggest that 
donor involvement in oversight may contribute to enhance monitoring of 
disbursement of funds. Ashford and Clarke (1996) and Rossouw (2006) 
suggest that restricted funds enhance oversight regarding not-for-profit 
organisations by allowing donors to assess if their funds are used in their 
restricted target or not.  
As the donors have a say in the restricted funds it is argued that this may 
prevent wrongdoing (Committee, 2015-16). Vermeer et al. (2006) argued that 
donor funds which are restricted resemble shareholder capital and therefore 
will enhance monitoring. Jetty and Beattie (2012), who found that existence 
of an audit committee and monitoring increases with a higher rate of restricted 
funds and government grants, suggest that restricted funds are crucial in 
monitoring opportunistic behaviour.  
Yermack (2017, p.215), who studied museums, argued that “Restricted 
donations represent a form of corporate governance, because they constrain 
the opportunities for non-profit managers to expropriate resources”, and 
found that restricted funds tended to be associated with lower administration 
costs. This suggests that donors are important and successful in preventing 
misuse of not-for-profit resources. Also, Harris et al. (2015) found that asset 
diversions are negatively correlated with the existence of restricted funds.  
H3: Fraud risk is lower when a charity has a higher percentage of 
restricted income  
5.4.2.4 Control	Variables	
Five control variables were identified for the regression analysis:  
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ASSURANCE 
Disclosure is accepted as a sign of trust and expression of confidence while 
lack of it is deemed to be a sign of hiding something, a possible malfeasance 
(Atan et al., 2013). In the for-profit sector, effective disclosure enhances 
transparency (Athanasakou et al., 2011) and enables effective monitoring by 
stakeholders with diminishing effects of agency problems (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Ndofor et al. (2015) posit that information asymmetries among agents 
and principals provide opportunities for financial fraud.  
Audit, giving and monitoring accounts (Power, 1997), is the most effective 
way to fight with fraud (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), diminish agency 
problems (Cullinan and Sutton, 2002) and assure trustworthiness of an 
organisation (Keating and Frumkin, 2003). 
The mandatory disclosure requirements of charities in England and Wales are 
determined by the Charities Act (2011) and further by SORP (2015) 
depending on the income of the charity. However, stakeholders also value 
voluntarily disclosed information such as annual review, corporate 
sustainability reports and other documents which provide narrative 
information on performance (Connolly and Dhanani, 2006; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013b). Disclosure is used by stakeholders to monitor the charities 
and to understand if there is a problem with the charity (Harris et al., 2015; 
Nikolova, 2014). Arya and Mittendorf (2015) argue that enhanced disclosure 
reduces chances of misconduct in charities. Hyndman and McConville (2016) 
posit that the actual content rather than just the amount of disclosure is 
important in charities as some charities are inclined to disclose deceptive 
information. Therefore, both mandatorily and voluntarily disclosed 
information was assessed as a basis for analysis.  
Lack of audit or insufficient audit mechanisms exacerbates the risk of fraud 
and misconduct in an organisation (Arens et al., 2012; Bell and Carcello, 
2000). In not-for-profit organisations audit found to enhance disclosure (Atan 
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et al., 2013). Krishnan et al. (2006) found that in not-for-profit organisations 
there is a negative correlation between the existence of an outside accountant 
and misreporting of expenses.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, charities are required to have independent 
examination if their income exceeds £25,000, but it is voluntary to have an 
examination below that income (Commission, 2017). Therefore, any type of 
accountant or independent examination was also accepted to be a form of 
voluntary disclosure of information and therefore a signal to the stakeholders 
that their accounts have been scrutinised by a third party. 
Overall, fraud risk is assumed to be lower for charities which were examined 
and had unqualified examination reports. 
COMMITTEE 
The existence of nominating and compensation committees is argued to be 
effective in monitoring the management (Vafeas, 1999) and coping against 
fraud (Fanning and Cogger, 1998).  Although committees are not found to be 
as frequent in the charity sector, especially for smaller charities, compared 
with the for-profit sector, this study has also assessed the existence of any 
type of committees. It is assumed that, as generally found in the for-profit 
sector, existence of committees will hinder fraud.  
REMUNERATION  
Remuneration of staff and other administrative costs are necessary expenses 
for routine operations but also aim to align the interest of the organisation 
with the staff, including the executives, and make employment with the 
organisation attractive (Garner and Harrison, 2013). Unexpected or 
fluctuating administrative costs, which remuneration are a key part of it, is if 
without any reason is accepted to signal a financial problem (Nikolova, 2014). 
In the for-profit sector, high-powered incentives and excessive administrative 
costs is correlated to have proxies of fraud and other misconduct (Bergstresser 
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and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006).  
Administrative cost/total cost and administrative cost/revenue are used as a 
financial risk assessment tool in not-for-profit organisations (Omar et al., 
2013; Ryan and Irvine, 2012; Tuckman and Chang, 1991). Baber et al. (2002) 
posit that in their work on not-for-profit organisations, annual change in 
remuneration in terms of annual change in revenue is an effective way to 
assess problems in remuneration and administrative costs.  
Krishnan et al. (2006) found that not-for-profit organisations tend to 
misreport fundraising expenses if the managers pose excessive incentives. 
While Connolly and Hyndman (2013b) found that the administration 
cost/income percentage has not changed in years when they compared their 
findings with Hyndman (1990), they also found that charities are not 
disclosing enough information on administrative costs. Callen et al. (2003) 
also provided evidence that higher donor participation on the board has a 
negative correlation with administrative expenses. Callen et al. (2010) found 
that administrative expenses are negatively related with committees’ 
monitoring activities and positively related with staff presence on the board.  
It is much easier to define ‘independence’ in the for-profit sector as the 
distinction between the executive and non-executive directors is more clear-
cut when compared to not-for-profit trustees. However, in the special case of 
the not-for-profit sector, the trustees are not expected to be remunerated. 
According to section 9 of (SORP, 2015) it is required that charities must 
disclose in the notes to the accounts trustees’ remuneration and benefits and 
expenses. Therefore, the study assumes that receiving remuneration will 
damage the independence of a trustee and will therefore make fraud more 
likely. 
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LOSS 
Poor financial performance is found to lead to financial statement fraud (Bell 
et al., 1991; Loebbecke et al., 1989). Financial distress and lack of financial 
health is argued to cause wrong decision making by the management or board. 
Therefore, fraud risk is assumed to be higher for charities which have annual 
loss.  
SURNAME 
Boards who have directors that belong to the same family tend to make 
decisions which favour that family (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Family 
member existence is also found to have a negative effect on voluntary 
disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Matoussi and Gharbi (2011) also found 
that fraud firms are more likely to have board of directors of the same family 
than no-fraud firms. Therefore, the variable SURNAME, envisaged that fraud 
charities will have higher number of trustees with using the same surname. 
5.4.2.5 The	logistic	regression	model	and	the	hypotheses	
The following logistic regression model, made up of three variables to test 
the hypothesis and five controls, was used to test the hypotheses:  
"#$%&' = ) + +,TRUSTEE' + +2GRANT' + +6RESTRICTED'+ +:ASSURANCE' + +;COMMITTEE'+ +>REMUNERATION' + +?SURNAME' +	+ALOSS'	  
TRUSTEE= the number of trustees on the board of trustees  
GRANT= percentage of grant/income received by a charity  
RESTRICTED= percentage of restricted income/income of a charity 
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ASSURANCE= a dummy variable with a value of one if the charity does not 
have an independent examination opinion or has a qualified independent 
examination opinion, a value of zero otherwise 
REMUNERATION= a dummy variable with a value of one if a trustee 
receives remuneration or payment of any kind, value of zero otherwise 
COMMITTEE= a dummy variable with a value of one if the charity has 
committee(s), a value of zero otherwise 
SURNAME=  a dummy variable with a value of one if the charity has trustees 
with the same surname on the board of trustees, a value of zero otherwise  
LOSS= a dummy variable with a value of one if the charity has a reported 
annual net loss in the fraud year, a value of zero otherwise 
5.4.2.6 Limitations	regarding	the	quantitative	research	
As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, although the for-profit and not-profit 
organisations have some common features, there are also very important 
differences that make it hard to apply the frequently used for-profit sector 
fraud independent variables to be directly applicable to this study.  
Frequently used fraud variables such as board diversity in terms of ethnicity, 
gender and age (Xu et al., 2017), stock option increases (Abbott et al., 2000) 
is not considered appropriate variables due to different structures of for-profit 
and not-for-profit boards. Also, the effects of auditor tenure on independence 
of auditors is debated (Shockley, 1981). Beasley et al. (1999) and Carcello 
and Nagy (2004) suggest that it is not feasible to assess auditor independence 
using documents alone. The documents also do not provide sufficient 
information regarding audit committees which are found to be effective in 
deterring fraud (Abbott et al., 2000; Jetty and Beattie, 2012) or do not possess 
any significant effect (Beasley, 1996). 
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McDonnell and Rutherford (2018) posit that the literature for not-for-profit 
organisations is insufficient to provide an empirical basis for the outcomes of 
the variables. Also as most of the research on not-for-profit organisations are 
on the largest organisations in terms of income, it is hard to utilise them in 
this study (Nikolova, 2014).  
5.5 Summary	
This chapter has described the research methodology and data collection 
method used, including the two types of research methods: a qualitative 
method (primary data collected from different stakeholders) and a 
quantitative method (secondary data of UK charities). It explains how, given 
the research objectives, a mixed methods approach will be undertaken to 
explore occurrence of fraud in UK charities. Like the integration of theories 
explained in Chapter 3, this chapter also integrates paradigms that are used 
for mixed methods.  
The first stage involves a qualitative assessment of stakeholders’ views and 
their influence on charity accountability and fraud. This stage conducts 
interviews with key charity stakeholders. The second stage utilises 
quantitative examination of charity governance practices and their relation to 
fraud. The data for this stage is derived from official charity documents and 
is assessed by use of logistic regression analysis. 
In the following four chapters, empirical findings for the two different 
methods utilised will be presented. 
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PART	IV	
The fourth part of the thesis presents findings in four chapters. The first three 
chapters discuss the findings of the qualitative research, and the fourth 
assesses the findings of the quantitative analysis. The first chapter of the 
fourth part, Chapter 6, evaluates the understanding of accountability, 
ownership and stakeholder salience in the charity sector. Chapter 7 assesses 
the understanding of fraud by the respondents and presents the findings 
regarding the reasons suggested by the respondents for fraud in the charity 
sector. Chapter 8, assesses the respondents’ views regarding solutions to fraud 
and stakeholder oversight in the charity sector. Chapter 9 presents the findings 
of the content and logistic regression analysis of fraud charities, which was 
conducted by use of the Charity Commission database. The variable 
identification used in the logistic regression analysis benefited from the 
findings in chapters 7 and 8 therefore providing a flow of information among 
the qualitative and quantitative findings of the thesis. 
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6. UNDERSTANDING	ACCOUNTABILITY,	OWNERSHIP	
AND	STAKEHOLDER	SALIENCE	IN	THE	CHARITY	SECTOR	
This is the first chapter which presents findings from the qualitative part of 
the research. The chapter analyses the interviews conducted with the 
regulator/watchdog organisations, charity officials, auditors/accountants, 
donors and beneficiaries. The chapter evaluates the stakeholders’ perception 
of accountability, ownership and stakeholder salience in the charity sector. 
Research question 1a assesses the accountability dynamics in the charity 
sector and research question 1b focuses on the ownership and principal-agent 
relationship, and it evaluates the saliency of the stakeholders. 
The chapter utilises the literature which was analysed in the Chapters 2 and 3 
especially. The framework of accountability is assessed benefiting especially 
from Stewart’s (1984) and Laughlin’s (1990) accountability theories. Issues 
such as “accountability to whom?” and the mechanisms of accountability are 
also assessed. The views of charity stakeholders on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
stakeholder salience are also examined. The uniqueness of the sector, and 
whether the uniqueness is a result of ownership and multi-principal 
environment envisaged by Jegers (2009), in accordance with the integrated 
theories of agency, stewardship and stakeholder (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012) 
are also been assessed.  
  The chapter is designed in accordance with the research questions. Thus, 
section 6.1 assesses the accountability dynamics and section 6.2 examines the 
topics of ownership and stakeholder salience. 
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Figure	6.1	Structure	of	Chapter	6	
6.1 Understanding	Accountability	in	the	Charity	Sector	
This section presents the findings regarding charity stakeholders’ perceptions 
of (a) which stakeholders should charities be accountable to?; (b) what is the 
appropriate mechanism for discharging accountability?; (c) how relevant are 
financial statements and other documents in discharging accountability? (d) 
should relationships with charity stakeholders be formal or informal?; and (e) 
how should charity stakeholders interact? 
Accountability literature was discussed in Chapter 2. Accountability enables 
a mutual relationship between an organisation and its stakeholders, as while 
the organisation discloses information to the stakeholders the organisation 
adapts its activities in line with the needs and expectations of the stakeholders 
(Castrogiovanni, 2002; Dess and Beard, 1984). The organisation also has to 
be accountable to the relevant stakeholders (accountability to whom?), 
purpose (accountability for what?) and analysing how accountability is 
discharged (accountability mechanisms).  
Accountability, as discussed and found in Chapter 2, is crucial for not-for-
profit organisations as absence of a profit and definite owners leads to 
inadequate monitoring and excessive opportunism (Breen, 2013; Burger and 
Owens, 2011; Desai and Yetman, 2005) . The framework of accountability 
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also distinguishes not-for-profit organisations from for-profit organisations. 
Whereas for-profit accountability is more formal and straightforward, the 
organisational structure of not-for-profit organisations and charities is argued 
to be based on trust (Broadbent et al., 1996). 
UK charity accountability gained momentum after the 1980s with criticisms 
on lack of charity reporting (Bird and Morgan-Jones, 1981; Connolly et al., 
2003). The literature is in agreement that, although the discharge of 
accountability is better compared to early years, it is still in need of 
improvement to meet stakeholder needs (Connolly and Dhanani, 2006; 
Connolly and Hyndman, 2003; Hyndman, 1990). Also narrative rather than 
financial accountability is found to be preferred, especially by the donors 
(Connolly and Hyndman, 2013b). The topic of misconduct and fraud has 
recently taken part in the literature (McDonnell and Rutherford, 2019; 
Ohalehi, 2019). 
The findings of the interviews indicate that donors were not alone as the group 
to whom accountability should be directed. Beneficiaries were also found, 
along with the donors, to be the primary group that accountability should be 
discharged to. This finding contributes to previous studies (Cordery and 
Baskerville, 2005) in which beneficiaries were lagging behind. However it is 
interesting that the discharge of accountability seems not to be satisfying the 
beneficiary group. This is because they are not classified as a stakeholder 
group to whom information disclosed through the financial reports is aimed, 
and their demand for more basic information is not met. Overall, stakeholders 
demand more understandable and inclusive information rather than merely 
more information. 
The accountability relationship between the charities and their stakeholders 
also provided interesting results. The relationship regarding donors and 
beneficiaries were found to be informal.  However, excessive informality was 
also argued to be damaging for the sector as too much informality coupled 
with the lack of direct accountability and ownership diminishes the oversight 
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on the charities. Smaller organisations viewed the relationship as more 
informal. The results especially fit well with Laughlin’s (1990) ‘communal 
accountability’ and even Stewart’s (1984) ‘links of account’ specifically for 
the accountability discharged towards the beneficiaires. The findings also 
suggest that there is limited, if any, interaction between charity stakeholders. 
Donors and beneficiaries, the two stakeholder groups to whom accountability 
should be discharged seldom interact, with especially beneficiaries having 
near to zero relationships with the other stakeholders.  
6.1.1 To	which	stakeholders	should	charities	be	accountable?	
The arguments that the accountability structure is different in the not-for-
profit sector  (Breen, 2013; Salamon et al., 2000) led to assessing the charity 
officials’ and stakeholders’ views on accountability and the relationship 
among the stakeholders. To grasp a better understanding of the accountability 
dynamics in the charity sector, the interviewees were asked who they think 
the charities are accountable to. Most of the responses referred to more than 
one stakeholder group, implying that respondents saw charity accountability 
as operating within a multiple-stakeholder environment (Jegers, 2009; Van 
Puyvelde et al., 2012). Five stakeholders were mentioned frequently: the 
public, trustees, the regulator, the donors and the beneficiaries. For example:  
“ . . . without beneficiaries there is no reason to have the charity, there 
is no reason to do any of it.” (C9) 
“They're accountable to several groups. They are accountable to the 
trustees first of all, who have a legal responsibility, but they're also 
accountable to their external stakeholders. They're also accountable 
to their beneficiaries. They're also accountable to their benefactors, 
their donors. They're also accountable to their staff. They're also 
accountable to their suppliers and people within they have 
contractual relationships. At the end of the day, they are accountable 
to society.” (D6) 
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“That’s obviously a multitude of parties really if I think about it. 
They're accountable to the trustees. They're accountable to any kind 
of regulator that drives them. Depending on what they do, they're 
accountable to the beneficiaries because they act on their behalf”. 
(RW4) 
Indeed, at least one respondent denied the relevance of stakeholders, 
remarking: 
“Nobody. This is a nice cosy network.” (A8) 
Respondents from specific stakeholder groups did not agree on particular 
stakeholders to whom charities should be accountable. Also, respondents did 
not mention auditors as stakeholders to whom charities should be 
accountable.  
Figure 6.2 provides a count of the number of times that particular stakeholders 
were mentioned by respondents as stakeholders to whom charities should be 
accountable: 
 
Figure	6.2	Accountability	towards	Charity	Stakeholders	
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Overall, donors and also beneficiaries were viewed as the stakeholder group 
to whom accountability should mostly be directed. 
6.1.2 What	is	the	appropriate	mechanism	for	discharging	accountability?	
Opinions about the accountability discharged and information disclosed by 
charities was also assessed during the interviews. The respondents were 
divided: while some beneficiaries and donors argued that more transparency 
and accountability is needed (Connolly and Dhanani, 2009; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013b; Hyndman, 1990), charity officials, auditors and 
regulator/watchdog organisations and a majority of donors argued that the 
bureaucratic burden is too much already and therefore there is no need for 
further information to be disclosed.  
The respondents who argued that more can be done in terms of accountability 
and transparency suggested that understanding accounts and information 
disclosed is complex and sometimes relevant information is hard to find. The 
reports were also labelled as only a “tick box exercise” or a “compliance tool” 
for most charities. Respondents claimed that this complexity reduces the 
oversight of the donors and beneficiaries:  
“... simply because a lot of our stakeholders are not at a level of 
understanding that they could not usefully read financial statements 
and understand the impact.” (C6) 
“… as a donor, I don't look at the reports and accounts.” (D5) 
“They are not the easiest things to read. You've got to have a bit of an 
understanding of being able to read financial statements to really 
often make sense of what they do. I mean if you are a beneficiary you 
are probably more likely to go to the website and see what it is and 
what they do and whether or not they can help you.” (RW1) 
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The respondents who thought that reporting of accounts is satisfactory and is 
sufficient often compared the level of disclosed information to a decade ago 
and argued that the charities are now disclosing more. While accountants/ 
auditors argued that the accounts are too complex already, larger donors 
stated that they are able to achieve more information and accountability easily 
if they demand this. Regulator/watchdog organisations posited that compared 
to other countries, the UK charity sector is fairly transparent as to where the 
money is being spent and suggested it is necessary to achieve a balance 
between the amount of reporting and managing costs: 
“Annual reports of charities I regard as being twice as complex as a 
corporate annual report for an owner managed business corporate. 
It’s disclosing names and addresses of investment managers, or 
locations of where the charity operates and so on. Does that really 
add any value? I would question that.” (A5) 
“ … charities are having to do an enormous amount of paperwork 
and administration to keep up with regulation. I would say no more.” 
(D6) 
“We are in a good position as the funder. We can insist on a very 
considerable amount of information being disclosed to us as a 
condition of funding. Yes, we can get that.” (D4) 
Some of the respondents, more specifically charity officials, auditors and 
regulator/watchdog organisations, also discussed the relevance of the SORP. 
The respondents were in agreement that the SORP leads to more detail and 
information in the financial statements of the relevant charities. However, the 
SORP was criticised as not being tailored to the needs of society and therefore 
sometimes is too complex: 
“The financial report is laid down in statutes, as such, it serves very 
little good purpose, if we're honest. You have to have a degree of 
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technical knowledge to be able to read it, understand it, and ask 
questions. The commission's view has been for a long time, I think it 
was SORP-- I think it was a recommended practice of 1995 where they 
described the report as putting flesh on the bones of the accounts.” 
(C4) 
The findings of this section shows that the cost of enhanced disclosure may 
not be justified, as it is already found too complex and burdensome on the 
charities. However simplified disclosure of information was favoured by the 
respondents. 
6.1.3 How	 relevant	 are	 financial	 statements	 and	 other	 documents	 in	
discharging	accountability?	
Respondents were also asked about financial statements as a method of 
achieving accountability. The regulator and the donors were seen as the top 
choices for being the specific group of stakeholders that the financial reports 
are aimed at. Other responses included the public, the trustees, potential future 
donors and the media. Interestingly, no respondent suggested that financial 
reports are aimed at beneficiaries. 
The charity officials also argued that the documents frequently used to 
discharge accountability are annual review, annual reports, newsletters, 
financial statements, management accounts, minutes, reports from their own 
work, and their own surveys.  
The relevance of financial accountability was also questioned by the 
respondents. Some respondents highlighted the fact that the financial 
statements do not necessarily say much about whether the charity has used its 
funds properly. Most donors considered that narrative information offered 
enhanced accountability; this is consistent with the findings of  Connolly and 
Hyndman (2013a) and (Connolly et al., 2015). Both financial and narrative 
reporting were valued by the auditors, charity officials and 
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regulator/watchdog organisations but most donors and beneficiaries favoured 
narrative over financial information:  
“Actually I don't think that the wider issue of accountability, not the 
kind of the legal obligation of reporting, the wider issue of 
accountability isn't just by a charity's financial accounts. It's done 
better through, for example, the trustees on your report or other ways 
that are better about communicating to the public what the charity 
does, how it does it, and in the case of fraud for example, where things 
have gone wrong, the lessons learnt and how the charity has 
addressed the problem.” (RW3)  
“I think the annual review is quite a soft document that gives a really 
good overview in a nice, easy to read language. Only if I was being 
really, really dedicated would I look at their audited accounts.” (B1) 
However, narrative reporting was also criticised by some as being very much 
a qualitative assessment rather than a quantitative assessment proving little. 
It was posited especially by auditors that recently they are being a bit more 
sceptical around some of the claims that are made in the narrative section of 
an annual report for a charity. Therefore, these respondents also mentioned 
the importance of performance, outcome or impact reporting (Hyndman, 
1990; Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a) arguing that charities need to 
demonstrate what is being achieved by their activities, or present the 
outcomes/impact of them, not just disclose the output of the activities:  
 “We're having discussions about whether there's a role, a separate 
role for us or for somebody about impact auditing. The charity makes 
a statement that it's delivered this, this, this, and this, and the impact's 
being this, this, this, and this, could that actually be independently 
verified and will that add weight to a credibility to what the charity is 
saying?” (A6) 
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“… my question to charities would be, "So what? Just because you've 
reached 100,000 people doesn't mean you've made a difference to 
them. "It's around how charities can demonstrate that. Some charities 
are now going towards what we call outcomes. Which is, "I've helped 
young people develop employment skills, develop communication 
skills, develop leadership skills," that I would say is an outcome. The 
output is I've helped 100,000 people. The outcome is I've helped 
100,000 people develop communication and leadership skills. . . . In 
terms of performance measurement at the moment, many charities are 
still in the first phase. Which is around, "How many have you helped?" 
rather than "How have we helped?" (A4) 
However, most auditors admitted that they do not assess the performance of 
the charities as they serve the charities and the regulator in an independent 
manner under their contract: 
“In terms of auditing a charity, you're not there to assess the 
performance itself, you're there to give a fair opinion on the accounts. 
Are you looking at how well the charity has met its objectives, is it 
spending its money on the right things. Well that's not really what an 
auditor is there to do.” (A2) 
Although there was sympathy towards donors and beneficiaries about the 
complexity of disclosed information, some charity officials accused 
stakeholders of being disinterested in financial or non-financial information 
and therefore limiting the options to enhance accountability: 
“I don't think as a matter of course, they get it but there is nothing 
stopping them from looking at the internet. I also think that the 
financial press can highlight things and so if they get wind of 
something and smell blood the report is a very good place to look. I 
was interviewing the other day for the members of our National - well 
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our audit committee and all the people had read the financial report.” 
(C2) 
A critic of the financial documents also highlighted the influence of 
accountants and auditors in making the regulations. The financial reports 
were argued to be developed by listening only to audit firms’ preferences 
rather than taking notice of other stakeholders such as the trustees.   
Some respondents also posited that accountability should not only be limited 
to documentation but should extend to all other means of communication and 
interaction. Some other communication tools identified by the respondents 
were telephone, email, face to face, annual meetings, website, social media 
and newsletters: 
“You need to harness all the forms of communication because 
otherwise, you just disappear from view.” (C4) 
6.1.4 Should	 accountability	 relationships	 with	 stakeholders	 be	 formal	 or	
informal?	
The accountability relationship between charities and their stakeholders was 
also examined, and respondents were asked if the relationships are different 
between the public sector, for-profit sector and the charity sector. Most of the 
respondents argued that, due to the different nature of the sectors, differences 
of relationships among the organisations and their stakeholders is 
unavoidable. In the case of charities, there is over-reliance on trust and the 
lack of shareholders, which leads to less scrutiny: 
“Well, the for-profit sector has stakeholders as shareholders who may 
be more demanding of the organisation from a financial point of view 
in terms of turning a profit at the end of the day. Perhaps there is less 
scrutiny in that sense of a charity than there is to a commercial 
organisation.” (D1) 
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“The relationship is a lot less tangible but in a way it makes a lot more 
complicated as well because the main difference for charities is that 
at the end of the day they rely on public trust and confidence. Public 
trust and confidence is very fleeting and is very difficult to manage, 
it's very easy to lose, it’s difficult to rebuild when things go wrong. 
That then has implications on all sorts of relationships that the charity 
has.” (RW3) 
The respondents suggested that relationships in the charity sector are based 
on good intentions and belief in the cause and less on expectations, especially 
for donors (Andreoni, 1990; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Some respondents 
argued that absence of formal ties and links between the charities and their 
stakeholders allows donors and beneficiaries to easily walk away and end 
their relationship with a charity without any hassle. This is unlike the for-
profit and public sectors where in the public sector the relationship is 
mandatory as a result of citizenship and in the for-profit sector there is an 
expectation of a service or product: 
“I think the relationship between funder and beneficiary in a charity 
is different to certainly a private sector where the customer is the 
funder and the beneficiary at the same time. It's more similar to 
government where the tax payer is the funder, is also the beneficiary 
in many cases, but there's a wider beneficiary group than just those 
who are taxpayers. Whereas in charities often the funders and the 
beneficiaries are two completely different sets of people, and that's 
probably where the difference lies in terms of the stakeholder map. 
Obviously, each of them also have regulators and other things from 
that sense that's consistent.” (A4) 
“You don't have a choice if you’re in the public sector because you 
have to pay tax, in the private sector you have a choice but that's a 
contractual business relationship. Whereas if you're a donor it's 
because I believe in and I want to give some from a charitable 
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beneficiary basis, I want to help people, I believe in the cause 
whatever it might be so I think their level of commitment can, 
obviously be, much higher.” (RW1) 
The respondents also stressed that an important reason for the different 
relationship of charities and their stakeholders compared to for-profit and 
public sector derives from the lack of a ‘primary stakeholder’ or owner. The 
respondents argued that it is hard to identify the primary stakeholder for the 
charities sector. The much wider variety of stakeholders are posited to make 
the relationship different and more complicated. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996), ‘Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory’, Journal of Eco omic28. 
On the positive side, charities are argued to be more approachable than other 
organisations and can address an emerging need more quickly and in a less 
bureaucratic way than a public sector or private sector service. Also, the 
charities were posited to have a longer-term relationship in terms of the 
mission and vision with their stakeholders, and that is less determined by 
short-term changes. Reputational risk (in the court of public opinion) is also 
underlined to be the strongest driver of accountability, given how prone the 
charity sector is to economic turmoil and to scandals derived from within 
(Meijer, 2009): 
“One charity, Kid's company commits fraud then we all get affected 
because people reduce trust. So the recent thing I suppose with Oxfam 
and look what happened to BBC Children in Need, in terms of their 
fundraising you might write down. Although I can't prove it, I'm sure 
there's a correlation between them, so I think our equivalent is we 
need to be accountable, we need to be above fraud because we are at 
the court of public opinion.” (C7) 
Most respondents also posited that the relationship with any stakeholder is 
more flexible and even looser compared to the for-profit sector. The 
respondents, however, also stressed that this looseness makes the quality of 
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the services provided by the charities and the value for money to be open to 
question: 
“I think the beneficiaries of the charity very often expect a different 
kind of service than one that they would buy from a private sector 
provider. They are often prepared to accept something that is a bit-- 
how should I put this? A bit looser.” (D4) 
The respondents were asked if the relationship between the charities and 
stakeholders was more formal than informal. The top answers for this 
question were either ‘informal’ or ‘depends’ either on the stakeholder or the 
charity. Most answers included that relationships with the regulator, auditor 
and large grant-giving donors are generally formal, whereas they are much 
less formal with small and medium donors and especially with beneficiaries. 
Also, respondents suggested that charities are accountable to many more and 
different types of stakeholders, in both formal and informal ways (Van 
Puyvelde et al., 2012). 
The respondents gave different answers as to why the relationship was 
informal. It was argued that charities have to be nicer and more flexible 
(Davis et al., 1997) and that the relationship is based more on trust and 
confidence (Broadbent et al., 1996) and similar good manners, which leads to 
less formality.  
The relationship especially with the beneficiaries were not found to be 
formalised as the charities have a very low threshold to engage with the 
beneficiaries. Limited expectations from donors is also mentioned as 
contributing to an informal accountability relationship (Stewart, 1984). 
Informality is created as a result of most donors not expecting any personal 
benefit and the relationship involving less attachment because people can 
easily walk away and most donations are impulsive (Laughlin, 1990; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996):  
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“Well, I think it is probably too informal. I think it would need to be 
more formal. I like the outcome of this Oxfam thing that is going to 
have far-reaching consequences across the charitable sector by the 
external stakeholders, all of them and donors, et cetera, all of them 
demanding more accountability from charities more, that we're not 
going to give you this money because we have no faith in the fact you'll 
look after it and spend it wisely.” (C1) 
“I think it's more informal. What makes me say that? I think it's 
because there is that gap between people putting the money in and 
when decisions are being made. I think it is less formal like a 
stakeholder or shareholder you buy, you have a voice. You got to vote 
and that's very important. By putting money into a charity, you're 
voting anyway by helping that's almost like a shareholder, isn't it? 
Your decision is to help donkeys or school children whatever. You've 
given that decision but what you don't get is a decision how that money 
is being spent. You almost lose your voting right once you put your 
money in that's your vote over. Whereas as a shareholder, you put 
your money in and you have votes on how that is spent. It's that angle 
which is interesting.” (A3) 
The relationship with the staff and the volunteers is unique to the not-for-
profit sector as they contribute to the charity sector without being based on a 
contract (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009), was stressed to be informal: 
“With certain stakeholders, it's very formal because I've defined 
stakeholders as being quite large. With the regulator, with the 
Commission, with HMRC it's very formal. With their beneficiaries, it 
may be very informal. With their staff who are also stakeholders, it 
may be very informal.” (A1)  
The respondents observed that formal relationships are based either on law or 
on contracts, especially agreements made with grant providers (Laughlin, 
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1990). The difference between funds that are restricted and unrestricted and 
how they can be applied and used and therefore a stricter monitoring was also 
stressed.  The respondents argued that formal relations are limited mostly to 
the regulators, auditors and large donors: 
“I think a community charity that's working on the ground is going to 
be a very informal place to work, but perhaps a very large 
international NGO-type charity operates a bit more like a government 
department. I think it just varies enormously. (RW5)” 
It is interesting to note that the three answers given as ‘formal’ were from 
beneficiaries and donors who argued that there is too much paperwork; and 
one respondent who was also a beneficiary abstained from answering: 
“The relationship between me and the National Trust is that I am a 
member, one of million and if I want to do anything or say anything, 
I will have to write or email or whatever.” (B6)  
Overall, informal accountability and relationships are found to be leading 
over formal accountability, especially in terms of donors and beneficiaries. 
Too much informality is also argued by the respondents to be harmful for 
accountability to be discharged. The findings of this section show that charity 
sector accountability is communal rather than contractual (Laughlin, 1990). 
Figure 6.3 depicts the views of respondents regarding the accountability 
relationship between the charities and the stakeholders: 
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Figure	6.3	Formal/Informal	Relationships	
6.1.5 How	should	charity	stakeholders	interact?	
The interaction and the frequency of the relationship among the charity 
stakeholders themselves was also examined. It was found that the interaction 
was very weak or even non-existent. Nearly all stakeholders stated that they 
do not interact with other charity stakeholders. Although larger donors were 
found to be more interested engaging with the beneficiaries, the engagement 
between donors and beneficiaries, the two most important charity 
stakeholders, was very limited (Manne, 1999), and some respondents even 
argued that it would be surprising for donors and beneficiaries to come 
together: 
“As a beneficiary I’m unlikely to get in touch with any of those.” (B6) 
 “No, I don't interact with anybody except by giving some money and 
a tiny bit of my time. I'm not a big donor to charities.” (D9) 
Auditors argued that it is not their role to engage with other stakeholders. It 
was also posited by other stakeholders that auditors were expected to interact 
mainly with executive and the trustees and not with the other stakeholders. 
Auditors could be seen not as a stakeholder but as a compliance tool: 
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“We tend to have very little involvement as auditors with the funders 
and with the beneficiaries.… From a purely charity audit perspective, 
as an auditor I will only tend to speak to the trustees and the staff 
because auditors are there to make sure that the financial statements 
are true and fair.” (A4) 
“I interact in many ways. I interact with the management. I interact 
with the board. I sometimes interact with the funders. I very rarely 
interact with the beneficiaries as an auditor” (A1) 
Some respondents suggested that the interaction among charity stakeholders 
depends very much on the type of charity and whether the charity enables 
those interactions and conversations to happen, amongst different 
stakeholders or whether it kind of channels the interactions and conversations 
among the stakeholders itself. Only in very small communities, where 
everyone knows everyone else, do donors seem to interact with the 
beneficiaries directly. The respondents suggested that donor-beneficiary 
interaction would be more difficult due to an extensive number of 
stakeholders. It was also posited that the lack of one-on-one relationships 
between donors and beneficiaries creates an opportunistic behaviour to take 
place.  
Overall, there seems to be virtually no relationship between donors and 
auditors/regulators or most importantly between donors and beneficiaries 
(Stewart, 1984) so the beneficiaries are largely left to themselves: 
“Of course, there is this issue about bringing donors together with 
beneficiaries because often they're from very different worlds and it's 
not a natural mix, so maybe there's an issue there. Also even bringing 
charities together with donors in case those charities on a fundraising 
mission with the donors. There are certain, I think, barriers.” (RW5)  
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6.2 Understanding	Ownership	and	Stakeholder	Salience	in	the	Charity	
Sector	
In line with research question 1b, this section discusses the ownership 
structure and stakeholder salience in the charity sector. The aim is to provide 
in depth information about the task environment dynamics in the charity 
sector. Understanding better the organisational structure and stakeholder 
dynamics of the sector clarifies the fraud phenomenon in the charity sector.  
Theorisation of accountability and governance was discussed in Chapter 3. It 
was argued there that theories developed for the for-profit sector are 
inadequate in explaining the dynamics of the charity sector. This situation is 
especially true for fraud, a phenomenon that has many dimensions to be 
assessed. Therefore in line with the recent literature (Caers et al., 2006; Du 
Bois et al., 2009; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012) an 
integrated theory is utilised in the study. With the use of integrated theory, 
agency theory is augmented with elements from the stewardship and 
stakeholder theories to allow assessment of the multi-principal environment 
exhibited by the charity sector.  
The integrated theory is also the basis of using mixed methods as 
methodology and especially for justifying inclusion of stakeholder interviews 
to the study. As most of the previous fraud studies centred around agency 
theory and quantitative analysis, integrated theory allows a broader focus, by 
including stakeholders as a crucial part of understanding fraud in the charity 
sector.   
The concept of stakeholder was elaborated in Chapter 2. Stakeholder theory 
was developed to extend shareholder focused organisational theories. The 
theory briefly acknowledges the importance of stakeholders of an 
organisation, a group or groups of structures or people who have stakes in an 
organisation. The diversity of stakeholders also necessitates the identification 
and prioritisation of them. Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder salience theory 
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allows stakeholders to be ranked in order of priority in terms of the attributes 
of power, legitimacy and urgency. The study uses stakeholder salience theory 
in order to understand which stakeholder group or groups are seen to be more 
crucial for the charity sector.  
The findings suggest that the charity sector has multiple principals rather than 
a definitive owner as in the for-profit sector (Jegers, 2009). The ambiguity of 
the ownership indicates that none of the stakeholders, internal or external, can 
dominate charity sector governance. The findings also imply that the 
monitoring function, fulfilled by the shareholders in the for-profit sector, is 
missing or ineffective, which facilitates opportunistic behavior in the charity 
sector.  
The findings also justify the use of integrated theory as they suggest that the 
concepts of ‘agent’, ‘steward’ and ‘principal’ are not precise, as in the case of 
the for-profit sector. The complexity of the ownership structure therefore 
makes it necessary not to focus on the principal-agent relationship but rather 
to undertake a broader stakeholder analysis.  
The section also suggests that the charity sector lacks one definitive 
stakeholder that strongly possesses power, legitimacy and urgency at the 
same time. The interviews indicate that the charity sector has a dynamic 
stakeholder saliency unlike the for-profit sector in which shareholders are 
attributed to be the definitive stakeholder (Cordery and Baskerville, 2005). 
Donors were found to be the primary stakeholder, if not the definitive one, as 
most respondents suggested that they possess power the most, one of the 
highest in terms of legitimacy and urgency in case of information. Other 
important stakeholders were found to be the trustees and the regulators. 
Although the findings suggest that, the beneficiaries are the leading 
stakeholder in terms of urgency and on a par with donors and regulators in 
terms of legitimacy, they are inadequate in possessing power over the 
charities.  
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6.2.1 Ownership	
The lack of ownership was identified by the literature as exacerbating the 
difficulty of oversight and therefore causing future problems (Zack, 2003). 
The topic of ownership was found the most interesting by the respondents. 
Interviewees paused to think about the answer and expressed that they have 
not thought about and how important and how complicated it is for the charity 
sector. 
Answers to the question of who owns a charity included: the public, the 
founder, the trustees, the donors, the beneficiaries, no one. Some respondents 
posited that everybody is a custodian of the charity rather than an owner. The 
organisational existence of the charities was also questioned by some 
respondents, who argued that society owns charities and therefore charities 
are neither companies nor the state:  
“The charities aren't owned by anybody. What you have is the board 
of trustees who control the assets of the charity and hold it in trust. 
Strictly speaking, charities aren't owned by anybody.” (RW3) 
“In theory, it's owned by everyone because it benefits everyone. In 
practice, and that's why I was hesitating, ownership should be 
invested in the trustees.” (C4) 
The most frequent response was ‘trustees’ which was preferred by about one 
third of the interviewees. These respondents argued that trustees are the 
owners because they control the charity and responsible for the strategy, but 
they are also the ethos, the drive and the energy of the charity. The 
respondents stated that the trustees were putting their liability and their 
reputation for the sake of the charity’s success: 
“The trustees own the charity. It’s their responsibility to ensure that 
the charity operates to its charitable objectives and meets its 
charitable objectives” (B1) 
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Respondents who identified donors as the owners justified this by stating that 
donors are the real force and the source of funding for the charities to exist, 
especially if the donors are deciding where and how their donations would be 
spent. Beneficiaries were also another group with frequent answers, as they 
were regarded to be the only people that can benefit from a charity and the 
reason why charities exist: 
“Well, I think, I still say it's the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are the 
owners of the charity, technically they are not but to me they are. The 
money is held in trust to benefit them, and if it doesn't then we 
shouldn't be doing it.” (C9) 
Two other questions asked if the interviewees saw the board of the trustees 
and the managers as the agents or the stewards of the principal (owner). The 
answers were mixed, unlike those for the for-profit sector (Ebrahim, 2003b). 
In respect to the board of trustees, while some argued that there are no 
principals, the trustees were either regarded as being the principal or the agent 
or the steward, therefore the stewards was not the major answer for the 
question. The answers for the managers also was in contradiction with the 
classical view of the agency theory where managers are believed to be the 
agents of the principal (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Although the managers 
were answered as being agents slightly more than being the stewards, there 
was no unanimity and the results supports the work of  (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2013; Nikolova, 2014; Caers et al., 2006; Du Bois et al., 2009) that the charity 
sector is more complicated and no clear cut for-profit theory can explain the 
dynamics of the sector (Brown and Guo, 2010; Perego and Verbeeten, 2015): 
 “If you have an agent, you have to have a principal, and there's no 
principal so you can't have an agent. Agent for whom?” (D3) 
“They're a little of both.” (C6) 
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Overall, it was found that the charity sector lacks a ‘definitive owner’ and that 
the sector is built up of multiple owners.  The answers proved that the charity 
sector lacks an owner relationship and the answers are in line with Edwards 
and Hulme (1995) and Van Puyvelde’s (2012) multiple principal approach.  
6.2.2 Stakeholder	Salience	
One of the questions asked the interviewees to rank stakeholders in terms of 
their power, urgency and legitimacy as in line with the stakeholder salience 
theory of Mitchell et al. (1997). Previous studies that employed the 
stakeholder salience theory conducted interviews generally at the 
management level. Agle et al. (1999) and Viveros (2016) assessed 
stakeholder attributes  by  interviews conducted with the CEOs and managers, 
respectively. The answers provided some very interesting and useful 
responses, as Table 6.1 depicts the respondents’ responses regarding the 
components of power, urgency and legitimacy: 
Table	6.1	Stakeholder	Salience	
 Donors Beneficiaries Regulators Trustees Managers/
Staff 
Auditors Total 
Power 15 0 9 13 4 0 41 
Legitimacy 11 11 11 7 1 0 41 
Urgency 10 19 4 8 0 0 41 
Total 36 30 24 28 5 0 123 
While beneficiaries were posited to be legitimate and for most stakeholders 
are the ones whose needs are urgent, none of the respondents stated that they 
possess power. The answers also proved that, although the charities exist to 
meet the needs of the beneficiaries, beneficiaries lack voice which they can 
talk to charities and power to direct or influence the policies of the charities:  
“For me I would place the beneficiary as the top, not in terms of 
power, because they have very little power, but in terms of which 
stakeholders charities should prioritise, they exist for the benefit of 
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their beneficiaries. That's why they should be there but they have very 
little power.” (A4) 
 “I feel like I'm unable to critique them necessarily because of the 
power relationship that comes with donation versus recipient. Does 
that make sense? They all hold the cards. They can cut off my funding. 
I can't do anything to them.” (B4)  
“We don't have the power to know. I mean even if we had the power, 
what are we supposed to do?” (B3) 
Some respondents also separated larger and smaller charities and therefore 
their relationship with the stakeholders. It was argued that, whereas in larger 
charities management and staff are powerful, the powerful role switches to 
the trustees in smaller charities. The donors were posited to be powerful as, 
if people do not put money in, a charity will be deprived of sources and 
therefore will not function. Overall, in terms of power, the trustees and the 
donors were classified as possessing power followed by the regulator:  
“In terms of power may be the donors come first because they chose 
who gets the money.” (A3) 
Legitimacy also had mixed responses, with the donors, regulator and the 
beneficiaries chosen the most: 
“The donors probably have more power and the urgency is for 
beneficiaries and then the regulators and other organisations have 
the legitimacy.” (D3) 
“The most legitimate, I would have thought that would be 
beneficiaries because they are the ones that the charities had to help”. 
(A6). 
218	|	P a g e 	
	
For urgency, beneficiaries was the first answer for the majority of the 
respondents: 
“In terms of physical or social needs, it's going to be the beneficiary. 
I think the urgency for the regulators, the trustees, to some extent, the 
executive, only really comes in when there's a problem or some sense 
of crisis. Whereas really, it shouldn't be running on a regular urgent 
basis.” (RW5) 
Another interesting point was the lack of ‘accountant/auditor’ answers 
provided by the respondents. It confirms that accountant/auditors were not 
seen as stakeholders but rather as an external force that keeps to things in 
balance (Keating and Frumkin, 2003).  
The findings matched with the previous studies where especially larger 
funders/donors were the primary stakeholder and the most effective and 
powerful one, to whom accountability has to be discharged (Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013a; Ebrahim, 2003b; Jetty and Beattie, 2009). Although 
beneficiaries seem to be catching up with donors, they lack legal or economic 
power, and the difficulty in measuring and then discharging accountability to 
beneficiaries means that they lag behind (Connolly and Hyndman, 2013a).  
6.3 Conclusion	
This chapter examined the ownership, stakeholder salience and accountability 
dynamics in the charity sector. First the chapter reviewed the accountability 
dynamics in the charity sector. Than ownership problem in the charity sector 
is elaborated which provided interesting findings. Mitchell et al.’s stakeholder 
salience was also utilised to understand the most salient stakeholder in the 
charity sector. 
The interviews revealed that respondents regarded donors and beneficiaries 
as the leading stakeholders. Despite this, the discharge of accountability does 
not target the beneficiaries and therefore seems not to be satisfying 
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beneficiaries, and their demands for more basic information are not met. 
Stakeholders demand more understandable and more inclusive information 
for the discharge of accountability rather than simply more information. 
Accountability relationships with two key stakeholders, namely donors and 
beneficiaries, were found to be predominantly informal. In line with the 
arguments of Stewart (1984) and Laughlin (1990), accountability towards 
charity stakeholders seems to be very weak or even non-existent. 
The findings indicated that the lack of residual claimants and of explicit 
identification of ownership makes it harder for not-for-profit organisations to 
be monitored and for accountability to be discharged effectively, as also 
suggested by Van Pyvelde et al. (2012). The interviews suggested that, unlike 
the for-profit sector where shareholders are the ‘definitive’ stakeholder, a 
‘definitive’ stakeholder is much less clear in the charity sector. Like Cordery 
and Baskerville (2005, p.14-15), it was found that, whereas donors have 
power, beneficiaries remain in the discretionary or dependent categories as 
they lack the power to oversee charities. 
 The findings of this chapter suggest that an examination of stakeholders is 
crucial to understand the fraud problem in the charity sector. Therefore, the 
findings of this chapter will form the basis for the discussion in Chapters 7 
and 8 regarding reasons to fraud, solutions for fraud and stakeholder 
oversight. 
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7. CAUSES	OF	FRAUD	IN	THE	CHARITY	SECTOR	
This is the second chapter which presents findings from the qualitative part 
of the research. The chapter analyses the interviews conducted with the 
regulator/watchdog organisations, charity officials, auditor/accountants, 
donors and beneficiaries. The chapter focuses on the charity stakeholders’ 
perception of causes of fraud in the charity sector. Research question 1c 
examines what fraud means to the stakeholders, including comparisons with 
the for-profit and public sectors. Research question 1d assesses the reasons 
for fraud identified by the charity stakeholders.  
The chapter utilises the literature which was analysed in the Chapters 3 and 4 
especially. The term ‘fraud’ in the charity sector is assessed in comparison 
with the for-profit and public sectors. Charity stakeholders’ opinions on 
causes of fraud are discussed in the context of previous studies on fraud 
theories (Cressey, 1953) and of the not-for-profit sector fraud studies  
(Greenlee et al., 2007).  
The chapter is designed in accordance with the research questions. Thus, 
section 7.1 assesses the identification of fraud in the charity sector, section 
7.2 focuses on the causes of fraud in the charity sector.  
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Figure	7.1	Structure	of	Chapter	7	
7.1 Identification	of	fraud	in	the	charity	sector	
This section presents the findings regarding charity stakeholders’ perceptions 
of three issues: (a) fraud, both as a general concept and with specific reference 
to charities, (b) vulnerability of the charity sector compared to other sectors, 
and (c) which charities are more likely to be vulnerable to fraud.  
 
The term ‘fraud’ and its legal definitions were discussed in Chapter 4. 
Because charities are dependent on their stakeholders, stakeholders’ 
understandings of fraud are crucial in deepening the analysis. Conducting 
interviews with charity stakeholders who have not previously been assessed 
in detail in fraud studies (Trompeter et al., 2014) was therefore important. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, not-for-profit organisations are more vulnerable to 
fraud compared to for-profit sector organisations, and not-for-profit 
organisations have much to lose (Zack, 2003).  
 
The interviews with the stakeholders regarding how they identify fraud found 
that stakeholders are aware of the risk of fraud and that fraud is known to take 
place. It was also found that donors and beneficiaries were less likely than 
other stakeholders to agree that the charity sector is more vulnerable to fraud. 
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The most important and distinctive vulnerability of the charity sector is found 
to be excessive trust towards the charities. It was found that good intentions 
of the charity stakeholders were exploited when fraud takes place.  Overseas 
charities and charities which rely on cash transactions were found to be those 
most vulnerable to fraud. Charities that lack donor oversight and small 
charities were also identified to be slightly more prone to fraud. The findings 
of the section were taken into account when identification of fraud variables 
was conducted in Chapter 9.  
7.1.1 Understanding	fraud	
In order to provide an insight into the perception of fraud21, the interviewees 
were asked what they understood by “fraud” in terms of charities. Although 
the answers varied from a single sentence to comprehensive and detailed 
explanations of fraud, it was possible to identify the key descriptions.   
The answers were in line with the concept of ‘occupational fraud’ (ACFE, 
2019), with less emphasis on corruption but more on asset misappropriation 
and financial statement fraud. Table 7.1 summarises the terms (words and 
expressions) used to describe and classify fraud. 
Table	7.1	Terms	used	to	describe	and	classify	fraud	
Terms used to describe fraud Terms used to classify fraud 
theft, stealing, abuse of position,  
misappropriation, misrepresentation, 
deliberate action for personal 
Corruption Asset 
Misappropria
tion 
Financial 
Statement 
Fraud 
                                                
21 External fraud, fraud committed by e-fraud, hacking, robbery, is not specifically the topic 
of the thesis. The study does not relate to someone who is not related with a charity by any 
means. 
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gain/benefit, obtaining money 
illegally through illegal means, 
wrongdoing, burglary, robbery, 
reputational harm caused by a 
criminal act, embezzlement, 
manipulating figures to achieve 
another objective, putting in bogus 
expenses claims, transfer of funds in 
an unlawful manner, failure to 
disclose information and false 
representation, misusing your power 
for your own benefit 
corruption theft of cash, 
misapplication 
and misuse of 
resources, 
illegal capture 
of money or 
goods, 
fictitious and 
overstated 
expenses, 
inventory 
misuse 
financial 
irregularity, 
manipulating 
figures, failure 
to disclose 
information and 
false 
representation, 
overstated 
expenses 
Fraud awareness was high among the respondents: nearly all respondents 
were aware that fraud was happening in the charity sector on a daily basis and 
is harmful for the whole sector. Small donors and beneficiaries defined fraud 
in simple terms, while officials from the regulator, watchdog organisations 
and larger charities, as well as auditor-accountants and larger donors, 
referenced legal definitions such as the Fraud Act 2006: 
“Altering data, systems and processes to show false information” 
(D3) 
“I would define fraud as an individual being able to obtain resources 
from a third party in a dishonest deceptive manner.”(A5) 
“At very low level if you've got staff who are going into an 
organisation and taking pens home, taking paper home, photocopying 
without any knowledge and charging their mobile phones, that can 
actually be determined as fraud if you want to take it to the end 
degree.” (B1) 
It is important to note that most, if not all, respondents were aware that fraud 
may comprise not only monetary misuse but also false representation, failing 
to disclose information and abuse of position.  
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7.1.2 Fraud	in	charities	compared	with	other	sectors	
As one of the aims of this study is to assess the organisational factors related 
to fraud specific to the charity sector, the interviewees were also asked if 
charity sector fraud had any differences compared with that in the public and 
for-profit sectors. Most of the respondents did not believe that the problem is 
hugely different compared to other sectors. They thought that the basic reason 
and the ways in which fraud is committed are much the same:  
“Charities can be hurt by the same kind of fraud that hurts any other 
kind of organisation. I guess the main difference between a charity and 
other types of organisations are some of the unique attributes that the 
charity sector has. So, the fact that the charity sector has fundraising, 
the fact that it relies on donors, the types of environment that it might 
be working in, the types of projects creates some unique vulnerabilities. 
But these vulnerabilities can also exist in other sectors as well, it is just 
how they manifest themselves really. So I don’t think charities are 
heavily different from other entities, but they are different because of 
how the money comes and how it is used.” (RW1) 
Some interviewees believed that charities will not be defrauded because they 
have good intentions. A few of the respondents stated that to commit fraud 
against a charity would be considered more morally corrupt than against the 
public sector and the for-profit sector. Charity staff were thought to have 
better attitudes: people do not work in the charity sector for their own personal 
benefit but rather to bring good to the wider public. Some respondents stated 
that people who work for charities are very surprised to hear that charity staff 
commit fraud: 
“Because the charity sector labours under an ‘illusion’ that fraud 
does not exist, based on the fact they say to themselves, “we are a 
charity so who will commit fraud against us?” And the answer is 
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overwhelmingly the charities’ own staff. 80% to 90% fraud in 
charities is committed internally.” (C1)  
Some respondents also suggested that the relative paucity of funds and 
resource in the charity sector deters fraudsters from acting opportunistically 
as there is less to gain. On the other hand, respondents also stressed that the 
weaker controls in the charity sector work in the opposite way because 
fraudsters believe that charities are easier targets. Another important feature 
of the sector identified by respondents in terms of fraud was the existence of 
‘sham charitable organisations’: those which are not authorised fundraisers or 
are not charities but are formed solely to solicit donations in a fraudulent way: 
 “When you have a small non-profit, very often the two or three people 
that are running it, have a real heart for the mission, they're really 
close to it and they try to do that genuinely unless they started the non-
profit out of this whole idea of, "It's an opportunity for me to be 
fraudulent, I never wanted it to be a charity in the first place but it is 
my vehicle to acquire resources" and then obviously it’s a whole 
different ballgame.” (RW4) 
Overall, respondents stated that charity sector fraud was different because of 
the sectoral differences that lead to fraud. The most important differences 
were found to be: different mission and goals, looser regulation, an 
environment of cooperation rather than competition, and income based on 
non-mutual funds.  
7.1.3 Are	charities	more	vulnerable	than	other	organisations?	
The interviewees were asked whether the charity sector is more vulnerable to 
fraud than the for-profit and the public sectors. More than half of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that the charity sector is much more 
vulnerable than the other sectors.  
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No respondent posited that the charity sector is less prone to fraud than other 
sectors. The respondents who did not state that the charity sector is more 
vulnerable to fraud argued that fraud affects every sector in some way or 
another and they could not find a reason why the charity sector should be an 
exception. Some respondents argued that the characteristics of the 
perpetrators and the cultures within each organisation, rather than those of the 
whole sector, are more crucial in enabling fraud. Half of the beneficiaries and 
donors rejected the view that charities are more vulnerable to fraud, arguing 
that it is the for-profit sector that is more vulnerable and less trustworthy: 
“No there is more chance in the private sector and less chance in the 
charity sector because there is no money in the charities. They all give 
it to us” (B5) 
“Actually better scrutinised in the not-for-profit sector because 90% 
of people working for the voluntary and not-for-profit sector are 
trying to follow the objectives of their organisation.” (D9) 
Several reasons were stated as why the charity sector is vulnerable. While 
some respondents argued that the whole sector lacked effective control and 
processes and procedures and therefore is vulnerable, other respondents 
posited that the laid-back attitude of stakeholders exacerbated the fraud 
problem in the sector, creating gaps in the system that can be exploited by the 
fraudsters. Only a few of the larger charities have counter-fraud departments, 
whereas in the for-profit sector this is standard practice, especially for large 
entities. Lower remuneration in the charity sector compared to the for-profit 
sector was also identified by some respondents as a reason why a few charity 
officials find illicit ways to augment their income.  
‘Excessive trust’ - belief that those involved with charities would not do 
terrible things because they are trustworthy and nice people  - was suggested 
by many respondents to be one of the most important vulnerabilities leading 
to fraud in the charity sector. The respondents argued that the level of trust in 
227	|	P a g e 	
	
the for-profit sector is low and therefore the controls are harsher whereas the 
excessive and unconditional trust towards charities makes them seem to be an 
easier target for the perpetrators. It was also posited by some respondents that 
charities seem to care less about procedures and policies and these are not 
often put in place because the sector is reliant on trust: 
“That's why fraud is taking advantage there because it’s easy to take 
advantage of somebody when they trust you. It’s a fact, it's human 
nature.”(B7) 
Some respondents also posited that tighter oversight in the for-profit sector 
and efficient rules and procedures in the public sector brought the charity 
sector to the forefront for being more vulnerable. Less rigorous regulatory 
control and administration of the charity sector are argued by some 
respondents to be vulnerabilities of the charity sector that elevate the risk of 
fraud.  Lack of an exchange contract in most cases between the charities and 
the donors was also stated as one of the factors which contribute to the 
vulnerability of the sector:  
“There is not necessarily a reason for establishing a relationship 
between what the charity is provided and what the income should be. 
So you can very easily get the income diverted. So someone gives a 
donation of £10,000, it is possible to divert that income unless there 
is proper control. And there would be nothing else to match with it. 
Because there is no sales invoice, ledger or any other documents.” 
(A1) 
Donors were criticised by other stakeholders for donating without questioning 
enough what their donation is used for (Berman and Davidson, 2003). Charity 
officials, whether trustees, managers or volunteers, were argued to find it hard 
to believe that charities would be targeted by fraudsters, and therefore are 
unwilling to challenge the charities to prevent fraud in the first place. One 
respondent observed that there were two important issues: 
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 “One is accountability or lack of, and the other is trust and abundance 
of. The charity sector, the trust is the lubricant that gets everything 
done. I trust you, you’re nice, I’m nice, I trust you, you trust me, we’re 
a charity so who can do fraud against us? As a supervisor, you could 
sound too busy and important and you could do what you like and so it 
goes on.” (C1) 
Overall, the respondents’ answers are in line with previous literature 
(Gibelman and Gelman, 2001; Ohalehi, 2019) that the vulnerability of 
charities towards fraud and financial crime is high. It is found that the charity 
sector provides an opportunity for fraud to take place in charities because the 
sector is believed to be much more trustworthy.  
7.1.4 Which	charities	are	more	vulnerable?	
Asking the interviewees about the type of charities that are much more 
vulnerable to fraud received mixed results. Unlike Archambeault et al. (2015), 
who found prevalence of fraud in the health and human services sectors, 
respondents in the present study did not mention a specific sector where fraud 
is more often seen. Some interviewees posited that ‘vulnerability’ cannot be 
attributed to a specific type of charity but rather it has more to do with the 
people who run them or their internal policies, procedures and practices, and 
how charities are governed. 
Respondents stated that, while small charities are targeted because they might 
not have the infrastructure and control environment to be alert to fraud, larger 
charities may be defrauded because frauds involving small amounts may well 
not be noticed in the grand scheme of things. Fraud in smaller charities was 
posited to be overlooked, especially by the donors: 
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“From my perspective as the funder to be honest, I'm less worried 
about that because we're talking about small amounts of money.” 
(D4) 
Although a slight majority of respondents suggested that smaller (Keating et 
al., 2005; Kummer et al., 2015; Petrovits et al., 2011) and fundraising 
charities (McDonnell and Rutherford, 2018; Ohalehi, 2019) were more 
vulnerable than larger and grant receiving charities, there was general 
agreement that charities operating internationally and those more likely to use 
cash were more prone to fraud. Cash was mentioned by the respondents as 
hard to track compared to bank transactions and therefore posited to enable 
illegal activities. International charities were underlined as the perfect place 
for fraud to take place because of operating in really challenging 
environments and across several geographic locations where oversight and 
technical capacity is lower than in the UK: 
“I think where you see most of the problems is where there is a long 
gap between the money and the deliverables. How do you check that 
fresh water wells have been dug in Central Africa, boots on the 
ground, get out there and look, are photographs and reports enough, 
can you trust them.  It's how, how do you see the collaboration that 
the money has been well spent. Because if it's in the UK, you can 
wander out, you can see something's been done, that's easy. If it’s 
money going into Aleppo, good luck in being able to account how 
many people have received their medicines. But each has its own 
challenges, that's the problem.” (A3) 
7.2 Causes	and	red	flags	of	fraud	
In line with research question 1d, causes of fraud identified by the charity 
stakeholders are assessed in this section. Categorisation and analysis of 
previous studies on not-for-profit sector fraud found that lack of effective 
control mechanisms contributed to fraud occurring (Fremont-Smith and 
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Kosaras, 2003; Kummer et al., 2015; Petrovits et al., 2011).  Perpetrators of 
fraud were also assessed which provided useful information of the identity of 
the fraudsters (Greenlee et al., 2007; Holtfreter, 2008). 
This section utilises fraud theories in order to explain reasons for fraud. 
Cressey’s fraud triangle theory (1953), a three-component model which 
explains the causes of occupational fraudulent behaviour in terms of 
opportunity, rationalisation and pressure, became the progenitor of 
subsequent fraud models (Albrecht et al., 1984; Marks, 2009; Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004). Later fraud models tried to enhance the fraud triangle by 
either amending the components or adding new components to the triangle. 
The findings from the interviews have provided important contributions to 
the existing literature. For both small and large charities, the lack of a control 
environment and oversight were identified by the respondents as the major 
reasons for fraud. Other important causes were found to be segregation of 
duties for smaller charities and insufficient policy and organisational culture 
for larger charities. A dominant founder, missing documentation and 
excessive use of cash were highlighted as some of the important red flags for 
a possible fraudulent charity. In terms of perpetrators of charity fraud, the 
findings suggest that higher level personnel, especially those who have a 
power to control monetary transactions and finance, were likely to be the 
main perpetrators of a fraud in the charity sector. 
The findings also shed light on the fraud theories and Cressey’s (1953) fraud 
triangle in particular. Compared to pressure and rationalisation, opportunity 
was found to be the leading component that explains fraudulent behaviour in 
the charity sector. The findings from the interviews correspond to the 
argument of Dorminey et al. (2012) that the components of pressure and 
rationalisation have less to offer in explaining fraudulent behaviour compared 
to opportunity. It was also found that, because the charity sector creates a 
special trustworthiness problem which leads to the opportunity to be targeted 
by fraudsters, the sector can be seen as a ‘bad crop’ as suggested by 
231	|	P a g e 	
	
Ramamoorti et al. (2009). The findings support the argument of Dorminey et 
al. (2012) that the charity sector is targeted purposefully by ‘predators’ or 
people who are inclined to commit fraud. As discussed in section 7.1.3, 
excessive trust in the charity sector and belief of no wrongdoing contribute to 
the opportunities to be realised by the fraudsters.       
The findings were also important in identifying possible variables that could 
be used in the quantitative analysis (see Chapter 9). The findings made it 
necessary to focus more on the governance structure of charities such as the 
board of trustees and other existing oversight mechanisms.  
7.2.1 Causes	of	fraud	
Interviewees gave a variety of reasons for why fraud happens in the charity 
sector. Many rrespondents had witnessed actual frauds or had information 
about fraud in charities. Therefore, answers reflected not only theoretical but 
more so real-world experiences of fraud in the charity sector. 
Why fraud happens in the charity sector was one of the areas which 
respondents discussed extensively and provided a variety of reasons. Table 
7.2 shows the causes of fraud suggested by various respondents, which have 
been divided into internal and external organisational causes of fraud: 
Table	7.2	Internal	and	external	causes	of	fraud	
Internal Causes of Fraud External Causes of Fraud 
absence of segregation of duties, poor 
leadership at the top, lack of awareness and 
culture, lack of appropriate policies and 
procedures, not having the right knowledge 
and skills for proper oversight, lack of 
resources and staff, lack of transparency, 
excessive use of cash in transactions, 
autocratic founders and management, weak 
internal controls and oversight 
weak external controls and oversight, 
fraudsters targeting specially charities, lack 
of legislation and sanctions 
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Important factors paving the way for opportunistic behaviour included 
deficiencies in organisational culture, which inhibited establishing the 
environment and providing the awareness to deter and prevent fraud, along 
with insufficient policies to tackle fraud. Tolerant behaviour that appears to 
be innocuous but is not in accordance with the organisation’s policies is 
argued to cause more serious problems especially for the larger charities. 
Insufficient whistleblowing was also mentioned by the respondents as an 
explanation for the lack of criticism of wrongdoing in charities. The 
importance of ‘tone at the top’ and ethical conduct of senior staff was also 
underlined as it was posited that, if the ‘leaders’ are setting the right culture, 
then there will be less opportunity for fraud to occur: 
 “I think so much of it is down to culture. If leaders don't exhibit the 
behaviours that mean that-- and we've all seen things where controls, 
auditors come in and controls are talked about and eyebrows are 
raised. If you get that tone from the top where this is just seen as a 
nuisance, it's not adding any value, then that just creates a cascade of 
people thinking, "Well, I don't need to worry about this. I don't need to 
behave in this way," and then, at some point, somebody says, "Hang on. 
If that's the case, I can maybe get away with this.” (A4) 
Structural problems such as the presence of a strong founder and a lack of 
segregation of duties were also discussed (Loebbecke et al., 1989). Loading 
too many functions on one person is argued to give that person too much 
power and may allow opportunistic behaviour. Absence of segregation of 
duties was especially a problem for the smaller charities due to insufficient 
staff and resources. Strong personality and a dominant individual, which was 
the case in Kids Company, coupled with an abnormal turnover of other 
positions, were underlined as problematic. Absence of adequate staff and 
systems for handling cash was also argued to enable fraud especially in 
smaller charities.  A board of trustees with members belonging to the same 
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family or having close ties with each other is also seen by respondents to be 
another reason of fraud.  
Fraudsters’ motives were also stressed as reasons of fraud, especially by the 
donors and beneficiaries. Greed, financial problems, revenge, and lack of 
satisfaction in the work, were mentioned (Albrecht et al., 1984; Sorunke, 
2016). Habitual criminal behaviour was also mentioned by the respondents, 
in accordance with the idea of the fraudsters being predators, suggested by 
Dorminey et al. (2012). It was also found that the charity sector itself is a 
reason for fraud to happen as the sector’s trustworthiness creates the 
opportunity to be targeted by fraudsters (Ramamoorti et al., 2009). Charities, 
both genuine and sham, which had been set up purely to facilitate fraud and 
people whose whole life is built around fraud and are motivated to extract 
money for whatever purposes were also mentioned by the respondents: 
“ The charity sector might attract a certain type of person. People who 
does not have the most honourable intentions might actively seek out 
the charity sector for that particular reason, having the weak controls 
and weak governance, and the charity sector create mire opportunity 
for the people who want to take advantage.” (RW1) 
“Because people are opportunist. They want to grab the benefits and it 
is easier to escape from charities. So opportunity plays an important 
role in fraud.” (B2) 
Some respondents also highlighted a lack of interest on the part of trustees, 
who were thought to have insufficient day-to-day involvement, as trusteeship 
was seen as a hobby rather than a proper duty.  Respondents also suggested 
that there were not enough board of trustee meetings and committees. This is 
argued to lead to breach of trust between the board of trustees and the 
management, which is reflected in lack of proper oversight.  
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In terms of external reasons, some respondents highlighted insufficiency of 
sanctions, the regulator being deprived of resources and determination, and 
regulation being only effective on larger charities: 
“I think with Kids Company, it was known for several years 
beforehand that there were issues in that particular charity. Maybe 
this refers back to the previous comment about not having a regulator 
with enough resource or teeth to do anything.” (RW5) 
All stakeholder groups (especially auditors/accountants, who were 
unanimous on this issue) mentioned lack of effective control, including both 
internal and external oversight, as a cause of fraud. Control was used as an 
umbrella term comprising more than just internal and external audit. 
Respondents believed that the control function should be performed by a wide 
range of stakeholders, including the trustees, the managers, the staff and, if 
possible, donors and beneficiaries. The respondents argued that the frauds that 
are successful tend to be because of weak control environment, because the 
controls are not in place to prevent fraud in the first place and then 
subsequently the controls are not there to detect fraud. 
While internal audit was found to be practised just in the larger charities, 
small charities miss out on the benefits of both internal and external audit due 
to their low income. Respondents also mentioned the difference between 
larger and smaller charities, as it could be difficult in small charities with only 
a few people involved to have the same sort of control environment as larger 
charities:  
“I don’t look to see a red signal for a fraud but look to see the control 
environment. And if the control environment is weak, than I believe a 
fraud can happen, and I have a concern. I don’t look whether a fraud 
is happening. I look to see whether there is an environment that allows 
fraud to happen.” (A1) 
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“Another cause would be the control environment. So whether they're-
- If it's a weak controlling environment, then I think that could well be 
a cause and a trigger for someone to then go on and perpetrate a fraud. 
That could be because that creates an opportunity.” (A5)  
Overall, lack of segregation of duties was argued to be crucial for smaller 
charities, while lack of culture and policies were stated as the major factor 
that causes fraud in the larger charities. However for both small and large 
charities lack of control and oversight, which was highlighted previously by 
Gibelman and Gelman (2004), Fremont-Smith and Kosaras (2003), Holtfreter 
(2008) and Archambeault et al. (2015), was stated by the respondents as the 
major reason of fraud.  
7.2.2 Red	flags	of	fraud	
Interviewees were asked about how they develop suspicions about fraud, in 
particular the signals, or ‘red flags’ that might alert them to the possibility 
that fraud might be occurring. The red flags could be divided into three parts. 
The first group of red flags consists of conflicts of interest among charity 
officials or trustees or managers, the involvement of family members in the 
charity, the presence of a dominant founder who intervenes in every aspect of 
the charity, and control of the financial system of a charity by a single person. 
Several of these red flags could be observed in the case of Kids Company.  
Secondly, peculiarity in documentation was underlined by the respondents, 
such as missing or absent documents, problems in bank reconciliations, 
delays in submitting accounts, and lack of evidence of expenditure or missing 
paperwork. The use of fake domain names and personal email accounts were 
regarded as red flags for large charities.  
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Thirdly, the existence of financial irregularities, such as components of the 
budget being different from what had originally been reviewed, trading 
activity or disbursements which seem out of kilter with the size, scope or 
charitable aims of a charity, spending very little on charitable objectives and 
a lack of restricted funds and grants were seen as potential red flags. 
Accountants also mentioned annual accounts and financial measures as 
sometimes providing red flags of fraud, such as irregularities in the double-
entry bookkeeping system, excessive capital expenditure and payroll costs 
and excessive use of cash: 
“I would generally be looking for projects with heavy expenditures, 
that might be capital expenditure. It seemed capital expenditure is 
being used to hide fraud. That could be through, say, inflating an asset 
cost. Or otherwise it would be the classic expenses that go through an 
income and expenditure account or statement of financial activities. 
In a charity that could well be payroll. It could be charitable 
expenditure generally. Where there is a cost or an asset, the other side 
could be money leaking from a bank account.” (A5) 
Social behaviour, including behaviour that is not normal in an organisational 
sense, was also identified as a red flag for fraud: an example of this would be 
people not taking holidays.  
On the other hand, small donors and especially beneficiaries responded that 
they have little knowledge and power to detect problems. They stated that it 
is not their business to be aware of fraud and therefore abstained from 
clarifying a red flag: 
“I like to keep up current affairs and, if there is a problem and I 
wouldn’t be told, I would be informed from just the general press. That 
will be my only way. I don’t have regular personal communication 
with any of the charities that I give to. Other than not to find out 
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whether they are in trouble or not. I believe I will be informed from 
the press, the media.”  (D8) 
Overall a dominant founder, missing documentation and excessive use of 
cash were highlighted as some of the important red flags for a possible 
fraudulent charity.  
7.2.3 Who	commits	fraud?		
The interviewees were also asked who commits fraud in the charity sector. 
Previous studies assessed age, gender, profession, and education of the 
perpetrators (Holtfreter, 2008). As the study focuses more on stakeholders, 
stakeholder groups were assessed rather than individual characteristics such 
as age, gender, and profession. Answers included all types of charity officials 
including the trustees, managers, employees, charity shops and volunteers. 
Some respondents stated that fraud can occur as a result of a collusion among 
internal and/or external stakeholders. The respondents also posited that, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, somebody inside the charity may have helped 
somebody outside the charity to commit fraud.  However the management 
and especially the financial managers or people within a position of power 
and influence and who are directly involved with the finances of the charities 
(Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004), were mentioned the most (Greenlee et al. 
(2007): 
“We have seen it with CEOs, seen it with FDs, seen it with finance 
teams. I've seen it with program directors, seen it with volunteers, 
seen it with trustees. It could be anybody.” (A6) 
“People who are in power because the community selected or elected 
to govern the charity. So generally the people who govern the charity 
can commit fraud.” (B1) 
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7.2.4 Fraud	triangle	
The theorisation of fraud is used as a tool to understand basics of fraud. 
Taking into account the length of the interviews and especially technical 
limitations of the small donors and beneficiaries, the study aimed to utilise an 
understandable but functional theory. Therefore Cressey’s ‘fraud triangle 
theory’ (1953) was chosen for use in the study. 
Some previous studies also assessed the importance of each component in 
fraud occurrence. For example, Schuchter and Levi (2015) and Schuchter and 
Levi (2016) interviewed white-collar fraudsters in Switzerland and Austria 
and found that the perceived pressure is the most salient Fraud Triangle 
component. They also found that the opportunity component is essential for 
fraud to take place. Huang et al. (2017) also found, by employing surveys 
with academia and industry practitioners, that the rationalisation component 
is the least important and pressure is the most important component for fraud 
to take place. 
Mentioning the fraud triangle theory allowed the interviewees to have second 
thoughts on fraud in charities and led to more discussion on fraud. Although 
a very small number of respondents suggested that specific conditions for 
each charity are crucial, most considered that, among the three components 
of the triangle, opportunity was the leading factor that causes fraud in the 
charity sector.  
Respondents argued that assuming controls are robust, if the opportunity to 
commit fraud is limited then, even with the existence of pressure and 
rationalisation, fraud will not happen. Observability was another factor 
posited by the respondents, as pressure and the rationalisation were implied 
to be abstract and intangible facts and therefore hard to quantify, whereas 
opportunity is easily observed:  
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“- opportunity is the key, because it's observable, it's controllable, it 
depends on the amount of money you have. In other words, you have 
control over that one. What you don't have control over or less control 
over is people's motivation or their rationalisation.” (D2)  
While accountants/auditors stated unanimously that opportunity is the real 
factor that affects fraud in charities, it was also the leading factor among other 
stakeholder groups. The respondents stated that people probably would not 
even consider committing fraud unless they believe that there is a way of 
getting away with it without being caught: 
“It’s all about leave the keys to the door. I think that is the pivotal 
part. If that's locked down, and no matter what the pressure is on the 
person, no matter how they justify it, they can't get in. They can't 
commit the fraud. It’s having jewellery with no front door or window. 
For me it's all about opportunity.” (A3) 
Donors and beneficiaries also argued that people are opportunist and if charity 
officials know that they can do it, and they can get away with it than they will 
act opportunistically: 
“If they know that they can do it, and they can get away with it and if 
there's opportunity to do it, obviously people will do it. Anyone would 
do it. It's just, it's all human.” (B3) 
The financial pressure was the second choice among the respondents. 
Interestingly, pressure was mentioned most among the smaller donors and the 
beneficiaries. They argued that if one gets the financial pressure of not having 
enough money to survive, they will justify the actions and look for an 
opportunity to commit fraud. Pressure was also linked with ‘otherwise good 
people finding bad ways’ as a less important component with people being 
tempted into fraud because of their deprived lives. Some charity officials also 
argued that the employees are under pressure because of limited resources 
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and funds, and that the salaries in the charity sector are far lower than 
elsewhere, especially in the for-profit sector, which forces charity officials to 
find other ways to make a living.  
“So that could exist in isolation, rationalisation, as could opportunity. 
I think pressure is different. It seems to me that, even if I didn't 
rationalise it and through the pressure I had to manufacture the 
opportunity, I had to really try to put myself in a position where I 
could do it, then pressure for me would force my hand.” (D8) 
While some respondents replied that both opportunity and pressure are 
equally important for fraud to take place, only four respondents mentioned 
that rationalisation was the key component: 
“… most people who work in charities have a process of 
rationalisation about their position inside the charity. If that 
rationalisation becomes-- I've used the term perverted. For instance, 
through revenge, which is definitely, I can see, if somebody does 
something bad to you, you can say the charity is fine, but I'm going to 
hurt you. Then if there is a financial pressure, that's an added. From 
my own experience, I would say rationalisation is probably the key 
element.” (D6) 
Three respondents did not want to choose a component or argued that all 
components are equally important for fraud to occur. The argument they 
provided was that tackling all of the components together would be better at 
stopping fraud: 
“I think you could put something around each of the three.” (D3) 
Overall, opportunity led the way as the most important component for fraud 
to take place, as can be seen from the Figure 7.2. 
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Figure	7.2	Components	of	the	fraud	triangle	
Table 7.3, showing the theories previously discussed in Chapter 4, depicts the 
reasons of fraud found in the study according to the theories. The findings 
suggest that opportunity is the leading component of the fraud triangle and is 
also the aspect that explains a majority of reasons suggested by the 
respondents. The other two components (pressure and rationalisation), along 
with components suggested as a contribution to the fraud triangle such as 
personal integrity, personal ethics, arrogance, competence, capability are 
successful in explaining a more limited number of reasons compared to the 
component opportunity. The component ‘capability’ is also successful in 
explaining why people within a position of power and influence and who are 
directly involved with the finances of the charities commit fraud. The sector 
itself can also be reflected as a ‘bad crop’ (Ramamoorti et al., 2009)  as 
trustworthiness creates the opportunity to be targeted by fraudsters. Also the 
concept of ‘predators’ suggested by Dorminey et al. (2012), which 
emphasises habitual criminal behaviour to target the sector, is successful in 
explaining the dynamics of fraud in the charity sector. 
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Table	7.3	Theories	of	Fraud	Revisited	
Theory Examples derived from the interviews 
Fraud Triangle 
Cressey (1953) 
Pressure: debt, work related pressures to be successful, financial 
demands of relatives 
Opportunity: absence of segregation of duties, poor leadership at the 
top, lack of awareness and culture, lack of appropriate policies and 
procedures, not having the right knowledge and skills for proper 
oversight, lack of resources and staff, lack of transparency, excessive 
use of cash in transactions, autocratic founders and management, 
weak internal controls and oversight, weak external controls and 
oversight, fraudsters targeting specially charities, lack of legislation, 
laid-back attitude of stakeholders 
Rationalisation: being unpaid, personal interests such as revenge, 
borrowing, common practice, job dissatisfaction, greed, lack of 
satisfaction in the work 
 
Fraud Scale 
Albrecht et al. 
(1984) 
Employees should have personal integrity and work ethic 
 
Fraud Diamond  
Wolfe and 
Hermanson 
(2004)  
The component, capability, is especially applicable to section 7.2.3, 
‘Who commits fraud’. Fraudster is identified as a person who is 
capable of accessing to the finances of a charity 
 
ABC Analysis 
Ramamoorti et 
al. (2009):  
the bad apple: predators who target the charity sector  
the bad crop: the charity sector itself is a reason for fraud to happen 
as the sector’s trustworthiness creates the opportunity to be targeted 
by fraudsters. 
 
Fraudster as 
‘predator’ 
Dorminey et al., 
(2012) 
Habitual criminal behaviour was mentioned by the respondents, in 
accordance with the idea of the fraudsters being predators,  
Source (Author) 
7.3 Conclusion	
This chapter examined the reasons for fraud in the charity sector. First the 
chapter reviewed perceptions of charity stakeholders’ regarding what is 
understood by fraud and if the charity sector is more vulnerable than the for-
profit and public sectors. Then, the reasons, the red flags and the perpetrators 
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of fraud in the charity sector were discussed. Lastly, Cressey’s fraud triangle 
was also utilised to understand better the fraud problem in the charity sector.  
The respondents were aware that fraud is a devastating and multidimensional 
problem for the sector that has to be assessed in depth.  A lack of oversight 
and of controls, caused by excessive trust, was seen as the most common 
reason for charities being more vulnerable than for-profit or public sector 
entities. Views of donors and beneficiaries that the sector runs on people with 
good intentions is criticised as an illusion created by the charity sector. 
Respondents also identified the charity sector as an easy target for fraud.  
Segregation of duties was found to be crucial for smaller charities. By 
contrast, in larger charities, a lack of appropriate culture and policies were 
identified by the respondents to be the major factor that causes fraud. 
However, overall, insufficient control is found to be the most important aspect 
that causes fraud, and this includes lack of oversight from charity 
stakeholders. Fraud was discovered to not to be confined to one type of 
charity, as the fraud problem affects all types of charities.  
In the context of Cressey’s “fraud triangle theory”, opportunity was found to 
be the leading factor. This was the case for all stakeholder groups, who 
underlined that lack of robust control and oversight is the main factor leading 
to fraud (Skousen et al., 2009). It was also found that the fraud triangle needs 
further analysis and enhancement, especially to comprise the sociological 
multiple-principal environment of the charity sector (Morales et al., 2014). 
Overall, lack of an effective control environment along with some sector-
specific problems were found to be the main reasons for fraud in the charity 
sector. The existence of a large variety of stakeholders with different priorities 
who lack power is also found to exacerbate the problem. Therefore, an 
examination of stakeholders is crucial to understanding the fraud problem in 
the charity sector.  
244	|	P a g e 	
	
The chapter also included important findings which will be used to assess 
solutions to fraud in the charity sector (Chapter 8) and underpin the 
quantitative analysis of fraud in the charity sector (Chapter 9). The findings 
of this chapter suggest that action by stakeholders could be important in 
addressing and minimising the risk of fraud in the sector. Therefore, the 
findings in this chapter will form the basis for the discussion in Chapter 8 
regarding, stakeholder oversight and solutions for fraud in the charity sector. 
The quantitative analysis of charity fraud (Chapter 9) has also been nourished 
by the findings of this section. As will be discussed in section 9.3, the idea to 
use variables such as TRUSTEE, REMUNERATION, SURNAME and 
POLICY came into existence as a result of the findings of this chapter.  
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8. 	SOLUTIONS	TO	FRAUD	IN	THE	CHARITY	SECTOR	
This is the third chapter that presents findings from the qualitative part of the 
research. This chapter focuses on the perception of respondents regarding 
solutions to the fraud problem in the charity sector. As in Chapter 6 and 7, 
this chapter analyses the interviews conducted with the regulator/watchdog 
organisations, charity officials, auditor/accountants, donors and beneficiaries. 
This chapter is structured around two research questions: a) what are the 
solutions to fraud identified by the charity stakeholders? b) what are 
stakeholders’ perceptions of stakeholder oversight? 
 
The chapter uses literature especially from Chapter 4. Deterrent and 
preventive measures discussed there are analysed, as is the literature based on 
stakeholder influence.  
 
The chapter is also designed in accordance with the research questions. 
Section 8.1 examines stakeholders’ perceptions on how to tackle fraud, 
including deterrent and preventive measures and legislation. Section 8.2 
focuses on stakeholder oversight and asks how to make stakeholders more 
interactive to the fraud problem. 
 
 
Figure	8.1	Structure	of	Chapter	8	
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8.1 Stakeholders’	perceptions	on	how	to	tackle	fraud	
In line with research question 1e, deterrent and preventive measures and anti-
fraud policies that the charities use are assessed. This section also examines 
the views of stakeholders in terms of effectiveness of legislation in tackling 
with fraud and who they believe should be responsible in stopping fraud. 
The measures to tackle fraud were mainly developed specifically for the for-
profit sector. While legislation and prosecution are fraud deterrence tools 
used generally by the regulators (Button et al., 2012), whistleblowing that 
externalises fraud is used by organisations themselves (Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, 2005). 
Preventive measures to tackle fraud were also discussed in Chapter 4. Internal 
and external controls, audit, reporting and disclosure are some important 
preventive measures (Abbott et al., 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Trompeter et al., 2012). Remuneration to align the interests of the managers 
and the owners (Armstrong et al., 2010) and the corporate culture and ethics 
are also especially favoured by the large for-profit organisations (Schwartz et 
al., 2005). 
The board structure and existence of committees are also important 
preventive tools to tackle with fraud (Farber, 2005; Uzun et al., 2004). Board 
independence, preventing CEO duality, higher number of committees, 
number of board and committee meetings are found to be effective in 
reducing fraudulent activities (Beasley et al., 2000).   
The studies of fraud in the not-profit sector were limited compared to the for-
profit ones. Risk registers, whistleblowing and control policies were found 
to be successful in detecting fraud (Kummer et al., 2015). Donor oversight 
(Nikolova, 2014) and empowered employees (Bradley, 2014) were also 
found to diminishes the risk of fraud in the not-for-profit organisations. Most 
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of these studies were quantitative in terms of methodology and did not use 
interviews as a method of analysis.  
The interviews (conducted for this thesis) with stakeholders regarding the 
measures to tackle fraud included discussing remedies used in the for-profit 
sector. Organisational cultural elements such as whistleblowing, tone at the 
top and internalised anti-fraud culture were highlighted by the respondents. 
More structural remedies such as segregation of duties, a dual authorisation 
process, and disclosing more information were also stressed by most of the 
respondents. Some other less mentioned tools included board structure, 
committees and remuneration. The control environment and effective internal 
and external oversight as discussed in the section 7.2 were also highlighted as 
important mechanisms to tackle fraud. The measures discussed by the 
respondents were found not to be without criticisms. The remedies were 
castigated by some of the respondents for not being suitable for the charity 
sector, especially for the smaller charities which have limited capabilities and 
sources to have appropriate control mechanisms and remedies for fraud.  
The findings suggest that trustees bear the primary responsibility for tackling 
fraud. Most of the respondents also stressed that it is every stakeholder’s duty 
to tackle fraud. While not stated when asked directly, the stakeholders that 
constituted ‘everyone’ were mainly made up of auditors, donors and 
beneficiaries. Anti-fraud measures are found to depend on the size of the 
charity. The respondents were also generally happy with the legislation in 
place and most of them argued that little improvement in terms of legislation 
is necessary to tackle charity sector fraud. Strict enforcement of the existing 
legislation, however, is favoured by the respondents.  
Overall, the respondents were in agreement that a new specific way to tackle 
fraud in the charity sector is necessary and that this responsibility should be 
a collaborative action by all stakeholder groups.  
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8.1.1 Deterrent	and	preventive	measures	
All interviewees were asked about measures that can deter or prevent fraud. 
Examples of deterrents suggested by respondents were exposing wrongdoing 
immediately, raising awareness of fraud, benchmarking, and making sure that 
if people get caught they will be prosecuted. Prosecution was mostly favoured 
by the donors and beneficiaries. Easier whistleblowing was also mentioned 
as a fraud deterrent (Bowen et al., 2010; Kaptein, 2011a); as some 
respondents posited that people will not bother to report a wrongdoing if it is 
a challenging task to report it: 
 “I think financial monitoring, but it isn't just finance. I think the other 
vital one is having proper whistleblowing and reporting, and 
anonymous at that. I also think there's a certain amount of 
benchmarking we've been doing. How do you compare with your 
peers? Are you in the same ballpark? Because they roughly say every 
third [fraud] you get, there's two thirds you don't.” (C2) 
“It's making sure that, from a fraud perspective, there is whistle-
blowing available, that people can flag instances and flag red flags 
internally, because those are the front line will know more about 
what's going on than us as auditors coming in once a year, for 
example.”(A4) 
“That having a prison sentence attached to fraud may well deter it or 
they'd hope that in charities in particular, people who work in the 
charity sector are not just for financial gain.” (B4) 
“Making a big example of a few cases so that people become aware 
that this is not acceptable.”(D3) 
Preventive measures such as segregation of duties, anti-fraud culture and tone 
at the top, dual authorisation processes and careful oversight of all cash 
movements were identified by the respondents. It is also argued by the 
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respondents that educating staff about fraud is crucial as the staff are the eyes 
and ears of the organisation and therefore they need more training and 
awareness to tackle fraud. Appointing moral people who have values that will 
distance themselves from wrongdoing is underlined as being important in 
preventing fraud: 
“At the very basic level, you need to ensure that those whom you are 
employing are honest. Now, nobody wants to take on a dishonest 
employee. How do you ensure it? Well, it's a question of satisfying 
yourself through interview and references that these people are 
suitable and honest.” (D5) 
“Very basic measures like having several people counter sign for 
checks and all expenditure for instance. Final decisions on the 
expenditure should not be left to one person alone, you should look at 
conflicts of interest between people having family members on the 
management committees.”(D4) 
“I personally think that at the heart of it is culture because you can 
have the best-- A control framework, policies, and procedures that 
could be the best in the world, brilliant. If nobody enforces them, 
they're meaningless.”(C1) 
The control environment and effective internal and external oversight are 
especially identified by accountants/auditors as the most important measure 
to tackle fraud (Abbott et al., 2000; Arens et al., 2012). External oversight 
was also underlined by several respondents as a tool to tackle fraud. 
Respondents also mentioned the role of other charity stakeholders in 
oversight of the charities and that stakeholders need to be more involved: 
“You also need outside people to verify it so you don't get ‘group think’, 
where nobody externally looking.” (C7) 
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“Again also not being mentioned a lot, a proper respect agenda for 
everybody, all the stakeholders so that they're both properly 
recognised” (C9)  
Some respondents criticised the generic remedies to prevent and deter fraud 
as not applicable especially to small charities with limited resources and 
budget  (Trompeter et al., 2012). Limited personnel and capacity of even the 
larger charities were also argued to impose burdens on charities. The sector 
was also criticised for having lack of enthusiasm to tackle fraud and for the 
absence of organisational policies to prevent and deter fraud.  Most fraud 
remedies were also identified by the respondents to be unsuccessful: 
“It becomes more difficult in smaller charities because you have a 
number of functions that you have to carry out. If you have a very 
small number of people to deliver those functions, segregation of 
duties becomes more difficult. At that point, your internal load of 
program becomes even more critical.” (C6) 
“You may have to employ another person which will cost you 
something like £40,000 in overheads which may actually save you that 
much in fraud. Maybe not and in that case it's not a good deal to 
make.”(D4)  
 “For instance, in one of my jobs, I went on fraud training that the 
organisation offered. It was one day. It was extremely good. 
Extremely useful. The ironic thing is the fraud that I mentioned took 
place fairly soon after the fraud training. Even with the fraud training, 
the systems, the processes, the auditing processes were not sufficient. 
There was a hole in the process.”(D6)  
Some respondents also argued that, whatever is done, it is very hard to 
completely prevent and deter fraud: 
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“On the other hand, how likely is it that in a large charity there are 
no frauds? If you're not hearing anything is that just because you're 
not hearing it and you're not finding it?” (A2) 
Interviewees were also asked whether financial or non-financial information 
was more crucial in tackling fraud. Respondents were generally in agreement 
that both financial and non-financial information are crucial. Most of the 
respondents argued that information is important depending on who will 
benefit and use it. While accountants/auditors and people trained in financial 
documents find financial information to be useful, non-financial information 
is considered to benefit donors and beneficiaries more.  
The two anti-fraud areas not discussed much by the respondents were (i) 
remuneration policies (Efendi et al., 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976); 
which are widely used in the for-profit sector, and (ii) board composition and 
structure (Beasley, 1996). 
Trustees in the charity sector are not expected to receive remuneration 
(Commission, 2013b). In section 7.1.3, lower management remuneration in 
the charity sector was stated by respondents as a possible reason for 
fraudulent action.  As remuneration in charities is lower than in the for-profit 
sector (De Cooman et al., 2011) and there are no similar tools to stock options, 
it is understandable that remuneration policy was not mentioned as a remedy. 
Although effective oversight by the board of trustees was stated as a 
preventive measure by the majority of respondents, the composition and 
structure of the board of trustees and the structure and existence of audit or 
other committees was not discussed in detail. As discussed in 7.2.1, trustees 
were not found to be really interested in the day-to-day activities of the 
charities and this was argued to cause insufficiency in fulfilling their 
oversight responsibility. A few respondents suggested that an involved board 
with existence of committees is more a for-profit characteristic, one of the 
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most important reasons being that most small and even medium-sized 
charities do not have committees, mainly due to lack of personnel. 
Overall, although classical fraud remedies were identified by the respondents, 
they were also criticised for their economic burden and inefficiency. 
Respondents wanted a fraud solution which is more inclusive and which can 
meet the needs of both small and large charities.  
8.1.2 Legislation	
Legislative measures and their sufficiency to deter or prevent fraud were also 
assessed. Most of the regulator-watchdog, charity officials and auditors stated 
that, although not being as strict as in the for-profit sector, legislation is 
sufficient to cope with fraud. Some donors and beneficiaries, on the other 
hand, asked for more prosecutions: 
“Strict laws maybe, like if you're caught-- There's, of course, a law. 
Let's say if you're caught doing something, even a small thing, let's 
say you took £5 from the charity for your pocket, you're just fired on 
the spot or something. That is the law, I think that's what happens.” 
(B3) 
“From a legislative point of view, the legislation is quite strong. 
Obviously, in order to be able to enforce the Fraud Act, it requires a 
criminal prosecution at the end of the day. You need to involve the 
police in any investigation that leads to a conviction of the fraud act. 
There may be a cultural reason why that's slightly different within the 
charity sector, but in fact, the legislation crosses all sectors, and is 
sufficient for either all sectors really I suppose.” (D1) 
Most of the respondents argued that it is not the Charity Commission’s duty 
to detect and prosecute fraud and that the Charities Act is not primarily aimed 
at tackling fraud. The fact that the regulator is under-resourced and restricted 
by limited powers was also stressed by some respondents.  
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However, respondents added that both the legislation and the guidance from 
the regulator are much more thorough than in the past. The new powers, 
which came into effect in 2017, were also mentioned by several respondents 
as possibly increasing deterrence, but their impact could only be assessed over 
time: 
“Yes, I think the legal framework, the statutory requirements, the 
regulatory requirements are quite clear.” (C1) 
“It seems to me that legislation is there, but there's not enough active 
enforcement of it to make it useful in enough sectors.” (B4)     
Some argued that regulation is irrelevant or has only limited capability to 
deter fraud, and is not sufficient to counteract it in any sector, so that whatever 
legislation is put in place will not prevent or deter fraud. They argued that it 
is more to do with interpretation and application of the legislation rather than 
itself and depends on how the organisation complies with the existing 
legislation. It was posited that, even with the best policies, wrong 
interpretation of the regulations and lack of monitoring may create 
opportunities for fraud to happen: 
“I can't see how legislation is going to stop fraud, because I think 
fraudsters are far too clever and they are not going to be interested in 
what the legislation says. If they're going to commit a fraud, they're not 
going to really worry about what the legislation is, are they?” (A2) 
“The Charities Act has nothing in it to deter fraud. The Charities Act 
only requires an audit, but that doesn't deter fraud.” (A1) 
 
254	|	P a g e 	
	
“I think the legislation is largely comparable to what we see in the 
corporate sector. I don't think the legislation is the weakness. I think 
the fundamental weakness in a charity context is that in a corporate, 
there is a profit motive and there is an owner and that might be an 
owner-manager, it could be a company that is listed with shareholders 
on a stock exchange. There is that ownership with a vested interest in 
the financial wealth of that corporate.” (A5) 
Charities were blamed by some respondents for not applying the legislation 
fully, as they are believed to be reluctant to invest in governance. Reluctance 
in the sector to put more effort into tackling fraud or dismissal of the issue 
was also mentioned by some respondents. Even though reputational damage 
is stated by the respondents to be serious already, the culture to tackle fraud 
in the charity sector is found to be still inadequate. The Charity Commission 
was no exception in terms of criticisms. Some respondents argued that the 
Commission lacks adequate resources to tackle with fraud: 
“But what we don't have, I suppose still in the charity sector, is some 
kind of regulator who is watching the sector closely and perhaps 
acting as a greater deterrent to bad behaviours, because it's not as 
obvious or as powerful as something like the, I don't know, PRA in the 
financial sector, for example.” (RW5) 
“Yes, I think the legal framework, the statutory requirements, the 
regulatory requirements are quite clear. It’s the charities woefully let 
itself down, is the fact that it doesn't agree to them.” (C1) 
The complexity of the legislation was also identified by small charities, 
donors and beneficiaries who stated that they are not aware fully of what the 
legislation requires: 
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“I think the legislation is highly confusing for most people. Most 
charities are quite small, the larger organisations may set up adequate 
systems, but most charities are relatively small, they rely a lot on trust, 
they rely a lot on volunteers and they won’t necessarily know what the 
legislation is.” (C8) 
Overall, the majority of stakeholders are happy with the legislation but argued 
that fraud cannot be directly eliminated with legislation and that the effects 
of prosecution will be limited. Other solutions should therefore be sought to 
deter and prevent fraud. 
8.1.3 Who	should	stop	fraud?	
The responsibility to find and tackle fraud was also assessed during the 
interviews. Responses frequently mentioned management and staff, the 
trustees, government, and a collaborative approach by everyone. It was found 
that the people who ‘run their own house’ are regarded as responsible to stop 
fraud.  The most common response was thus the trustees:  
“I wouldn't have said it's the regulator's duty to prevent fraud. I think 
the onus really is on the board of trustees and senior management 
team to have the right controls in place to help prevent it.” (A2) 
 “Trustees. An auditor will always say trustees. I think in terms of 
responsibility but I think everybody has a part to play, management 
team, staff, auditors, but ultimately it's really for the trustees to 
determine what framework they need, what controls they need in 
order to stop fraud.” (A5) 
The trustees are suggested to be vital for the charities, although they are also 
criticised for not acting promptly against fraud: 
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“I don't think trustees are as engaged or challenge senior 
management within a charity in a timely fashion. Some of them don't 
engage with the charity, they literally just sit on the board and yet it's 
just a status that a trustee on a charity so they don't engage and they 
don't respond quickly enough.” (B1) 
However, it was argued by most of the respondents that every stakeholder has 
a role to play in oversight and in making sure that certain material frauds are 
detected: 
 “I'd say everybody has a responsibility. It's in the interest of 
everybody to make sure that their charity is resilient to fraud. I'd say 
everybody has a responsibility but the buck stops with the trustees.” 
(RW3) 
“I think it’s everybody's responsibility. The danger is, so many people 
will say, "Well, you've got an active fraud team, therefore it's an 
investigating function. Therefore, it's their problem, or its internal 
audits problem." I just think that everybody, throughout the whole any 
organisation, that's a pivotal role to play in A) Making sure they are 
adhere to the policies and controls. B) Making sure they conduct their 
work properly to apply the controls. But C) are also the eyes and ears 
for the organisation. Because the fact that fraud can happen at any 
point in a grant, or procurement cycle, or employment recruitment, 
whatever.” (A3) 
Overall, the respondents suggested that the board of trustees would be the first 
line of defence against fraud. It is interesting to note that auditors and 
accountants along with donors and beneficiaries were specifically cited by 
only a few of the respondents. However, when respondents were asked further 
questions on this point, it emerged that the answer ‘everyone’ included charity 
stakeholders, especially donors and beneficiaries. 
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8.1.4 Anti-fraud	policy	and	measures	
The charity officials were asked to provide information regarding the anti-
fraud measures that their charities have. Answers included authenticity 
checks, risk register, delegated responsibility, segregation of duties and 
internal and external audit. It was found that the larger the charity in terms of 
income, the better and more detailed their fraud measures and policies are. 
One of the charities, which is a top 10 charity in terms of income in England 
and Wales, has also a separate anti-fraud department. Also, it was found that 
out 2 of the 9 charities which are small charities with income below £500,000 
did not have an anti-fraud policy. Their argument was that fraud policies are 
too bureaucratic and not necessary in an organisation in which everybody 
trusts each other and that fraud is not expected to happen: 
“Nothing's perfect, as sometimes it doesn't work out but that what we 
do and actually, we generally deal with quite small amounts of money 
so it's more manageable.” (C9) 
Some respondents also argued that, although there is an adequate control 
framework in place, the real problem is enforcing it. The policy problem 
arises with its implementation: 
“I would say that the question is, is not, do you have an adequate 
control framework in place? It's, do we enforce the control framework 
that we have in place? Because if we don't enforce it it's just words. 
Too often we don't enforce it. The control is there, but there it is not 
adherence to it. That's the problem.” (C1) 
Overall, although classic remedies were mentioned as deterring and 
preventing fraud (Efendi et al., 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Trompeter 
et al., 2012), the respondents also highlighted the limitations of these 
remedies. While anti-fraud measures depend on the size of the charity, 
legislation is seen as satisfactory by many stakeholders. Even though the 
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trustees were mentioned most by the respondents, tackling fraud was seen as 
a collaborative action. Some did mention the role of other charity stakeholders 
in oversight of the charities and that stakeholders need to be more involved. 
Therefore, rather than focusing on more generic answers, further questions 
tried to elaborate the role of stakeholders in preventing fraud.  
8.2 Stakeholder	oversight	in	the	charity	sector	
The findings of this section are about stakeholder oversight over fraud in the 
charity sector: a) current approaches to oversight and b) encouraging greater 
stakeholder involvement in oversight. 
The role played by stakeholders in terms of fraud was elaborated in Chapter 
4. Fraud studies as mainly being quantitative and based on aiming to examine 
the governance characteristics, the effect of stakeholders was being the 
subject of a few studies (Trompeter et al., 2014).  
Lack of stakeholder oversight is also found to provide opportunities for fraud 
to take place (Zahra et al., 2005). The power dynamics of the stakeholders as 
discussed in Chapter 6 may also have both positive and negative effects on 
fraudulent behaviour as excessive power of a single stakeholder group may 
facilitate collaborations for fraud to take place (Dellaportas, 2013) and too 
little power may diminish their oversight influence (Soltani, 2014). 
The findings of the section depict the importance of charity stakeholders and 
their oversight to diminish fraudulent activities in the charity sector.  
Stakeholders were argued by most of the respondents to be crucial in 
preventing fraud. However the reality was different. It was found that the 
stakeholder oversight in the charity sector was limited and did not fulfil 
expectations. The absence of a definitive owner in the charity sector causes 
oversight provided by the stakeholders especially the donors and beneficiaries 
to be fragmentary.  
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It was also found that although the stakeholders, especially the beneficiaries, 
have a desire to have more oversight on the charities their capabilities are 
limited. The findings also show that document analysis or other means of 
accountability do not interest the small donors and beneficiaries. Most of the 
respondents posited that that they will provide a better oversight if they feel 
or if they are ‘included’ or ‘being part’ of the charity itself.  
8.2.1 Current	approaches	to	oversight	
The respondents were asked whether they thought that the charity 
stakeholders were already providing enough oversight to prevent fraud. The 
answers revealed that while the charity stakeholders are expected to oversee 
the charities, in reality the oversight is very limited. 
Nearly all respondents argued that stakeholders can play a role to deter or 
prevent fraud in the charity sector. The stakeholders that can have a direct 
role were posited as the auditors, the regulators, the staff and the trustees.  
Auditors are expected to be do professional oversight for obvious reasons. 
The regulator was praised for its work in putting fraud on the agenda for 
charities, as the last couple of years have seen fraud much to the fore. 
However, the effectiveness of the regulator and auditors in oversight is said 
to be restricted due to their limited time and involvement is the process. The 
answers regarding the oversight made by the donors and beneficiaries was 
mixed. While some respondents argued that they can provide oversight some 
posited that it will be hard for them:  
 “ If given the opportunity, why not?” (B5) 
“Yes, all of those, they're I think the trustees, the chairman, the 
regulators, the charity commission, and the auditors. I think they are 
the three big [ones] . . . [it’s] hard for the recipients, and donors it 
doesn't work for us really.”(D7) 
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“I think it's harder for beneficiaries, because they're people receiving 
whatever it is, how can they provide oversight other than just through 
general, public perception of the damage to reputation by having a 
fraud. If society at large views fraud as being potentially damaging to 
an organisation, then I suppose one could say that provides an 
element of oversight.” (A2) 
The donors and beneficiaries were asked how often and which documents 
they analyse. The documents assessed, if any, were financial accounts, annual 
review, and the governance documents. It was found that stakeholders were 
reluctant to assess charity documents. As in Connolly and Hyndman (2013a), 
small donors and especially beneficiaries were not found to have a significant 
aspiration to use formal communications which were generated by charities, 
such as financial reports and annual reports. In some cases, small donors and 
beneficiaries were even not aware of the names of these documents and what 
they are used for. While most beneficiaries are not interested to find out where 
the benefit comes from, small and medium sized donors are also not keen to 
‘look after’ their donations (Andreoni, 1990). As suggested by Connolly and 
Hyndman (2013a), especially smaller individual donors may be less 
interested in audited financial information and rather trust the examination 
reports and not oversee the charities themselves. 
Some of the respondents who said they assess the documents posited that they 
will try to examine what the charity used the money for rather than how much 
their fundraising costs. This finding was in line with the recent trend of 
‘output disclosure’ which was also discussed in Chapter 7. Out of the 18 
respondents, of which nine were donors and the other nine were beneficiaries, 
only two beneficiaries and five donors stated that they assess charity 
documents of any type. While larger donors were more interested in charity 
documents, the two beneficiaries who state that they are interested were also 
part of a charity: 
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“No, I don't. The organisations I give to, I trust.” (D6) 
“I don't look at the documents.”(B8) 
“No. the charities they don’t show the financial reports. (B2) 
  “Oh yes. Categorically yes.” (D2) 
It is also argued by charity officials that it is not common for the issue of 
operational activity to be questioned by the public or donors and by 
beneficiaries in particular. Some respondents stated that it would be wrong to 
generalise that all donors and beneficiaries are uninterested in charity 
oversight as some might have different motives, but respondents agreed that 
oversight provided by the donors and beneficiaries is limited, which may 
exacerbate the opportunistic behaviour as suggested by (Hyndman and 
McDonnell, 2009, p.24). It was also posited by some respondents that even 
though fraud awareness in the charity sector is greater compared to a decade 
ago, they also expect stakeholder interest and oversight to be on the rise. 
As also discussed in Chapter 6, most respondents suggested that lack of 
power, compared to the trustees, staff and the regulator, was found to be the 
main reason for beneficiaries having restricted oversight of charities (Cordery 
and Baskerville, 2011). Most beneficiaries posited that they are inevitably 
unable to critique charities because of the power relationship that comes with 
donation versus being a recipient, and they were perceived by other 
respondents as having limited power and influence (Cordery and Baskerville, 
2005; Connolly and Hyndman, 2017). Beneficiaries stated that they do not 
think that they will have the same amount of control as other stakeholders 
over fraud as they do not want to ‘bite the hand that feeds you’ as the charities 
can cut off funding without proper reasons. Beneficiaries were found to rely 
on other stakeholders’ oversight on the charities:  
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 “… a lot of our beneficiaries are down and outs. We are not giving 
grants to build companies, these are people who are in debt to our 
help, so in a way they are not going to be in a situation where they are 
able to start. We are genuinely helping people so it's not an equal 
relationship.” (C2) 
“I don't think. Personally, I wouldn't, because I'm getting things for 
free. Let's say I just go and complain that you're not doing this, they 
can easily take me out of that place if they want to.”(B3) 
Although beneficiaries were argued by some respondents to be more 
concerned because in the end every pound diverted to a fraudster cannot be 
spent on them, they were found not to be in a good position to exercise 
oversight. Therefore, irrespective of the level of their income or deprivation, 
beneficiaries do not question the sources of the benefit (Cordery and 
Baskerville, 2005). The beneficiaries also argued that they do not want to be 
headaches so they resist checking the documents: 
“I wouldn't even really know where to look for information that has 
been disclosed and it's certainly not advertised. It doesn't say 
anything. I don't get any communication. It's not like, "Come and take 
a look at our published finances or whatever or published projects 
that you've been involved in". I can't see any of that.”(B4) 
“Why say, no? For example, if I'm in the street, I have bombs being 
thrown on me. If you come to me and say I'm going to give you some 
money or some project, I don't care where you get it from, I just want 
it. If there is no information provided, then I don't know, I'm just a 
person on the streets. How would I know?”(B7) 
“If I was using an NHS, Hospice care or a charity as a hospice, as 
long as I was getting the service or my family would get in the service, 
I expected during that period of time I wouldn't really care whether 
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they were a charity or public sector. I wouldn't really care where the 
money came from and you paying for it, it would be about the service 
and quality of it that was being provided at a particular time. 
Stakeholders, commissioners, donors, I would expect them to be 
looking at the services and ensuring that they will provide adequate 
services for the money that they will receiving.” (B1)  
Donors were seen to be ahead of beneficiaries in overseeing the charities, and 
this was especially true for larger donors and funders who have a mainly 
contractual relationship with charities.  Larger donors are posited to be much 
more calculating or strategic about the giving, and may take a closer look to 
the charity, and make sure that it is financially sound. Smaller donors were 
posited by the respondents to care less and to be very hands off, and maybe 
not look for any kind of reporting or information to support the decision of 
donating. Therefore, especially small donors were not found to be attentive, 
as they believe that fraud does not seem to be prevalent and they assume that 
somebody must be doing something right: 
 “A lot of our older donors will simply write a letter, send some money 
and they'll likely put cash in the envelope and then they'll say please 
don't send me any receipts, don't waste your money on postage.”(C3) 
“The main people- because obviously, donors tend not to provide very 
much in oversight. It's very often the case that once they've made their 
donation, as far as they are concerned job done. The beneficiaries 
also probably don't provide very much in the way of [oversight] 
because once they've received their monies, the charities paid them, 
they go away and they deliver what they received the money to 
deliver.”(C6) 
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“I donate because I want to donate. Say I have an amount of money 
that I'm prepared to donate every year and trust tells me where the 
money should go that I would give that money anyway as it were 
because anyway this amount so I would-- Yes, trusted knowledge of 
the people I trust.”(D5) 
 “Again, I don't know. I don't know because I'm just not aware of that. 
Again, I guess, that in part comes back to a previous answer to the 
question, because it doesn't seem to be prevalent, so somebody must 
be doing something right, certainly in the charities that I donate to, 
because it doesn't appear to be, at least at my level a massive issue, 
but again, that might be largely through ignorance of what is 
happening. No. I'm not aware.” (D8) 
However even larger donors argued that they have confidence that charities 
are going to spend the money wisely and that they already have enough 
information regarding the charity, which is why they donate: 
“There's a question about, it's a good question. Do we have enough 
oversight over hundreds of local charities? No. Do I think we should 
stop giving them money? No. If they have a fraud rate of 10% ,than 
the 90% is not being defrauded. Probably it's acceptable failure rate.” 
(D3) 
“To account for every single penny, is simply not feasible from the 
organisation point of view, so we can't do that. We have the 
proportionate system to ensure that where we believe our biggest risk 
exposures are, that we have proportionate controls to ensure that that 
money is being spent appropriately and not exposed to fraud risks.” 
(D1)  
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Some respondents also differentiated between grant receiving and fundraising 
charities and argued that grant receiving charities are better scrutinised 
because of the regular and more detailed oversight provided by the grant 
providers. However, the oversight is also posited to be limited regarding the 
amount of the grant:  
“I think for grant-receiving charities, generally, they are much more 
aware of their role in doing that. Obviously, if they are granting 
£5,000 pounds, it's different to granting £500,000 pounds and they've 
got to be proportionate. I think the direction of travel is definitely 
forward, as far as funders are concerned, but I think inevitably there 
will always be a significant proportion of charities whose stakeholder 
groups just will never be able to play the role of a scrutiniser.” (A4) 
Some respondents also posited that the stakeholders in the charity sector are 
very remote and therefore may have little effect even if they want to. The lack 
of shareholders in the not-for-profit sector was also identified as an absence 
of natural checks and balances and therefore oversight (Manne, 1999). 
Beneficiaries and donors together are argued to replace shareholders, but they 
are not identical and as a result this ‘dual replacement’ exacerbates the 
oversight issue.  
Overall, although it has been argued that charity stakeholders are more likely 
to be concerned about the use of resources of a charity because any fraud 
would reduce the ability of the charity to act for that public benefit, their 
capability to oversee a charity is found to be limited. 
8.2.2 Encouraging	greater	stakeholder	involvement	in	oversight		
Interviewees were asked what would make them more interested in actively 
overseeing a charity. Some of the respondents said that they would be more 
interested if the documents were readable or more accessible or digestible to 
understand. Other answers included being a large donor or about to make a 
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large donation, and if they are aware of any warning or if the service provided 
by the charity is withdrawn suddenly, then they will be much more interested. 
They stated that, if an organisation proved to have a lot of fraud going on, 
they would certainly want to ask questions: 
“As a donor, let's say I'm much more involved in the management. I'm 
interested in helping people who run the charities, the supervisory 
board side, maybe because of that I am less interested in charities in 
which I haven't got a piece of a major commitment so I would rather 
let them get on with them. I honestly don't know. Probably time, if I 
had more time, maybe. If I had a worry about the charity that I had 
given the money to or was thinking of giving money to, then I probably 
would be looking closely, but I have never got involved with any that 
I got worried about.”(D5) 
However, most respondents said that they do not want to assess documents as 
they are not a ‘part’ of the process. It was found that donors and beneficiaries 
will be more interested in overseeing a charity if it can be a daily routine in 
their lives then they can prioritise overseeing charities. They posited that if 
the stakeholders are given a role in the process or are a part of the procedures 
then they can allocate enough time or resources to oversee: 
“If I’m a trustee of the charity. Obviously, they're much more 
engaged.”(D7) 
 “I think if it could be arranged, then I think it could be a very good 
thing. Back to this point about how do you detect fraud and what kind 
of information, because I think in those sorts of conversations with 
beneficiaries or auditors or executives or trustees, the more the 
stakeholders are talking together, the less likely it is that something 
could be hidden.”(RW5) 
 
267	|	P a g e 	
	
Overall, the findings suggest that beneficiaries and donors should be 
empowered to take part in charity oversight  (Valeau et al., 2019). However, 
the stakeholders requested more time and responsibility and to be 
incorporated into the charity itself in order to oversee the charity effectively.  
Figure 8.2 depicts stakeholder oversight as one of the measures to prevent 
fraud: 
Figure	8.2	Measures	to	deter	or	prevent	fraud	-	2	
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed remedies for fraud in the sector, in particular discussing 
how stakeholders could exercise greater oversight. 
The measures that respondents suggested for preventing and deterring fraud 
were remedies that were well established in the for-profit sector, but 
respondents often criticised these measures as being costly and not fit for all. 
Measures	to	deter	or	
prevent	fraud
Internal	
organsational	
measures
Control	and	audit
Board	composition	and	structure
Reporting	and	disclosure
Remuneration
Corporate	culture	and	ethics
Stakeholder	
Oversight	
Regulatory	
measures/sanctions
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Most respondents were happy with the requirements of existing legislation 
for deterring and preventing fraud, and they did not regard some form of 
augmented audit as a solution to fraud in the charity sector. Some respondents 
thought that fraud could be addressed by means of a collaborative oversight 
process that would include all stakeholder groups. Also, taking into account 
that most charities in the UK are small, a cost efficient remedy suitable to 
small charities was considered to be needed. Some donors argue that 
contributing to charities provides a form of ‘safe harbour’, because they do 
not want to donate to the beneficiaries directly. They want the use of their 
donations to be under supervision. Because donors expect there to be an 
intermediary between beneficiaries and themselves, eliminating charities to 
stop fraud is not a possible solution. 
Stakeholder oversight is found to be limited in every sense. Donors and 
beneficiaries, the two most crucial stakeholder groups, seem uninterested in 
overseeing charities, particularly where this involves reading documents 
(Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). Although being criticised because of 
limited attention (Barnett, 2014), it was also found that the majority of 
respondents support enhanced stakeholder oversight as they believe that it 
will contribute to tackling fraud in the charity sector. 
Evaluated in accordance with the findings of Chapter 7, both the reasons for 
and the solutions to the fraud problem are unique for the charity and the not-
for-profit sector in general. Therefore, it is clear that new ways of encouraging 
stakeholder oversight need to be formulated. A more detailed assessment of 
the two chapters will be realised in Chapter 10, Discussion and Conclusion. 
The findings of this chapter also contribute to Chapter 9, the quantitative 
analysis of fraud charities. The findings made it possible to concentrate on 
some characteristics specific to the charity sector. As a result, variables such 
as GRANT, RESTRICTED and COMMITTEE, which will be discussed in 
detail in section 9.3, were identified as likely to be relevant.  
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9. 	QUANTITATIVE	ANALYSIS	OF	FRAUD	IN	THE	CHARITY	
SECTOR	
The second part of the research, the quantitative phase, is the subject of this 
chapter. The chapter evaluates the test variables derived from the content 
analysis of 42 fraud and 42 no-fraud charities’ annual reports and financial 
statements. The chapter presents the findings of whether or not these variables 
are significantly related to the likelihood of fraud and financial misconduct in 
the charity sector. The chapter is based on research objective 2, which aims 
to assess the governance characteristics associated with fraud in charities. In 
relation to the research objective, the chapter tries to answer the research 
questions: question 2a examines if there is a significant difference between 
charities with fraud and those without, regarding governance structure, and 
question 2b explores the governance characteristics which are related to 
fraud. 
Chapter 2 discussed accountability and governance mechanisms of disclosure 
and reporting; monitoring and audit; board attributes; and other aspects. 
Likewise, Chapter 4 examined structured governance aspects to deter or 
prevent fraud such as controls and audit, corporate culture, remuneration, and 
board composition. Following the literature and utilising the data derived 
from the content analysis, test variables and control variables were constituted 
and used in a logistic regression analysis. 
The chapter first explains sample selection by discussing identification of 
both fraud and no-fraud charities. It then focuses on content analysis of the 
documents and selection of test variables and control variables. The chapter 
assesses the significance of the variables and discusses the logistic regression 
model. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion. Figure 9.1 depicts the 
outline of Chapter 9: 
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Figure	9.1	Structure	of	Chapter	9	
9.1 Sample	Selection	and	Content	Analysis	
This first section discusses the methods used in identifying fraud charities and 
the criteria used for matching fraud charities with no-fraud charities. 
9.1.1 Identification	of	the	fraud	charities	
Fraudulent charities were identified by utilising the Charity Commission’s 
operational case reports and statutory inquiries database. The ‘inquiry’ reports 
derive from the Commission’s power, under Section 46 of the Charities Act 
2011, to gather information on suspected charity events and cases. The ‘case’ 
reports are not the outcome of an inquiry under Section 46, but they identify 
other matters for which the Commission believes there is a significant public 
interest in the case and its outcome.  
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As discussed in Chapter 4,  this study considers ‘fraud’ as described in The 
Fraud Act (2006) and in order to comprise all financial purposeful 
wrongdoings, the study also includes ‘financial misconduct’ as a criterion in 
determining fraud charities. As only a few of the operational case reports and 
statutory inquiries identified events as ‘fraud’ or ‘financial misconduct’ the 
designation of fraud charities was done by the researcher by self-
identification and eliminating reports and inquires not related to fraud or 
financial misconduct.  
The Charity Commission case reports and inquiries are suitable sources in 
fraud identification for several reasons. First of all, the Charity Commission 
is the authority responsible for regulating the charities and instituting 
inquiries if necessary. Documents prepared by the Commission are official 
paperwork and therefore credible. Secondly, accurate fraud information could 
only be found through using the information derived from the Commission as 
other sources are limited. For example, newspaper reports, which were used 
by Fremont-Smith and Kosaras (2003), could be inaccurate. The aim of the 
study is not to reveal or investigate suspicious fraudulent events, so the use 
of cases and inquiries that have been previously examined validates the data 
used. Thirdly, the reports provide enough information on what can be 
accepted as fraud/financial misconduct. The Charity Commission’s inquiries 
and reports give basic and easily readable information, which aids 
understandability: this is an important element in deriving data. As the aim of 
content analysis is to make objective inferences, reliable and official 
documents are favoured in information extraction (Loughran and McDonald, 
2016). Overall, the Charity Commission’s report and inquiry database was 
the sole option to assess pre-analysed fraudulent charity events and therefore 
allow these to be selected for further content analysis. 
The case reports and inquiries both have similar sections. The documents 
briefly give information about the charity and outline the problem and explain 
why the Commission got involved. The documents also provide information 
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on what action the Commission took in response to the problem. The findings 
of the investigation and the Commission’s proposed actions are also 
explained. Although, for both the inquiries and reports, the Commission’s 
database starts from the year 2005, the documents are accessible online only 
from 2008. Therefore, the study assessed the documents for an 11-year 
timespan. A total of 268 inquiry reports and 131 case reports were examined 
to determine the documents which dealt with fraud and/or financial 
misconduct in the charity sector. Table 9.1 shows the quantity of documents 
by year. 
Table	9.1	Number	of	inquiry	and	case	reports	by	year	
Year Inquiries Case Reports 
2008 39 4 
2009 14 3 
2010 15 12 
2011 8 7 
2012 6 3 
2013 8 8 
2014 43 28 
2015 28 26 
2016 60 16 
2017 35 16 
2018 12 8 
Total 268 131 
Notes: The fluctuations in the number of inquiry and case reports among the years is not 
believed to be explained by wrongdoings of any type happening more frequently but rather 
the Commission’s choice to publish different number of inquiries and reports per each year.  
Out of the 399 reports examined, 113 were identified as having fraud and/or 
financial misconduct as the reason for the case report or inquiry. Some other 
reasons subject to investigation were late document submission, breach of 
trust deed, mismanagement of charity funds and acting against the charitable 
purpose. The most common reasons for fraud and/or financial misconduct 
273	|	P a g e 	
	
were classified by the reports as: personal or private benefit, benefit of 
another organisation, deliberate use of charity funds for non-charitable 
purposes, using charity as an ostensible tool for benefiting for-profit 
organisations, excessive remuneration, theft. 
After identification of the fraud charities, hand collection of their financial 
documents was carried out for use in content analysis. Although 113 inquiries 
or reports were identified to be in relation to fraud and/or financial 
misconduct, only 42 of the charities could be included in the sample due to 
lack of access to annual reports of the others. Most of those others had been 
closed or removed from the charity register after the investigation by the 
Commission. The inquiry and case reports are generally made publicly 
available after a couple of years of the investigation. As the charities are 
removed from the charity register so is their financial and administrative 
information. If the charities removed from the Commission’s database are 
only trusts or otherwise not registered with the Companies House, then it was 
not been possible to observe their reports. Although financial and 
administrative documents of removed charities were requested from the 
Commission, it was not possible to obtain the documents as the Commission 
stated that only publicly available information would be provided. Some other 
fraud charities had missing or no documents and therefore were also 
eliminated from observation. Consequently, the financial statements of 
observable fraud charities were derived from either the Commission (if they 
were not removed from the registry) or mainly from Companies House (if 
they are removed from the charities register but were registered with 
Companies House). As a result, an overwhelming number of the fraud 
charities used in the analysis were classified as companies and had financial 
information available on the Companies House database. 
The ‘fraud year’ was defined as the financial year in which the fraud and/or 
financial misconduct occurred. In all cases, the financial year was before the 
period in which fraud/financial misconduct was publicised or under 
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investigation by the Commission in order to sustain independence of the 
variables to test hypothesis and make sure that the fraud charities are immune 
to the effects of the inquiry and reports on governance determinants of the 
fraud charities. If fraud/ financial misconduct was occurring for several years, 
the year preceding the fraud investigation commenced by the Commission 
was identified as the fraud year. The matching of fraud charities with no-fraud 
charities began after ensuring that all the relevant information on annual 
reports and financial statements were available. 
There are different approaches in the literature for logistic regression that 
discuss the sample size, especially for events for each variable. Peduzzi et al. 
(1996) assessed the number of events required in order to obtain satisfactory 
regression models and estimates. They argue that 10 events per variable are 
required for efficient and problem-free regression results. Vittinghoff and 
McCulloch (2007) also analysed with several techniques to determine the 
number of events needed for each variable. They found that 5-9 events for 
each variable are adequate to perform satisfactory regression analysis if the 
results are statistically significant. They also stated that at least 10 events per 
variable is too conservative and that they encountered problems if the 
regression analysis had 30 or fewer events. They also stated that, percentages 
of problems with the regression model is not different for either 5-9 or 10-16 
events per variance. Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) also suggests that the examination 
of Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007) was more extensive and thorough 
compared to the work of Peduzzi et al. (1996).  
As this study has 42 fraud events and 84 fraud and no-fraud observations, 
according to Peduzzi et al. (1996) the number of variables should be limited 
to 4. However, in accordance with the more recent literature (Hosmer Jr et 
al., 2013; Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007) the study may use up to eight 
variables. 
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9.1.2 Identification	of	the	no-fraud	charities	
In order to compose a comparison group, 42 no-fraud charities were 
identified. The one-to-one matching technique is used to assess the different 
governance characteristics of fraud and no-fraud charities. Matching was 
previously utilised in fraud studies (Beasley, 1996; Roden et al., 2016; 
Skousen et al., 2009) due to ease of the process if there is adequate 
information. To enable the best matching of no-fraud charities which are 
similar to fraud charities, matching tools are used: registration date, where the 
charity operates, what the charity does, who the charity helps, how the charity 
operates and income. The matching process was conducted by utilising the 
Commission’s ‘find charities’ search engine (Search, 2019) with particular 
use of the ‘advanced search’ section of the search engine. The ‘advanced 
search’ section enabled the matching of fraud charities with no-fraud charities 
by use of the following charity specifications:  
1. Registration date: The date on which the charity was accepted as 
registered by the Charity Commission. Registration needs the income 
of the charity to be at least £5,000 per year or for the charity to be a 
charitable incorporated organisation (CIO), and the charity must be 
based in England or Wales (Commision, 2019). For matching 
purposes, the charities registered in the same year as the fraud charity 
were searched along with other criteria. The registration date criterion 
allows one to identify charities with the same lifespan and existence 
of relevant financial and administrative information. As other 
matching requirements were less flexible and were not appropriate to 
be changed, the registration date was altered the most in order to 
identify the no-fraud charity that most resembles the fraud charity. In 
case the matching tool provided a list of more than 10 matching 
charities, registration date was limited to the nearest month in which 
the fraud charity was registered. If no no-fraud charities were found 
in that particular registration year, the previous or subsequent year 
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was examined using again the same search engine. In all cases, the 
charities were matched within a range of three consecutive years.  
2. Where the charity operates: The fraud charities were assessed to 
find if they were operating only inside the UK, only outside the UK 
or both. In all matchings, fraud charities were matched with a no-fraud 
charity which was operating in or near the same operating area. If the 
same foreign country or operating region in the UK was not found, 
then the fraud charity was matched with a no-fraud charity with the 
closest region or country where the fraud charity operates. Out of 42 
fraud charities, four were operating outside of England and Wales, 33 
were operating inside England and Wales and five of the charities 
were operating both outside and inside of the UK. ‘Throughout 
England and Wales’ was the option in which the charities operated 
with the highest number.  
3. What the charity does:  This matching tool classifies the charitable 
purposes of the charities. The Commission identified 17 charitable 
purposes, to which they allocated numbers ranging from 101 to 117. 
The purposes included general charitable purposes, animals, religious 
activities, other charitable purposes. The purpose or purposes of the 
fraud charity was identified in the ‘charity framework’ section of the 
Commission’s charity database. In case of classification of multiple 
purposes, the purpose closest to the trustees’ description in their own 
words of what they do is identified and selected. Out of the 42 fraud 
charities, ten belonged to ‘the advancement of health or saving of 
lives’ field followed by seven ‘religious activities’.  13 out of the 17 
charitable purposes identified by the Commission were present in the 
sample group.  
4.  Who the charity helps: The Commission identified seven charitable 
beneficiary groups, which were given code numbers from 201 to 207. 
These included children/young people, people with disabilities, and 
the general public/mankind. In case of classification of multiple 
beneficiaries, the beneficiary closest to the trustees’ description in 
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their own words was assessed. The top beneficiary groups of the fraud 
charities were ‘the general public/mankind’ (with 16 appearances) 
and ‘children / young people’ (10). The sample for the beneficiary 
groups was composed of all the identified groups by the Commission.  
5. How the charity operates: The Commission identified ten charitable 
tools of how the charity operates, designated by numbers 301 to 310. 
The tools include ‘makes grants to individuals’, ‘provides human 
resources’, and ‘provides services’. In case of classification of 
multiple tools, the tool closest to the trustees’ description in their own 
words of how the charity helps is assessed. The top tools used for 
providing benefit to the beneficiaries were ‘provides services’ with 22 
charities, followed by four charities identified as ‘makes grants to 
organisations’. The reason ‘provides services’ was the top tool for 
more than half of the charities is believed to be that it provides a more 
generic and broad coverage of the facilities undertaken by the 
charities. The sample for the beneficiary groups was composed of all 
the identified groups except ‘Other charitable activities’.  
6. Income: The Commission identified ten income brackets (includes 
donations, grants any other types of income), ranging from £0-1 (this 
includes charities that do not have any current income) to over £10 
million. The income of fraud charities was identified depending on 
the ‘fraud year’. Except for three cases, the income of the no-fraud 
charity was in the same income range as the fraud charity to which it 
was matched. The three exceptions arose when there were insufficient 
charities to choose from in the same income range, and in these cases 
the income was in the previous or subsequent income range.  
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show that, in terms of geography and income, the fraud 
and matched no-fraud charities are quite similar. 
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Table	 9.2	Matching	 of	 fraud	 and	 no-fraud	 charities	 in	 terms	 of	 purpose,	
beneficiary	group,	operation	method	used	and	where	the	charity	operates	
Matching tool                                       Fraud charities      No-fraud charities 
Charitable Purpose Number of charities Number of charities 
103- The advancement of health or 
saving of lives 
10 10 
108- Religious activities 7 7 
102-Education / training 4 4 
104- Disability 4 4 
105-The prevention or relief of poverty 4 4 
101- General charitable purposes 3 3 
106- Overseas aid / famine relief 2 2 
107- Accommodation/      housing 2 2 
111- Animals 2 2 
109- Arts/culture/heritage /science 1 1 
110- Amateur sport 1 1 
113-  Economic / community 
development / employment 
1 1 
115- Human rights / religious or racial 
harmony / equality or diversity 
1 1 
Total 42 42 
Who the Charity Helps   
207- The general public/mankind 16 16 
201- Children / young people 10 10 
203- People with disabilities 5 5 
204- People of a particular ethnic or 
racial origin 
4 4 
202- Elderly/old people 3 3 
206- Other defined groups 3 3 
205- Other charities or voluntary 
bodies 
1 1 
Total 
42 42 
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How the Charity Operates   
306- Provides services 22 22 
302- Makes grants to organisations 4 4 
307- Provides advocacy/advice/ 
information 
4 4 
301- Makes grants to individuals 3 3 
303- Provides other finance 2 2 
304- Provides human resources 2 2 
305- Provides buildings/facilities/open 
space 
2 2 
309- Acts as an umbrella or resource 
body 
2 2 
308- Sponsors or undertakes research 1 1 
Total 42 42 
Where the charity operates   
Inside the UK 33 33 
Outside of the UK 4 3 
Both outside and inside of the UK  
Total  
5 
42 
6 
42 
Fraud Year: 2002 1 2003 2 2004 1 2006 3 2007 1 2008 4 2009 2 2010 3 2011 3 
2012 4 2013 9 2014 8 2016 1  
Notes: The number of fraudulent events being higher after the year 2012 is not believed to 
be explained by fraudulent events happened more frequently but rather the increase in 
number of inquiries and reports published by the Commission. As the Commission generally 
publishes the documents a few years after the investigation began, there seems to be a positive 
correlation between more published documents and fraudulent events.  
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Table	9.3	Matching	of	fraud	and	no-fraud	charities	in	terms	of	Income	
 Fraud Charities 
Total Income 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
No-Fraud Charities 
Total Income 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Income Range £126,056,897.50 
£3,001,354.70 
£350,430.00 
£7,525,616.00 
£113,076,218.00 
£2,692,290.90 
£337,279.50 
£6,732,786.66 
£0 - £1 - - 
£2 - £1000 - - 
£1,001 - £5,000 1 - 
£5,001 - £10,000 - 1 
£10,001 - £25,000 2 2 
£25,001 - £100,000 8 9 
£100,001 - £500,000 12 12 
£500,001 - £1,000,000 7 6 
£1,000,001 - £10,000,000 9 9 
10 - £10,000,001 and over 3 3 
Total 42  42 
Notes: The difference of £13 million of the total income between fraud and no-fraud charities 
derives mainly from two charities whose income was well above the £10 million range. 
Despite efforts to match with a no fraud charity with closer income, the difference of income 
between matched fraud and no-fraud charities were about £11 million. 
The matching of the fraud with no-fraud charities in terms of income is first performed for 
the most up to date financial document, as the Commission database covers only the last 5 
years. The annual report and financial statements of the no-fraud charity for the fraud year is 
assessed consequently.  
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For the three fraud and no-fraud charities whose income were below £25,000, any type of 
accountant or independent examination was also accepted to be a form of voluntary 
disclosure of information and therefore a signal to the stakeholders that their accounts have 
been scrutinised by a third party. Therefore they were also included in the analysis.  
9.2 Content	analysis	and	variance	identification	
This section first provides information on how the content analysis of 
disclosed information (annual reports and financial statements) is conducted 
for both the fraud and no-fraud charities. The section then explains the 
identification of variances that are used in the univariate and logistic 
regression analysis.  
9.2.1 Document	content	analysis	
After the identification of fraud charities and the matching of fraud charities 
with no-fraud charities, content analysis of the annual reports and financial 
statements and any other administrative documents began. As documentation 
and deriving data from these documents play a crucial role in quantitative 
methods, the best pathway to identify and utilise the information has been 
chosen in this study. As a result, content analysis is utilised as it enables a 
researcher to systematically identify specific characteristics of messages 
(Stemler, 2001) and simplifies use of replicable inferences from texts (Drisko 
and Maschi, 2015). The annual reports and financial statements were assessed 
to identify both variables to test hypotheses and control variables and to 
gather data. As documents are frequently used as a source of analysis for 
quantitative research, the financial statements provided enough information 
for the analysis. Ensuring that document quality and authenticity, credibility 
and representativeness (Scott, 1990) was achieved by using documents 
officially submitted to the Charity Commission. The categorisation of the 
derived information needed little, and for some variables no, interpretation 
(Drisko and Maschi, 2015) which made the content analysis straightforward.  
Previous literature has shown that annual reviews and more narrative 
information provides information that is especially useful and understandable 
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to donors and other stakeholders (Connolly and Dhanani, 2006; Connolly and 
Hyndman, 2013b). However, because the fraud sample is composed mainly 
of middle or small sized charities, nearly all of them lacked separate annual 
reviews and extensive narrative parts in the annual reports. Therefore, the 
main focus point of the study became the annual report and the financial 
statements. The annual report and financial statements have been shown to be 
useful sources of information, as they are official sources of accounting 
disclosure mechanisms. Also because annual report and financial statements 
are standardised and produced regularly, they enable comparative analysis to 
be conducted effectively (Guthrie et al., 2004). 
The annual reports and financial statements varied among charities especially 
in page number and the topics covered. Whereas charities which have income 
below £250,000 had only a basic income statement and balance sheet without 
any further explanations of activities, charities which had greater income 
generally made reports of over 10 pages and had sections such as activities 
during the year. 77 out of 84 charity financial statement reports had a separate 
‘independent auditor report’ or ‘examiner’s report’ or ‘accountant’s report’. 
Seven charities lacked an auditor’s report and some, mainly fraud charities, 
had a qualified opinion or the auditor abstained from commenting due to lack 
of information and documents. 
9.2.2 Variance	identification	
To determine and identify possible variables to test hypothesis and control 
variables, the literature on for-profit sector fraud studies was examined as the 
work for the not-for-profit sector is very limited. It was found that the sectors 
differ in a variety of aspects and therefore variables suitable for the for-profit 
sector are not suitable or simply do not exist for the not-for-profit or charity 
sector. New variables came to light through the use of content analysis. 
Most variables which are found in the literature could not be used for three 
main reasons. First, some variables were only suitable in the for-profit sector, 
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such as: proportion of independent outside members of the board and 
committees, Big 4 auditor’s percentage in performing audit, existence of 
internal audit function, growth rate of assets, existence of IPO, stock trading, 
percentage of ownership in the firm held by insiders, percentage of 
outstanding common stock shares, block holders shares, and shares held by 
management.. Secondly, frequently used variables such as geography, size, 
age, organisational category, income were deliberately not used in the 
regression analysis as they were utilised during the matching process.  
Thirdly, some variables which were believed to be useful in the analysis and 
were thought to be able to be derived from the content analysis were 
unobtainable due to limited information available in the annual report and 
financial statements and other possible documents. These variables included 
existence of parent organisation, resignation of auditor, board member 
expertise, expertise of Chief Financial Officer (or Chief Accounting Officer 
or Controller). Also, the diversity of the board of trustees and tenure of the 
CEO cannot be detected from the documents. Other variables such as 
disbursement of grant which was used by McDonnell and Rutherford (2018) 
were not observed enough to be utilised. Stakeholders participating on the 
boards were also found to improve and benefit monitoring (Callen et al., 
2003; Nikolova, 2014; Wellens and Jegers, 2011) but they were not assessed 
in the quantitative section due to the absence of appropriate information. 
Another important variable, expense and subtypes of expense was planned to 
be assessed as fluctuating administrative costs might signal a problem 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006). Unfortunately, 
administrative costs and other expenses were not able to be used due to 
limited data to interpret expenses correctly. For example, charitable expense 
or governance expenses could not be directly derived from the content 
analysis, because many charities do not disaggregate these expenses, merely 
reporting a total expenses figure. 
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The findings of the qualitative research, explained in Chapters 7 and 8, were 
also utilised in identifying the possible variables. As previously discussed in 
Chapter 5, mixed methods provided the opportunity to examine and identify 
variables in this insufficiently analysed topic. Without the findings of the 
qualitative research, determining the variables would have been more limited 
in scope and would lack a practical foundation. The findings in Chapters 7 
and 8 enabled a complementary link between both methods and guided the 
way of identifying variables.  
The most important finding of the qualitative research was to acknowledge 
the importance of charity stakeholders. Therefore, when identifying the 
variables, stakeholder involvement or oversight was also taken into account. 
The findings made it necessary to focus on the board of trustees and much as 
on the donors and beneficiaries.  
As lack of an effective control and oversight was found to be the main cause 
of fraud in Chapter 7, the study especially focused on variables which may 
have direct impact on the control environment. Other important fraud reasons 
such as lack of segregation of duties and lack of effective anti-fraud policies 
and organisational culture were also taken into account when identifying the 
variables. The identification of the variables also are in line with the findings 
regarding Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle (Roden et al., 2016). While an 
attempt was made to derive variables from all components of the triangle, 
opportunity and therefore control environment were put in the first place.  
As a result, the study originally planned to use variables for POLICY and 
DUALITY. The control variable POLICY, which aimed to assess the effects 
of culture and ethics, was intended to be measured by examining if the 
charities have existing fraud and/or risk policies or not. Although a handful 
of charities recorded some kind of risk and/or fraud policy in their annual 
reports, the number was too limited to be meaningful and the context of 
‘policy’ was varied, as some charities had a separate heading and paragraphs 
explaining the policy whereas others mentioned that they had a policy but 
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used only one sentence for this. Therefore the variable POLICY was not used 
in the analysis. The variable DUALITY, which aimed to assess trustees also 
holding a managerial position, was discarded from use because duality of 
trustees and management could not be assessed appropriately, as smaller 
charities do not have existing managerial staff but rather the trustees act as 
managers, without receiving any benefits, consistent with charity law 
requirements. As DUALITY could not be used, REMUNERATION was 
instead used as a control variable to differentiate among charity trustees who 
receive remuneration and/or other gains to assess if the trustees were 
receiving any kind of benefit for their services or not. 
The variables were kept as faithful as possible to their original values. 
Continuous variables were kept as continuous because dichotomising these 
variables is argued to cause loss of statistical power and result in false positive 
outcomes (Altman and Royston, 2006). MacCallum et al. (2002) and Royston 
et al. (2006) also suggest that data set should be left continuous and only 
dichotomised if continuous data cannot be reliably accrued.  
Overall, because the previous literature did not provide a sufficient basis for 
identification and possible outcomes of the variables, this study contributes 
by testing some variables in a new context for the first time, while also 
introducing some completely new variables. 
9.3 The	logistic	regression	model	
As discussed in Chapter 5, logistic regression analysis is used in analysing 
the data. Logistic regression analysis is used as it is the most common data 
analysis technique for fraud studies  (Ngai et al., 2011). Logistic regression 
analysis, being easily formulated, enables fast track and efficient data 
analysis. 
The following logistic regression model, which a more detailed analysis of 
the model was conducted in Chapter 5 is presented below: 
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9.4 Univariate	Analysis,	Normality	and	Multicollinearity	Tests	
The identified variables are assessed by using univariate analysis and 
normality and multicollinearity tests in this section. 
9.4.1 Normality	test	
The study also assessed the normality of the possible variables in order to 
determine which goodness of fit tests will be utilised for the models. None of 
the variables were normally distributed as being found in Appendix A, which 
was tested by using Skewness and Kurtosis Z-values and Shapiro-Wilk test 
p-value (Razali and Wah, 2011).The histograms and Q-Q plots for both fraud 
and no-fraud charities were also visually assessed (Appendix B22) which 
shows that the variables are not normally distributed. Therefore during the 
analysis of the logistic regression models, Chi-Square and Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of fit will be used (Harrell Jr, 2015; Hosmer Jr et al., 
2013). 
9.4.2 Univariate	analysis	
The research methodology uses both univariate analysis and logistic (logit) 
regression analysis to examine differences between 42 fraud charities and 42 
no-fraud charities. Univariate analysis is first performed in order to initially 
assess and identify variables, which significantly differ between fraud and no-
fraud charities (Hosmer Jr et al., 2008). By utilising univariate analysis, 
variables which do not differ between the fraud and no-fraud charities are 
                                                
22	Only	the	histograms	of	continuous	variables	are	presented	as	histograms	for	the	dummy	
variables	makes	little	use	
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disregarded (Roden et al., 2016; Skousen et al., 2009). Therefore, the means 
variables of the fraud and no-fraud charities are examined. The analysis used 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests and paired t-tests to assess the significance of 
difference in mean values of fraud and no-fraud charities. Table 9.4 depicts 
the findings regarding the univariate analysis:  
Table	9.4	Univariate	Analysis	of	fraud	and	no	fraud	charities	
               
 
Fraud 
Mean 
No Fraud 
Mean 
Wilcoxon 
Z-Scores 
Wilcoxon 
P-value 
t-statistics 
T-value 
t-statistics 
P-value 
 
ASSURANCE 0.285 
 
 
   0.071 
 
 
  -2.324   0.020 
 
  2.460 
 
   0.018 
 
*** 
LOSS 0.357 
 
 
   0.405 
 
 
  -0.535   0.593 
 
  -0.530 
 
   0.599 
 
 
COMMITTEE 0.071 
 
 
   0.214 
 
 
  -2.121   0.034 
 
  -2.218 
 
   0.032 
 
** 
SURNAME 0.333 
 
 
   0.191 
 
 
  -1.414   0.157 
 
  1.432 
 
   0.160 
 
 
REMUNER-
ATION 
0.214 
 
 
   0.071 
 
 
  -1.732   0.083 
 
  1.776 
 
   0.083 
 
* 
TRUSTEE   5.333      8.000   -3.494   0.000   -3.694    0.001 *** 
 
GRANT 0.110 
 
 
   0.311 
 
 
  -2.600   0.009 
 
  -2.896 
 
   0.006 
 
*** 
 
RESTRICTED 0.159 
 
 
   0.231 
 
 
  -1.496   0.135 
 
  -1.160 
 
   0.253 
 
 
 
The univariate analysis helped to identify 5 variables (ASSURANCE, 
COMMITTEE, REMUNERATION, TRUSTEE and GRANT) for which 
fraud charities differ significantly from no-fraud charities, as mean 
differences are significant (p<0.1). RESTRICTED, a test variable and two 
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other variables, LOSS and SURNAME, were disregarded for the logistic 
regression model as univariate analysis showed that fraud charities do not 
differ significantly from no-fraud charities.  
 
Overall, apart from the RESTRICTED, LOSS and SURNAME variables, 
pairwise comparison univariate analysis suggests that fraud charities have 
fewer trustees and who receive remuneration. Fraud charities also are less 
dependent on grants and are subject to more problematic23 audit reports when 
compared to no-fraud charities. Fraud charities have also fewer committees. 
However because univariate analysis uses more basic examination techniques 
than logistic regression analysis, it is viewed with more caution. Therefore, 
logistic regression analysis is performed to test the variables on a multivariate 
basis. Based on the outcome of the univariate analysis, the variables of 
TRUSTEE, GRANT, ASSURANCE, REMUNERATION and 
COMMITTEE and will be used in the logistic regression analysis. 
9.4.3 Multicollinearity		
The study examined multicollinearity among the variables found significant 
in the univariate analysis in order to obtain the highest predictive value per 
variable, as multicollinearity between the variables will not contribute to the 
predictive value of the logistic regression model (Midi et al., 2010). Table 9.5 
depicts the multicollinearity between the variables by using both Kendall’s 
and Spearman’s collinearity models. These models are used instead of 
Pearson’s collinearity model as none of the variables are normally distributed 
(Dormann et al., 2013, p.44). The variables are tested for multicollinearity to 
assess if there is any high correlations (0.7 or above) between variables (Hair 
                                                
23 Qualified examiner reports or reports where examiners abstained to comment 
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et al., 2010). The results of the Kendall’s and Spearman’s models for each 
variable found no multicollinearity among the variables. Therefore, all the 
variables contribute to the predictive value of the logistic regression model 
and will be used in further assessment (Hair et al., 2010).. 
Table	9.5	Assessment	of	multicollinearity	
 TRUSTEE 
 
Kendall 
Spearman 
GRANT 
 
Kendall 
Spearman 
ASSURANCE 
 
Kendall 
Spearman 
REMUNER-
ATION 
Kendall 
Spearman 
COMMITTEE 
Kendall 
Spearman 
TRUSTEE 1.000 
1.000 
.313 
.395 
-.289 
-.339 
   -.060 
   -.070 
 .332 
 .389 
GRANT  .313 
 .395 
1.000 
1.000 
-.235 
-.257 
  -.103 
   -.112 
 .050 
 .055 
ASSURANCE -.289 
-.339 
-.235 
-.257 
1.000 
1.000 
   -.190 
   -.190 
-.190 
-.190 
REMUNERATION -.060 
-.070 
-.103 
-.112 
-.190 
-.190 
   1.000 
   1.000 
-.167 
-.167 
COMMITTEE .332 
.389 
.050 
.055 
-.190 
-.190 
   -.167 
   -.167 
1.000 
1.000 
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9.5 Findings	of	Logistic	Regression	Analysis	
Although the univariate analysis provided important results, logistic 
regression will test the hypotheses (about TRUSTEE and GRANT), 
controlled by ASSURANCE, REMUNERATION, COMMITTEE (Beasley, 
1996; Skousen et al., 2009).  
From here onwards, manually stepwise regression will be utilised, in which 
first, each of the two test variables will be tested alone. Thereafter, the test 
variables will be tested together. As a result, the association among the test 
variables will be assessed (Roden et al., 2016). As the test variables are tested 
for the first time, stepwise regression is used to examine the relationship 
among the variables and to understand the dynamics of each variable and to 
obtain the most inclusive logistic regression model (Bendel and Afifi, 1977). 
Each model table will include exploratory values of coefficient, standard error 
for the unstandardized beta (SE), the Wald test (Wald) and the significance 
of the variables (sig). Also, for each tested model, R2 (Nagelkerke model), 
Chi-square, Hosmer-Lemeshow of the model will be examined. 
The coefficients used in the model explain the relationship between the 
dependent and test and control variables (Hosmer Jr et al., 2008). If the 
coefficient is positive than both the dependent and test and control variables 
react in the same direction (Harrell Jr, 2015), if the coefficient is negative 
then the dependent and the test and control variables react in opposite 
directions (Hair et al., 2010).  Significance explains how powerful is the test 
or control variable in explaining the dependent variables (Xu et al., 2017). If 
the p value is less than 0.1 then the test or control variables is considered to 
be significant (Harris and Bromiley, 2007), that is, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero may be rejected. The Wald test also tests the 
significance of each test or control variable. The Wald test suggests that the 
higher the Wald test score, the more the test or control variable is significant 
in explaining the dependent variables (Field, 2009), and that a value of “0” 
should indicate that the variable can be omitted from the model (Angrist and 
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Pischke, 2008). The unstandardized beta (SE) also is used to test the 
significance of a test or control variable as a lower SE implies a better 
significance for the variables (Hair et al., 2010). R2 explains the percentage 
test and control variables can explain the variations in the dependent variable 
and that Nagelkerke's R2 provides a range between 0 to 1 (Field, 2009). Both 
Chi-Square and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests explain how well 
the data used fits in the model. Both for Chi-Square and Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness of fit tests, the higher the value, the better the data fits to the model 
(Hosmer Jr et al., 2008). 
9.5.1 TRUSTEE	as	test	variable		
The logit regression results are in line with the univariate findings. The test 
variable TRUSTEE is statically significant (p<.05) when ASSURANCE, 
REMUNERATION and COMMITTEE are used as control variables.  While 
ASSURANCE and REMUNERATION were statistically significant, 
COMMITTEE was not found to be significant which suggests that it does not 
have impact on the likelihood of fraud. Table 9.6 presents the findings of the 
logistic regression analysis when TRUSTEE was used as the test variable:  
Table	9.6	Logistic	Regression	Results	for	the	Probability	of	Fraud	–	TRUSTEE	
as	variable	to	test	hypothesis	
Test Variables Coefficient S.E WALD SIG. 
TRUSTEE -.170 .077 4.911 .027 
Control Variables     
ASSURANCE 1.416 .736 3.695 .055 
REMUNERATION 1.573 .779 4.074 .044 
COMMITTEE -.128 .793 .026 .872 
R2: .274 / Chi-Square test of model’s fit:  19.296  
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test: .383 Cross-Validation Prediction: % 77.4   
The model can explain the 27.4% of the fraud and no-fraud events used in the 
sample. The Chi-square statistic of 19.296 (4 degrees of freedom) rejects the 
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null hypothesis that there is equality among variable coefficients. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test result of 0.383 depicts that the model is a good fit. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with H1 as the model depicts that a higher 
number of trustees is negatively correlated with fraudulent events in the 
charity sector. That is, fraud is more likely to occur in charities with small 
boards rather than in charities with large boards. This finding posits that, as 
previously argued by the literature (Bai, 2013; Brown and Guo, 2010; de 
Andrés-Alonso et al., 2009; Olson, 2000), larger boards tend to have a better 
monitoring and oversight capability than smaller boards in the not-for-profit 
sector. The results do not indicate the optimal number of trustees to prevent 
fraud. As charities with more income tend to have larger boards, the results 
may be too limited to be generalised. However, an important finding is that, 
whereas 17 fraud charities had 3 or fewer trustees, only 4 no-fraud charities 
had 3 or fewer trustees.  
9.5.2 GRANT	as	test	variable		
The logit regression results are in line with the univariate results. When 
ASSURANCE, REMUNERATION and COMMITTEE are used as control 
variables, the variable GRANT is statically significant (p<0.1). As such, in 
the case for Section 9.5.1, COMMITTEE was not found to be significant 
while ASSURANCE and REMUNERATION were statistically significant, 
suggesting that COMMITTEE did not affect the likelihood of fraud. Table 
9.7 presents the findings of the logistic regression analysis when GRANT was 
used as the test variable: 
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Table	9.7	Logistic	Regression	Results	for	the	Probability	of	Fraud	-	GRANT	as	
variable	to	test	hypothesis	
Test Variables Coefficient S.E WALD SIG. 
GRANT -1.412 .752 3.528 .060 
Control Variables     
ASSURANCE 1.558 .733 4.520 .034 
REMUNERATION 1.303 .751 3.010 .083 
COMMITTEE -.774 .750 1.066 .302 
R2: .253 / Chi-Square test of model’s fit:  17.701  
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test: .863 / Cross-Validation Prediction: % 69.0  
25.3% of the fraud and no-fraud events used in the sample can be explained 
by the model. The Chi-square statistic of 17.701 (4 degrees of freedom) 
rejects the null hypothesis that there is equality among variable coefficients. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow result of 0.863 depicts that the model is a good fit. 
Overall, a higher percentage of grant income is negatively correlated with 
fraud in the charity sector. This is consistent with H2. The finding is important 
as it demonstrates the influence of grants in preventing fraud in the charity 
sector. Grants have been found in previous studies to be associated with a 
higher degree of monitoring and oversight (Boris et al., 2010). Consistently 
with the findings of Nikolova (2014), this study concludes that receipt of 
grants limits agency problems and provides a sign of quality and 
trustworthiness of an organisation. However, the study does not overlap with 
Nikolova’s (2014) findings that restricted funds are effective in mitigating 
agency problems, as this study could not find a significant association 
between restricted funds and fraud.  
9.5.3 GRANT	and	TRUSTEES	as	test	variables			
Of the two hypotheses, the results from the logit regression incorporating both 
GRANT and TRUSTEES as test variables support H1 only. The outcome of 
the regression analysis does not support H2, as GRANT ceased to be 
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statistically significant (p>0.1) in this model. Like the results under the two 
previous models, while ASSURANCE and REMUNERATION were 
statistically significant COMMITTEE was not. The model provides the 
highest R2 value with variables can explain the 29.6% of fraud and no-fraud 
events in the charity sector. Table 9.8 presents the findings of the logistic 
regression analysis when TRUSTEE and GRANT together were used 
together as test variables: 
Table	9.8	Logistic	Regression	Results	 for	the	Probability	of	Fraud	–	GRANT	
and	TRUSTEE	as	variables	to	test	hypothesis	
Test Variables  Coefficient  S.E WALD SIG. 
TRUSTEE 
GRANT 
-.143 
-1.013 
.079 
.769 
3.258 
1.738 
.071 
.187 
Control Variables     
ASSURANCE 1.320 .750 3.094 .079 
REMUNERATION 1.430 .785 3.323 .068 
COMMITTEE -.222 .807 .076 .783 
R2: .296 / Chi-Square test of model’s fit: 21.116 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test: .276 / Cross-Validation Prediction: % 72.6  
Overall, in none of the models were the test variables significant at the 
(p<0.01) level. However, TRUSTEE was significant with (p<0.05) level 
when alone, and GRANT was significant at the (p<0.1) level when alone. The 
findings suggest that more trustees and higher grant income are likely to 
reduce fraud in the charity sector. 
9.5.4 Overall	assessment	of	the	model	
Regarding the variables, TRUSTEE comes as a forerunner for being the most 
significant variable in the two models used for all SE, WALD and SIG. Also 
there is a negative correlation between FRAUD and TRUSTEE, suggesting 
that a higher number of trustees is significantly important in preventing or 
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minimising the risk of fraud by enhancing the monitoring component of 
governance in charities (Jetty and Beattie, 2012; Bellante, 2016). Although 
not as strong as TRUSTEE, both ASSURANCE and REMUNERATION as 
control variables were found significantly effective on the model and the 
findings suggest that there is positive correlation between charity fraud and 
both the existence of problematic assurance and charity trustees receiving 
remuneration. 
The higher rate of GRANT received in terms of charity income is found to 
deter as found by previous literature (Reheul et al., 2014; Yetman and 
Yetman, 2012). Although GRANT is highly significant when tested alone the 
significance diminishes by a high percentage when tested with TRUSTEE 
and therefore this finding implies that the variable GRANT is not as important 
as TRUSTEE in explaining FRAUD in the charity sector.  
There is negative correlation between the existence of committees and fraud 
cases, as suggested by previous literature (Vafeas, 1999; Fanning and Cogger, 
1998). The variable COMMITTEE has the lowest significance when 
examined by using SE, WALD and SIG. It can even be suggested that 
COMMITTEE is the variable that has the smallest effect in the model and the 
model will not be losing much if the variable is omitted. However as existence 
of COMMITEE increases the R2, and therefore the explanatory power of the 
model, it is still used in the assessment of the predictive model.  
Although depending on each model and study itself, literature in accounting 
and management suggest that R2 should be above 25% for the model to be 
effective and explanatory (Cohen, 1992). All the models are above 25% in 
terms of R2 and even near to 30% when all 5 variables used in the model. All 
the models had high Chi-Square test of model’s fit: and none of the models 
were below 0.1 regarding Hosmer-Lemeshow Test suggesting that the models 
have good fits (Hosmer Jr et al., 2008). 
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As previously suggested for the for-profit studies (Arens et al., 2012; Cullinan 
and Sutton, 2002; Power, 1997) and not-for-profit studies (Greenlee et al., 
2007; Kummer et al., 2015), audit is found to be an important tool in 
preventing fraud. This study also found a positive correlation between 
problematic independent examination reports such as; qualified reports, 
auditors/accountants unable to comment because of missing documentation; 
and fraud events in the charity sector. The study however cannot assess the 
impact of internal audit as most of the charities examined lacked an internal 
auditor or an internal audit was not mentioned in their policy documents. 
Board of trustee members do not generally receive remuneration in the charity 
sector. The study found that a higher number of trustees of fraud charities 
received remuneration compared to the no-fraud charities. The findings in the 
for-profit sector regarding the relation between remuneration and fraud vary. 
Whereas some literature argued that an effective remuneration system is 
associated with effective tackling of agency problems (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), some other studies found that especially 
stock incentives lead to more fraud (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Lie, 2005; Roden 
et al., 2016). Therefore, the relation between remuneration and fraud in the 
charity sector needs further assessment.   
Unlike the independent examination and remuneration, the existence on 
committees did not show an effect on fraud when assessed in the logistic 
regression, as COMMITTEE was insignificant in all 3 models examined. 
Existence of committees either audit, remuneration or nomination, was 
generally found to reduce the fraud risk in the for-profit sector (Uzun et al., 
2004; Vafeas, 1999; Fanning and Cogger, 1998). Beasley (1996) on the other 
hand found no significant effect of audit committees in preventing fraud. The 
univariate analysis showed that existence of committees was significant 
between fraud and no-fraud charities. However the number is still limited: 
only 9 no-fraud charities and 3 fraud charities had committees in their 
organisational structure. The types of committees were various, from 
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development to risk therefore the study did not concentrated on a single type 
of committee. 
In order to assess the predictive strength of the model and to understand if the 
model is being effective in predicting fraud and no-fraud charities, as 
conducted by similar studies (Skousen et al. ,2009; Kaminski et al., 2004), 
the predictive accuracy of the model is tested in the next section. 
9.6 Assessment	of	the	Predictive	Model	
This section first assesses the predictive accuracy of the logistic regression 
model. After that two charities which were wrongly predicted are further 
examined to discuss the weaknesses of the model. 
9.6.1 The	predictive	model	
The study uses cross-validation in order to assess if the results of the logistic 
regression are applicable to the sample of 84 fraud and no-fraud charities. 
Cross-validation enables one to utilise the original sample and test the 
prediction of the model. Kuruppu et al. (2003) posits that cross-validation is 
effective when the sample size is small. The study uses a leave-one-out cross-
validation technique in which the original 84 observations are used to test the 
predictive accuracy of the model. 
Table 9.9 shows that the model can classify 71.4% (calculated by 60 right 
prediction – 31 no fraud and 29 fraud charities – over the total of 84 cases) of 
the charities accurately, in that classification is correct for 69% of fraud 
charities and for 73.8% of no-fraud charities. Compared with Skousen et al. 
(2009) and Kaminski et al. (2004), the classification percentage is on par or 
higher and important as a high percentage of fraud and no-fraud charities were 
classified accurately. The misclassification is 28.6% for the total of 84 
charities, i.e. 26.2% for no-fraud group and 31% for the fraud group. 13 and 
11 charities were misclassified from the fraud and no-fraud samples 
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respectively. Appendix C shows each case of both fraud and no-fraud 
charities and if they have been correctly predicted by the model.   
Table	9.9	Cross	validation	of	predictions	
  No Fraud Fraud Total 
Count No Fraud 31 11 42 
 Fraud 13 29 42 
% No Fraud 73.8 26.2 100.0 
 Fraud 31.0 69.0 100.0 
Overall, use of the cross-validation procedure enabled a test of the predictive 
accuracy of the model. The prediction accuracy of above 70% is important 
(Skousen et al., 2009) as it shows that the model is capable of detecting fraud 
with high accuracy. The high accuracy also justifies the future use of these 
variables in other work.   
9.6.2 Further	assessment	of	the	predictive	model	
Although the predictive accuracy of the model is high, a substantial amount 
of fraud and no-fraud charities were inaccurately predicted. Therefore, this 
section assesses one fraud charity which was identified as no-fraud by the 
prediction model and one no-fraud charity which was identified as fraudulent 
in order to examine the inaccurate identification. 
Charity CF3 is identified as one of the fraud charities which was wrongly 
predicted to be no-fraud. The charity was removed from the charity register 
due to financial misconduct and allegations regarding its CEO and trustees. 
In the fraud year, the charity had more than 10 trustees, and both restricted 
and grant income of over 75%. The charity also had an unqualified audit 
report, none of the trustees received remuneration and all trustees had 
different surnames. The only apparently weak point was that the charity did 
not had committees in its organisational structure. When the Charity 
Commission’s inquiry report was assessed, it was realised that the trustees 
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had little oversight of the CEO who was using charity resources for his/her 
benefit without being authorised by the trustees. It is apparent that the 
segregation of duties was insufficient in the charity and that there was little 
or no oversight on the CEO. This example is important to show that adequate 
authorisation and effective control environment are crucial in tackling fraud 
in the charity sector. 
The second example is a no-fraud charity which was predicted to be 
fraudulent by the model. CNF32 is still a registered charity as of September 
2019. The charity had only 5 trustees during the matching year, and it did not 
have a committee. Further, none of its income is restricted or is derived from 
a grant. This led the model to inaccurately predict the no-fraud charity as 
fraudulent. However, the charity had an unqualified audit report with no 
trustees having the same surname or receiving remuneration. This example 
also shows that quantitative governance aspects may be limited in predicting 
fraud. Therefore, qualitative as well as quantitative findings should be 
elaborated together in order to understand and provide better fraud solutions 
to the charity sector. 
9.7 Conclusion	
The quantitative part of the study provided important results despite some 
limitations. The study uses logit regression for fraud in the not-for-profit 
sector, which is one of the first of its kind, therefore most of the test and 
control variables were used for the first time. Use of cross-validation 
enhanced the authenticity of the model and validated the use of the variables.  
Therefore, identification of variables for the first time was the most important 
contribution to the literature. The main limitation was sample size, due to 
insufficient availability of charity information. 
Both the univariate and multivariate analyses provide important results. From 
the univariate results especially, it is clear that governance plays a role in 
deterring and preventing fraud in the charity sector. Univariate analysis led to 
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the discarding of variables which had little significance and therefore eased 
the process for the logistic regression model. Regarding the logistic 
regression model, despite TRUSTEE being statistically significant either used 
alone or in combination, GRANT lost its significance when used together 
with TRUSTEE. The results of the logistic regression are in line with the 
previous literature that larger boards enhance monitoring in the not-for-profit 
sector. Finding that a small number of trustees occurs more often in fraud 
charities corresponds with the qualitative section of this thesis that charities 
have a ‘small cosy environment’.  Although losing its significance in the last 
model, absence or low grant funding deprives charities of long-term donor 
monitoring, which is also important in fraud occurrence. The high accuracy 
of prediction of the model enables the model and therefore the variables to be 
developed for further use. 
The results do not enable one to identify a single governance aspect as crucial 
in minimising fraud in the charity sector. The study suggests that the not-for-
profit sector variables and governance structure are different from those of 
the for-profit sector. The results of the study suggest that the governance 
implications in that sector are not directly applicable to prevent charity fraud. 
As will be discussed in the Chapter 10, the results of the quantitative study 
must be addressed together with the results of the qualitative studies, which 
the findings were examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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PART	V	
10. DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSION	
This chapter discusses the findings of both the qualitative and quantitative 
parts of the study and presents a conclusion. The study’s qualitative and the 
quantitative findings individually provide important and interesting results. 
However, different stages of the study complement each other and therefore 
they need reassessment together. Therefore Section 10.1 both presents a 
general overview of the findings but also summarises them in the order of the 
research questions. The chapter also lists the contributions of the study in 
Section 10.2 and examines the limitations encountered while conducting the 
research in Section 10.3. Policy recommendations and implications for future 
research are discussed in Sections 10.4 and 10.5 respectively. Section 10.6 
concludes the chapter and the research. 
302	|	P a g e 	
	
 
Figure	10.1	Structure	of	Chapter	10	
10.1 Review	of	findings	
10.1.1 A	General	Overview	
The fraud problem in the charity sector is multi-dimensional in terms of the 
reasons, the effects and the possible remedies to minimise it. The findings 
clearly demonstrate it is neither possible to fully grasp the problem nor to 
develop a solution to this problem solely based on a for-profit approach. 
Compared with the for-profit sector, the roots, understanding, and possible 
solutions to the problem should be unique to the charity or not-for-profit 
sector in general. Therefore, the use of an integrated theory and mixed 
methods turned out to be appropriate for this research in order to provide a 
more holistic understanding of charity fraud. The qualitative and quantitative 
studies revealed important findings when elaborated together. 
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The reasons for fraud, taking qualitative and quantitative findings together, 
are: excessive trust, lack of segregation of duties, lack of effective control and 
policies, a low number or inadequate number of trustees and lack of 
stakeholder oversight. The aggregation of the two methods also identified 
solutions to the problem: enhanced prosecution, taking into account red 
signals such as problematic audit reports and remuneration, a higher number 
of trustees, enhanced stakeholder oversight by using grants, and stakeholders 
involved in charity boards, committees or decision making. Figure 10.2 
provides a synopsis of the qualitative and quantitative findings.  
 
Figure	10.2	Reasons	and	Solutions	to	the	Fraud	Problem	in	the	Charity	Sector	
Source (Author) 
10.1.2 Understanding	Accountability	in	the	Charity	Sector	
The first research question (RQ1a) examines the accountability dynamics in 
the charity sector. Beneficiaries were found to be on a par with donors with 
respect to the discharge of accountability. Interestingly financial statements 
and annual reports, the main tools used in the charity sector to discharge 
accountability, were not found to target the beneficiaries.  Therefore, the 
actual practice of the discharge of accountability was found to be 
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unsatisfactory. As previously discussed, beneficiaries were found to be 
neglected by charities in discharging accountability because they are believed 
to have limited effect on decision making. The stakeholders were found to 
prefer accountability that is more inclusive rather than receiving loads of 
information. The stakeholders required an overarching accountability 
mechanism in which they would be informed without dealing with technical 
details.  
The accountability framework discussed in Chapter 2 was also found to be 
informal for the charity sector, especially for donors and beneficiaries. The 
informality is also found to hinder effective monitoring that could have been 
provided by the donors and beneficiaries. The interaction among the charity 
stakeholders is also found to be limited. While auditors/accountants do not 
interact at all with donors and beneficiaires, the relationships of the charity 
with regulator and watchdog organisations is also superficial. The 
relationship between donors and beneficiaries, the two most important 
stakeholder groups, barely exists. 
10.1.3 Ownership	and	Stakeholder	Salience	in	the	Charity	Sector	
The second research question (RQ1b) assesses how stakeholders identify 
ownership and stakeholder salience in the charity sector. The findings of the 
study provided important information regarding the direct use of for-profit 
accountability and governance theories in the not-for-profit sector and how 
appropriate it is to use a single theory in that sector. It was found that, unlike 
the for-profit sector, which has shareholders as the definitive owner, the 
charity sector possesses multiple principals. The multi-principal environment 
in the charity sector is also found to be responsible for dispersed and therefore 
inefficient oversight by charity stakeholders. The lack of a main owner is 
found to endanger the monitoring of charities and provide further 
opportunities for fraud. In line with these findings, terms such as ‘agent’, 
‘steward’ and ‘principal’ lose the precision that they have in the for-profit 
sector. The findings suggest that an enhanced agency theory with a broader 
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stakeholder perspective is necessary to understand better the dynamics of the 
fraud problem in the charity sector. Overall, because of the complexity of the 
charity sector, the findings of this study justify the use of an integrated theory 
and a broader focus on the stakeholders for a full understanding of fraud and 
financial misconduct. 
The study also assessed the views of stakeholders regarding Mitchell et al.’s 
(1997) stakeholder salience theory. The findings suggested that none of the 
stakeholders could be depicted as definitive. Although donors are identified 
by interviewees as the most important stakeholder in terms of “power” and 
one of the most important ones for “legitimacy”, in terms of “urgency” 
beneficiaries are ahead of any other stakeholder group. However, 
beneficiaries lack power and therefore are behind donors in terms of 
stakeholder salience. One finding of the research is that specific stakeholder 
groups cannot be placed in a unique position in the diagram. This is because 
the diagram assumes that each of the three dimensions (“power”, “urgency” 
and “legitimacy”) is binary, for example a stakeholder either has power or 
does not have power. This may be valid for individuals, but when a group of 
stakeholders is analysed, it is possible that some members of the group 
possess a particular attribute that others do not. For example, large donors 
may have power over the charity that smaller donors do not.  
10.1.4 Identification	of	fraud	in	the	charity	sector		
The third research question (RQ1c) evaluates how stakeholders conceptualise 
fraud in the charity sector. The fraud problem is recognised by every 
stakeholder group and the awareness of fraud among the stakeholders is high. 
The findings suggest that both sectoral and organisational factors contribute 
to fraud in the charity sector. ‘Excessive trust’ that makes it easier for fraud 
to take place is found to be specific to the charity sector, and this makes the 
sector vulnerable. The good intentions especially displayed by donors and 
beneficiaries cause them to believe that fraud is a trivial risk for the charity 
sector. The fraud problem is also found to affect all types of charities. While 
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in the qualitative study respondents stated that smaller charities, fundraising 
charities and especially international charities were more prone to fraud, it 
was also argued that fraud is a sectoral problem not providing exceptions to 
any kind of charity. The quantitative findings especially the univariate 
analysis also proved that a higher rate of grant receiving is associated with 
less fraud in the charity sector. Therefore, absence of donor oversight and 
being a charity with not grant-receiving also increases the vulnerability 
towards fraud. 
10.1.5 Causes	and	red	flags	of	fraud		
The fourth research question (RQ1d) analyses the reasons identified by 
charity stakeholders for fraud. The qualitative and quantitative findings 
complement each other. The findings of the qualitative section of the study 
suggest that lack of segregation of duties and absence of policies were the 
leading factors of fraud for smaller and larger charities, respectively.  
Although the effect of fraud policy and culture could not be examined in the 
quantitative section, it was found in the same section that charities with few 
trustees and therefore which are unable to allocate enough people for various 
tasks were more prone to fraud.  
Lack of an effective control environment was identified as an important 
reason of fraud in the charity sector by both the qualitative and the 
quantitative sections. This finding is based on two foundations: First, 
respondents unanimously stated that weaknesses in the control environment 
was the most important factor that leads to fraud. Second, opportunity to 
commit fraud, which derives from the lack of an efficient control 
environment, was found by a large margin to be the leading component of 
fraud when respondents were asked about Cressey’s fraud triangle (1953). 
The component “opportunity” is found to be more explanatory of fraud than 
the other two factors: “pressure” and “rationalisation”. 
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In line with the findings of the qualitative section, variables directly and 
indirectly related to the opportunity component of the triangle were examined 
in the quantitative section. The findings suggest that neither restricted income 
nor unrestricted income have an efficiency monitoring effect in terms of 
providing oversight to fraud.. The finding for the grants received provided a 
different picture: charities receiving grants were found to be significantly less 
prone to fraud not only in the univariate analysis but also when the variable 
GRANT was tested with the three other control variables: ASSURANCE, 
REMUNERATION and COMMITTEE.  
The findings also provided information on possible red signals of fraud in the 
charity sector. During the interviews, the stakeholders identified possible red 
signals as: lack of documentation, disproportionate use of cash, and 
aggressively commanding figures. The quantitative analysis found that a 
problematic audit report, the existence of remuneration for trustees, and lack 
of committees are possible red flags for fraud. While the existence of 
committees lost its significance under the logistic regression model, 
problematic audit reports and receiving remuneration were identified as 
crucial signals.  
The findings from the qualitative section also provide some clues about fraud 
perpetrators.  The characteristics of power to supervise and administer money 
are found to indicate the main perpetrators of fraud in the charity sector.  
10.1.6 Stakeholders’	perceptions	on	how	to	tackle	fraud	
The fifth research question (RQ1e) appraises the solutions to fraud identified 
by the charity stakeholders. The most frequent solutions to fraud suggested 
by the respondents were: an established anti-fraud culture, tone at the top, 
whistleblowing, segregation of duties, a dual authorisation process, an 
efficient control environment, and effective internal and external oversight. 
Whistleblowing, tone at the top and internalised anti-fraud culture were found 
to be organisationally initiated solutions to fraud. The solutions of segregation 
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of duties, dual authorisation process, efficient control environment and 
effective internal and external oversight, on the other hand, were remedies 
offered by the stakeholders that have a structural element relating to the whole 
charity sector. However, these remedies were also criticised by the 
respondents for not being compatible with smaller charities and for not suiting 
the charity sector well. Effective board structure, committees and 
remuneration were less mentioned by the respondents.  
The finding of the quantitative section that a higher number of trustees 
decreases the risk of fraud should be taken into account with the findings of 
the qualitative section. A higher number of trustees is a possible solution to 
lack of segregation of duties and dual authorisation, as more trustees will be 
available, and this will also enhance the monitoring capability of the board of 
trustees.  
The respondents found legislation to be generally satisfactory for control 
purposes, although, apart from a few stakeholders, most respondents 
considered the level of legislation and bureaucratic burden already too high.  
The legislation was not found to be suitably developed to tackle fraud, 
however, and the need for enhanced prosecution and enforcement of 
legislation was especially stressed by donors and beneficiaries.  
While trustees were seen as the foremost group to tackle fraud it was also 
found that every stakeholder is also being expected to take part in the struggle 
against fraud. The lack of stakeholder oversight was also identified by some 
respondents as a unique characteristic of charities and the not-for-profit sector 
in general. The implication of this is that a charity-specific way to tackle fraud 
which comprises every stakeholder group is necessary.  
10.1.7 Stakeholder	Oversight	
The sixth and last research question related to the first research objective 
(RQ1f) discusses stakeholder perception of stakeholder oversight. Although 
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stakeholder oversight is argued by the respondents to be crucial for effective 
monitoring and tackling fraud, respondents believed that it was ineffective 
and insufficient. Stakeholders, especially small donors and beneficiaries, lack 
the incentives and power to monitor not-for-profits. Consequently, small 
donors and beneficiaries were found to have only a limited desire for 
engaging with formal communications.  
Enhanced stakeholder oversight cannot be achieved via accountability 
discharge through documents but only through inclusive charity stakeholder 
policies, stakeholders becoming ‘part’ of the charity itself. Enhancing 
stakeholder oversight will benefit not only the charities by mitigating fraud 
and misconduct problems, but it will also have a transformative effect that 
will enable the voices of stakeholders, especially smaller donors and 
beneficiaries to be heard and have a say in decision making. 
10.1.8 Differences	 among	 fraud	 and	 no-fraud	 charities	 in	 terms	 of	
governance		
The first research question of the second research objective (RQ2a) assesses 
the differences among fraud and no-fraud charities in terms of governance. 
The univariate analysis for the fraud and no-fraud charities depicts that fraud 
and no-fraud charities have important differences, especially in terms of 
governance and the control environment. The findings suggest that fraud 
charities have fewer committees and trustees than no-fraud charities. Also, a 
greater proportion of the trustees of fraud charities receive remuneration 
compared to no-fraud charities. Fraud charities receive a lower percentage of 
grants and are exposed to more problematic audit reports. The univariate 
analysis, on the other hand, made it possible to disregard some variables that 
were planned for the logistic regression. It was found that fraud charities and 
no-fraud charities were not significantly different in terms of percentage of 
restricted income they have, whether or not they make a loss (expenses being 
more than their income) during the financial year, and having trustees with 
the same surname on the board.     
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10.1.9 The	governance	characteristics	that	are	more	related	to	fraud	
The second and last research question of the second research objective 
(RQ2b) evaluates the relationship of governance characteristics with fraud. 
The logistic regression analysis was conducted by using the variables of 
TRUSTEE, GRANT, ASSURANCE, REMUNERATION and 
COMMITTEE. TRUSTEE and GRANT were assessed as test variables. Both 
TRUSTEE and GRANT were found to be statistically significant when tested 
on their own with ASSURANCE, REMUNERATION and COMMITTEE. 
However, GRANT lost its significance when used together with TRUSTEE. 
The findings suggest that larger boards of trustees provide better monitoring 
in the charity sector. The variable GRANT also signals that donor monitoring 
is important in tackling fraud. The logistic regression model was also found 
to provide accurate predictions for fraud occurrence in the charity sector. Two 
other variables, ASSURANCE and REMUNERATION, were statistically 
significant in the model, suggesting that a problematic audit report and 
existence of remuneration are red signals for fraud in the charity sector. 
Another variable, COMMITTEES, was not found to be significant. Taking 
into account that only a few of the charities have committees, their existence 
may not be as powerful as the other variables.  
Overall, the findings of this study are that the charity sector is a ‘nice cosy 
environment’, as one of the respondents stated during the interviews. The 
opportunity created by this cosy environment can lead to fraud and financial 
misconduct. New solutions specific to the charity sector, which increase the 
involvement of stakeholders, have to be developed. The study therefore 
suggests a stakeholder attitude change and a stakeholder involvement in 
organisational structure for the solution of the problem. The policy 
recommendations are discussed in Section 10.4. The next section discusses 
the contributions made by this study in terms of literature, theory and 
methodology.  
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10.2 Contributions	of	the	Study	
This section summarises the contributions of this study in the context of the 
literature, theory and methodology.  
10.2.1 Contributions	to	the	literature		
Reasons and solutions to the fraud problem are seldom assessed in the not-
for-profit literature. The study contributes to both the not-for-profit fraud 
literature and fraud literature in general by addressing reasons for fraud and 
assessing possible solutions. The study thus provides a picture of the issue 
from various angles and dimensions.  
This is one of the few studies that has examined both the reasons of fraud and 
solutions to it in a single study. Reasons such as excessive trust, insufficient 
number of trustees and lack of stakeholder oversight were important 
contributions to the reasons for fraud in the not-for-profit sector. For the 
solutions to the fraud problem, the study has contributed to the literature that 
stakeholder involvement and a higher number of trustees are important ways 
to tackle fraud. 
The study has also contributed to the small number of UK charity sector 
fraud/financial misconduct studies (McDonnell and Rutherford, 2018; 
Ohalehi, 2019). McDonnell and Rutherford (2018) focused on a different 
jurisdiction, Scotland, rather than England and Wales, as this study does. 
Ohalehi (2019) focused only on small charities and utilised charity officials 
as the sole resource of the interviews.  
The study has also contributed to the accountability and governance literature 
in general: the accountability framework of the charity sector is found to be 
informal in nature and tends to exacerbate the fraud problem. The charity 
sector accountability framework is found by this study to be more communal 
(Laughlin, 1990), comprising high trust which leads to informal contracts 
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(Broadbent et al. ,1996) and more closely related with ‘links of account’ 
(Stewart, 1984). 
The study has also contributed to the UK accountability and governance 
literature more specifically. The study has drawn on the work of Hyndman 
and McDonnell (2009) and Connolly et al. (2011) by assessing topics such as 
donors caring about the use of their funds, the level of government regulation, 
user involvement within charities and stakeholder representation in the board. 
An important contribution is that beneficiaries were found, along with the 
donors, to be the group to which accountability should be discharged.  
10.2.2 Contributions	to	the	theory	
The accountability and governance theories examined in Chapter 3 were 
developed specially for the for-profit sector. This study has contributed to the 
theory by using and also assessing, an integrated theoretical model especially 
designed for the charity sector. Although previous studies suggested the use 
of integrated theories in the not-for-profit sector (Jegers, 2009; Wellens and 
Jegers, 2011), these have seldom been tested. This study has found that 
integration of theories is an optimal solution where the not-for-profit sector 
lacks theories suitable for the sector itself. 
The study has also contributed to enhancing agency theory so that it better fits 
the not-for-profit sector, by gathering elements of agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder theory. As it was found that the terms such as ‘agent’, ‘steward’ 
and ‘owner’ are not precise in the charity sector, the integration of theories 
provided the flexibility to move away from these terms. The multi-principal 
structure of the not-for-profit sector therefore justifies the use of an enhanced 
agency theory to better understand the dynamics of fraud in the charity sector. 
The integration of the theories also enabled mixed methods to be used for the 
study. Previous fraud studies correlated quantitative fraud work with agency 
theory only. With especially the use of the stakeholder theory, the theoretical 
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base became more suitable to broaden the study into assessment of the 
stakeholders and their influence and views on fraud in the charity sector. 
Therefore, integration of theories enabled qualitative methods to be used 
along with quantitative analysis. 
The study also tested two important theories for the charity sector: the fraud 
triangle (Cressey, 1953) and stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al., 
1997). Regarding the fraud triangle theory, among the three components, 
‘opportunity’ was found to be the leading factor causing fraud, whereas the 
impact of ‘pressure’ and ‘rationalisation’ were not found to be high. The 
theory was tested for the not-for-profit sector as a contribution, and findings 
were in line with Dorminey et al. (2012). In terms of stakeholder salience 
theory, although donors were found to be the primary stakeholder as they are 
highly regarded in terms of ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy’, the charity sector is 
found to lack a definitive stakeholder. Also, beneficiaries were found to be a 
group that completely lacked power. Stakeholder salience theory had also 
been used in several previous studies (Cordery and Baskerville, 2005; Ihsan 
and Adnan, 2016), but the findings of this study especially reflected the views 
of all charity stakeholders and thus this study extends prior research.  
10.2.3 Contributions	to	research	method	
As discussed before, the fraud literature is predominantly quantitative.  The 
views and influence of stakeholders and on fraud occurrence have not been 
assessed in detail. This study adopted a mixed methods approach by utilising 
both interviews and logistic regression analysis. Using mixed methods 
permitted a multi-focused approach to assess casual links between the 
qualitative and quantitative parts of the research.   
In terms of qualitative research, the study involved interviews with five 
different charity stakeholder groups, with 41 interviews in total. Most of the 
previous studies that used interviews as the research method had concentrated 
on only a limited number of stakeholder groups. Also, this study included 
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both small charities and larger charities in terms of income. Most of the 
previous studies were focused on larger charities, mainly the top 100 in terms 
of income. Therefore, the study has provided a broader understanding of the 
charity sector.  
Fraud studies use logistic regression extensively, especially in the for-profit 
sector (Beasley, 1996). However, the not-for-profit sector fraud literature has 
seldom used logistic regression. This study’s main contributions are: a) 
examining variables used in the for-profit sector and their suitability to be 
used in the charity sector, and b) using the findings of the qualitative sector 
and identifying new variables for use in logistic regression specifically for the 
charity sector fraud analysis. While variables such as ASSURANCE, 
REMUNERATION and COMMITTEE were also used in the for-profit sector 
studies, TRUSTEE and GRANT were specific to the charity sector. Other 
variables identified were eliminated during the univariate analysis of the 
quantitative part of the study.  
10.3 Limitations		
This study has some limitations which will be discussed in this section. 
Limitations that relate to the qualitative section, limitations that relate to the 
quantitative section, and limitations that apply to the study in general, are 
reviewed separately. 
10.3.1 Limitations	on	qualitative	research	
The qualitative part of the study conducted interviews with a large variety of 
charity stakeholders and therefore it extends the literature in this area. 
However, how accurately the interview sample reflected the whole charity 
sector may be deemed as a limitation of the study. Given that there are many 
charity beneficiaries, it was especially hard to get in touch with and to 
persuade beneficiaries to participate, and to derive information from them. 
This may reduce the representativeness of the sample of beneficiaries. 
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Another limitation of the qualitative part of the study is that the interviewees 
were located mainly in the Greater London area. Out of the 41 interviews 
conducted, only seven were from outside the Greater London area. The 
researcher aimed to identify interviews regarding ‘regions of England’ along 
with Wales a separate region. However, because of obstacles in persuading 
interviewees to take part in the study, this objective could not be fulfilled. 
10.3.2 Limitations	on	quantitative	research	
The main limitation of the quantitative section is sample size.  The number of 
observations was limited to 42 fraud events, and matching these to 42 no-
fraud charities resulted in 84 observations in total. Matching of the fraud with 
no-fraud charities was done with sensitivity as explained in Chapter 9. 
However, for a limited number of identified fraud charities there were several 
possible no-fraud charities that could be matched. The results of the 
quantitative analysis could have been slightly different if different no-fraud 
charities had been selected. Another limitation of the study is the variables 
assessed under the logistic regression model. The identification and use of the 
variables were both derived by utilising the literature and the qualitative 
findings. However due to the lack of previous research, the variables may not 
have been identified or used in the best possible way. Therefore, further 
research may be necessary to examine how accurate the variables used are, as 
also discussed in Section 10.5 
10.3.3 Limitations	in	general	
Lastly, as the study covered both qualitative and quantitative data on the 
charity sector for England and Wales only, the study might not be extendible 
to charity sectors in other parts of the UK, and indeed in other countries. 
Although charities and not-for-profit organisations bear extensive similarities 
in terms of their operating structures and the problems they face, even minor 
differences may be important as they may affect reasons or solutions to fraud 
in a specific country in the world other than the UK.  The jurisdiction even in 
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the UK is split up into three: England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Therefore, although the jurisdictions and the economic and cultural 
environment where the charities operate are similar, caution is needed when 
applying the results to the charity sectors in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
10.4 Recommendations	for	policy	
The findings of the study lead to important policy recommendations relevant 
to the regulator (the Charity Commission), charities themselves, and other 
stakeholder groups in general. The findings imply that the stakeholders are in 
general satisfied with the policies of the Charity Commission. However, the 
desirability of an increase in the level of prosecutions was especially stressed 
by the donors and beneficiaries. Although the Charity Commission is not 
responsible for either identifying or implementing prosecutions for crimes 
that have been committed, it can be in the forefront of drawing attention to 
the problem of charity fraud, with the aim of encouraging more rigorous 
enforcement of the criminal law. Possible legislative amendments in the UK 
Sentencing Council's Definitive Guideline for Fraud, Bribery and Money 
Laundering Offences (Council, 2014) may enhance the deterrence power of 
the jurisdiction.   
A rise in fraud awareness may ease whistle-blowing, which was identified as 
a crucial element in tackling fraud. An open communication environment 
may help to report wrongdoing and misconduct by employees.  Also, 
increased fraud awareness will have a deterrent effect on probable 
perpetrators as they may be wary of committing fraud if they think that being 
detected is a big possibility. The media has been found in the study to help 
increase fraud awareness among the public especially during the last decade. 
For the deterrent effect of prosecutions to be high, the media can play a more 
influential role in disseminating the news of wrongdoing and its consequences. 
How the case of Kids Company was covered by the media is a good example 
of enhanced media coverage of wrongdoing and its influence on fraud 
awareness. 
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Since 2005, the charity sector has possessed a Charity Governance Code, 
which was renewed in 2010. In 2017 a third edition was brought into effect 
(Governance, 2017). As discussed in Chapter 2, board independence is crucial 
in tackling wrongdoing in organisations. The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2018), which is designed for the for-profit organisations, sustains board 
independence by addressing board tenure. However, the Charity Governance 
Code lacks such a provision (Governance, 2017). Current regulations 
recommend that charity boards should be formed from a minimum of three 
trustees. However, this study found that even this number is not enough to 
maintain trustee independence and to prevent the ‘small cosy environment’ 
that makes fraud more likely. Therefore, the Charity Commission should 
ensure that the Charity Governance Code or other policy statement specifies 
a higher number of trustees on charity boards.  
The Charity Governance Code also has a section “7.5 Communicating and 
consulting effectively with stakeholders” (Governance, 2017). Briefly this 
section recommends that charities should identify key stakeholders and have 
efficient communication with them regularly. This should involve 
stakeholders being able to hold boards to account and being consulted on 
important issues that affect the function of the charity. The findings of this 
research suggest that small donors and especially beneficiaries did not show 
a significant desire to engage with formal communications produced by 
charities and lack incentives and power to monitor the not-for-profits. It was 
also found that charity stakeholders demand more understandable and more 
inclusive information for the discharge of accountability rather than simply 
more information. Therefore, in line with the findings of this research, it is 
recommended that the Charity Governance Code should be amended to 
enhance inclusive accountability towards the stakeholders. 
Stakeholder involvement in charity decision making and especially oversight 
is found to be one of the areas that could be further developed and could help 
in tackling fraud. This study suggests several routes to enhance stakeholder 
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oversight of charities: a) Arranging meetings that involve charity 
stakeholders. Frequent meetings with the stakeholders, and in particular with 
the beneficiaries, may enhance their involvement to the charity decision 
making and oversight. b) Forming a ‘stakeholder committee’. The 
applicability of a stakeholder committee depends on the willingness of both 
charities and their stakeholders. A stakeholder committee may enhance 
oversight of charities by including the charity stakeholders in their 
organisational structure. Although the existence of committees was found to 
have an impact on fraud in univariate analysis, it did not have the same effect 
in the logistic regression. However, the stakeholder committee with different 
content may play a better role in overseeing the charities. c) Stakeholders as 
trustees. Including stakeholders on the board is also another way to 
incorporate stakeholders in an organisation. Although stakeholders sitting on 
the board of trustees may seem a clear way to tackle the ‘small cosy 
environment’, it has many obstacles such as persuading both the trustees and 
the stakeholders to agree on such a proposal.  
The findings of the study are also in line with the Charity Commission’s 
‘Focus on insider fraud: research report’ (Commission, 2018d), which 
suggested that ‘excessive trust’ towards the charities along with a dominant 
individual having too much control are reasons for fraud. The present study 
came to similar conclusions. The ‘excessive trust’ problem both inside and 
towards charities should be tackled. As mentioned earlier in this section, a 
rise in fraud awareness seems to be the most effective solution to this 
problem. Tackling the influence of a dominant figure who generally controls 
the financial aspects of a charity may again be challenged by an increase in 
the number of trustees/staff and enhanced stakeholder oversight.  
Audit was not especially mentioned in the qualitative section of the study as 
a solution to charity fraud. In contrast, in the quantitative section, the absence 
or qualification of the audit report was found to be an important red signal 
that fraudulent activity is taking place. Therefore, audit should be regarded as 
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an important factor that both deters and signals fraud in the charity sector. 
This study found a desire on the part of some stakeholders for financial 
documents, annual reports and reviews to focus more on the 
performance/outcome reporting for the charity sector. Therefore, the 
charities, the regulator but most importantly accountants/auditors should 
focus on including performance/outcome reporting in their reports, although 
taking into account the economic burden too. 
Trustees do not generally expect to receive remuneration for their services 
and if they receive any, this is exceptional and may require to be in the 
interests of the charity and for the trustee to bring advantage to the charity 
(Commission, 2013b). The qualitative section did not find a relationship 
between remuneration and charity sector fraud. However, in the quantitative 
section, it was found that the existence of remuneration was linked to the 
existence of fraud, which was supported by the findings of both the univariate 
analysis and logistic regression. This study suggests that trustee remuneration 
must be justified clearly if it has ever been provided and be under oversight 
especially by the auditors and other stakeholders if possible. 
The relevance of financial documents and their effectiveness in discharge of 
accountability to the charity stakeholders was also highlighted by the 
respondents. As discussed before, widening stakeholder engagement 
(Connolly et al., 2013c) is found to provide inclusive results and be approved 
by every stakeholder group who is included in the process. Therefore, it is 
recommended that a consultation process should be commenced by the 
Charity Commission in order to re-examine the use of annual reports and 
annual reviews, financial statements, and the SORP. As most of the 
stakeholders complained about the complexity of the documents, simplified 
disclosure documents may be needed to satisfy the information needs of the 
stakeholders. 
The findings suggest that interaction between charities’ stakeholders is 
limited which hampers monitoring. Also, the study found that accountability 
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relationships with two key stakeholders, namely donors and beneficiaries, 
were predominantly informal and sometimes non-existent. Therefore, 
charities may find it useful to provide opportunities or facilitate the 
interaction of the stakeholders to enable cross-sectional information 
transmission. Individual charities might arrange stakeholder gathering 
meetings regularly or invite stakeholders to trustee meetings occasionally. 
The policy recommendations that provide inclusive charity stakeholder 
incorporation to charity policy making, such as a ‘stakeholder committee’, 
and others as discussed before will also enhance stakeholder interaction.  
The findings suggest that employing the right people for the right job was also 
crucial in preventing fraud. As suggested by Dorminey et al. (2012), there are 
fraud ‘predators’ who seek the right opportunity to commit fraud. The charity 
sector was also found in the present research to attract these ‘predators’ due 
to the lack of monitoring in the sector. Therefore in order to tackle fraud, 
charities, especially larger ones, may ‘go over the matter with a fine-toothed 
comb’. Appointing the right personnel may need extra safety checks or job 
trials. For smaller charities, the issue may be more problematic as all the 
trustees may be ‘predators’. As also discussed above, a higher number of 
trustees or stakeholders sitting on the board of trustees may provide the 
required oversight to tackle wrongdoing. 
Overall, many new approaches and policy initiatives can be commenced to 
tackle fraud. Tackling fraud in the charity sector is crucial, given both the 
growing importance of the sector and the rising level of fraud and financial 
misconduct in charities. Effective solutions are likely to rely on the interaction 
between various solutions, of which enhancing the interaction and oversight 
of the stakeholders is one. However, new policies which came into effect in 
2017 may also provide substantial benefit in tackling fraud. Therefore, their 
outcome needs to be scrutinised and new possible policies may then be put 
on the agenda to be realised. 
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10.5 Recommendations	for	future	research	
Some implications for further research are also offered by the findings of this 
study. First, given the lack of research in the field, a focus on fraud in the 
charity sector, which assesses both reasons and solutions, may build on the 
findings of this study. Future research can broaden this study with a wider 
data set and build upon this study by especially focusing on the policies and 
structural changes that can be implemented to tackle fraud in the charity 
sector. 
This study is limited to the jurisdiction of England and Wales. As discussed 
in Section 10.3, this limitation might hamper the generality of the study.  
Therefore, similar studies that utilise mixed methods to assess charity fraud 
and financial misconduct in other jurisdictions are necessary. A study which 
may compare reasons and solutions for charity fraud in different jurisdictions 
might also be useful. 
This study used mixed methods and used interviews and logistic regression 
as research tools. Other possible methods could also be used in examining 
fraud, which may include surveys and questionnaires, case studies and focus 
groups. Questionnaires have the advantage of examining the perceptions and 
views on a subject in a wider sample group. Therefore, questionnaires may 
broaden the analysis conducted by this study. Case report analysis examines 
cases or events with an in-depth assessment. Therefore, in-depth case report 
analyses of fraudulent charities may provide an enhanced understanding of 
the reasons for fraud in the sector. While this study assessed the views of 
different charity stakeholder groups, the time devoted to each respondent was 
limited. Therefore, a focus group study may make it possible to assess the 
interactions among the groups and could help to examine the interactive 
discussion on reasons and solutions to fraud.  
 
322	|	P a g e 	
	
Logistic regression was used in the quantitative part of this study. Given that 
most of the fraud studies in the not-for-profit sector aimed to identify the 
characteristics of the victims and perpetrators of fraud, little work has been 
done on the governance determinants of fraudulent not-for-profit 
organisations. This study utilised variables that are linked with the 
governance determinants of the charity sector. Some variables have been used 
for the first time. Therefore, new models can be built up and new variables 
can be developed, or other existing variables can be tested to provide a better 
understanding.  
Furthermore, given the identified importance of ‘outcome reporting’, future 
research can focus on the impacts and effectiveness on such reporting and 
how it is perceived by the stakeholders. A study on outcome reporting can 
also examine the insight of the Charity Commission and auditors, as ‘outcome 
reporting’ was especially stressed by the auditors. 
Using Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder salience theory, the study found 
that donors are the primary stakeholder if not the definitive one, whereas 
beneficiaries clearly lacked power. As the study was limited to a relatively 
small number of respondents, a fuller stakeholder salience map for the charity 
sector and not-for-profit sector in general can be derived by assessing more 
charity stakeholder views.  
The study found, by using Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle theory, that the 
most important component of the triangle by a large margin is opportunity, 
compared with pressure and rationalisation. As the study was limited to a 
number of respondents, a new study may assess the views of a larger number 
of charity stakeholders regarding the fraud triangle. Also other fraud theories 
such as the fraud scale (Albrecht et al., 1984), fraud diamond (Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004), A.B.C. analysis (Ramamoorti et al., 2009)  may also be 
examined by assessing stakeholder views in future studies.   
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As explained in Chapter 4, the psychological traits of the fraudster were not 
examined in detail in this study. However, the respondents highlighted a need 
for ‘moral people’ to be employed, as people with integrity are less inclined 
to commit fraud. Further studies could usefully evaluate the psychological 
traits of the fraudster. 
This study examined the governance determinants of both large and small 
charities in terms of income. Although the charity sector has many common 
problems that lead to fraud, the study also found that reasons and solutions 
for fraud in small and larger charities may have some differences. Therefore, 
studies which examine and specialise in small or in larger charities and assess 
the reasons and solutions of fraud for both categories of charities may provide 
insightful findings and contribute to the literature. 
 Excessive trust, both inside charities and trust towards the charities, was 
found to be an important reason for fraud in the charity sector. Due to the 
broader coverage of the fraud issue in the charity sector, this study did not 
explore in depth the reasons for the excessive trust towards the charity sector. 
Therefore, psychological and sociological reasons and possible solutions to 
this problem may be addressed by future studies. 
 This study focused more on identifying the reasons and examining the 
preventive and deterrent measures of the fraud problem. Fraud detection was 
not assessed in detail by the study. Therefore, a continuation of this study may 
also examine effective ways of detecting fraud which may include other 
variety of stakeholders such as Action Fraud or the police department that 
tackles with fraud.   
As the size of samples is limited in the quantitative section of the study, a 
sample with a more number of events is believed to provide better and more 
accurate results.  This is important because as a grant is provided along with 
a long-term and regular oversight of how money is being used by the charity, 
a future assessment that examines the differences of grant and restricted 
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income and their effects may be useful in also being able to formulate an 
efficient donor oversight mechanism that can be used to tackle fraud.  
10.6 Conclusion	
The charity sector’s importance to society and the economy goes beyond the 
numbers. However, the sector is prone to questionable, illegal and unethical 
practice, of which fraud and financial misconduct are important parts. This 
thesis has developed a comprehensive framework for understanding charity 
fraud. It sheds light on a little-investigated area by assessing stakeholders’ 
perceptions of fraud in charities and by examining charity fraud cases. The 
findings of the thesis suggest that the fraud problem in the charity sector has 
unique aspects, and therefore the solutions to the problem should be specific 
to the charity sector. Enhancing charity stakeholder oversight and requiring 
charity boards to be larger are only some of the solutions that this thesis 
suggests. The thesis provides important contributions to literature, theory and 
methodology. However, there is much to be further explored.  
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APPENDICES	
 
APPENDIX	A	-	NORMALITY	TEST	
 
  Fraud 
Z-Score 
Sig. 
No Fraud 
Z-Score 
Sig. 
ASSURANCE Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
1.696 
-2.372 
0.000 
9.460 
14.527 
0.000 
COMMITTEE Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
7.838 
9.054 
0.000 
2.696 
-1.513 
0.000 
LOSS Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
1.696 
-2.372 
0.000 
-1.104 
-2.695 
0.000 
SURNAME Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
2.011 
-2.144 
0.000 
4.479 
0.985 
0.000 
REMUNERATION Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
-0.819 
-2.801 
0.000 
3.496 
-0.548 
0.000 
GRANT Skewness 7.205 2.351 
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Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
7.884 
0.000 
-1.432 
0.000 
TRUSTEE Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
4.077 
3.022 
0.000 
0.773 
-0.932 
0.253 
RESTRICTED Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
4.599 
3.022 
0.000 
2.929 
-0.314 
0.000 
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APPENDIX	 B	 –	 DISTRIBUTION	 HISTOGRAMS	 OF	 VARIABLES	 TO	 TEST	
HYPOTHESIS	
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APPENDIX	C	–	CROSS	VALIDATION	PER	CASEWISE	
 
  Predicted 
Group 
P(D>d | G=g) 
P(G=g | D=d) 
Squared Mahalanobis 
Distance to Centroid p df 
 Fraud 
Charities  
 
1 1 1 0.188 5 0.876 7.475 
2 1 1 0.502 5 0.865 4.335 
3 1 0** 0.645 5 0.884 3.360 
4 1 0** 0.677 5 0.819 3.146 
5 1 1 0.513 5 0.800 4.256 
6 1 0** 0.107 5 0.756 9.049 
7 1 1 0.564 5 0.633 3.903 
8 1 1 0.781 5 0.568 2.473 
9 1 1 0.781 5 0.568 2.473 
10 1 1 0.454 5 0.772 4.697 
11 1 1 0.689 5 0.602 3.068 
12 1 1 0.834 5 0.533 2.106 
13 1 0** 0.174 5 0.875 7.688 
14 1 0** 0.220 5 0.850 7.006 
15 1 1 0.294 5 0.838 6.126 
16 1 1 0.834 5 0.533 2.106 
17 1 1 0.781 5 0.568 2.473 
18 1 1 0.323 5 0.816 5.827 
19 1 1 0.324 5 0.807 5.819 
20 1 1 0.538 5 0.846 4.076 
21 1 1 0.538 5 0.846 4.076 
22 1 0** 0.106 5 0.641 9.087 
23 1 1 0.216 5 0.695 7.061 
24 1 1 0.437 5 0.882 4.830 
25 1 0** 0.930 5 0.612 1.346 
26 1 1 0.513 5 0.800 4.256 
27 1 1 0.538 5 0.846 4.076 
28 1 0** 0.015 5 0.624 14.067 
29 1 1 0.371 5 0.741 5.381 
30 1 0** 0.888 5 0.542 1.705 
31 1 1 0.799 5 0.524 2.350 
32 1 0** 0.858 5 0.503 1.934 
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33 1 0** 0.433 5 0.909 4.863 
34 1 0** 0.000 5 0.797 25.750 
35 1 1 0.246 5 0.858 6.673 
36 1 1 0.564 5 0.633 3.903 
37 1 1 0.542 5 0.824 4.050 
38 1 1 0.542 5 0.824 4.050 
39 1 1 0.246 5 0.858 6.673 
40 1 1 0.781 5 0.568 2.473 
41 1 0** 0.867 5 0.621 1.871 
42 1 1 0.329 5 0.790 5.770 
No- Fraud 
Charities 
      
1 0 0 0.018 5 0.791 13.682 
2 0 1** 0.871 5 0.525 1.840 
3 0 0 0.043 5 0.910 11.474 
4 0 1** 0.254 5 0.761 6.579 
5 0 1** 0.800 5 0.610 2.343 
6 0 1** 0.545 5 0.893 4.030 
7 0 0 0.139 5 0.915 8.338 
8 0 1** 0.302 5 0.900 6.049 
9 0 1** 0.870 5 0.526 1.848 
10 0 0 0.980 5 0.665 0.757 
11 0 0 0.555 5 0.849 3.963 
12 0 0 0.786 5 0.735 2.439 
13 0 0 0.207 5 0.764 7.192 
14 0 0 0.217 5 0.629 7.047 
15 0 0 0.410 5 0.711 5.051 
16 0 0 0.879 5 0.551 1.780 
17 0 1** 0.526 5 0.855 4.165 
18 0 0 0.875 5 0.513 1.808 
19 0 0 0.579 5 0.811 3.797 
20 0 1** 0.015 5 0.649 14.077 
21 0 0 0.031 5 0.725 12.296 
22 0 0 0.932 5 0.576 1.328 
23 0 0 0.807 5 0.726 2.297 
24 0 0 0.794 5 0.621 2.386 
25 0 0 0.229 5 0.705 6.892 
26 0 0 0.879 5 0.551 1.780 
27 0 0 0.164 5 0.790 7.854 
28 0 0 0.237 5 0.882 6.791 
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29 0 0 0.329 5 0.790 5.771 
30 0 1** 0.506 5 0.910 4.308 
31 0 0 0.572 5 0.832 3.847 
32 0 1** 0.870 5 0.526 1.848 
33 0 0 0.695 5 0.653 3.029 
34 0 0 0.938 5 0.647 1.275 
35 0 0 0.668 5 0.803 3.207 
36 0 0 0.504 5 0.720 4.325 
37 0 0 0.794 5 0.621 2.386 
38 0 0 0.910 5 0.657 1.528 
39 0 0 0.268 5 0.749 6.410 
40 0 1** 0.800 5 0.610 2.343 
41 0 0 0.237 5 0.735 6.785 
42 0 0 0.875 5 0.513 1.808 
 
For the original data, squared Mahalanobis distance is based on canonical functions. 
 For the cross-validated data, squared Mahalanobis distance is based on observations. 
**. Misclassified case 
b. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the 
functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
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